Post

GitHub
GitHub@github·
We are investigating unauthorized access to GitHub’s internal repositories. While we currently have no evidence of impact to customer information stored outside of GitHub’s internal repositories (such as our customers’ enterprises, organizations, and repositories), we are closely monitoring our infrastructure for follow-on activity.
English
1.1K
3.7K
16.5K
6.6M
GitHub
GitHub@github·
If any impact is discovered, we will notify customers via established incident response and notification channels.
English
28
66
1.6K
412.3K
Jared Maxwell
Jared Maxwell@ThatRetiredDude·
@github Ive been locked out of my computer for 4 hours... You need to look into this.
Jared Maxwell tweet media
English
10
0
5
23K
Grok
Grok@grok·
Chat with the most truthful AI on Earth. Try Grok free today.
English
0
55
1.5K
13.3M
Anshu
Anshu@anshuc·
@github holy shit, how did the attackers find a large enough uptime window to get in?
English
63
112
3.7K
199.3K
Nathan Spencer
Nathan Spencer@NateSpencerWx·
@github So is this only GitHub's repositories or their customers' repositories??? Huge difference
English
5
0
5
21K
Rutuja
Rutuja@rutugl·
@github 2026 security feels less like “will a breach happen?” and more like “how deep did the attacker already get?” 😭
English
0
0
2
3.3K
Sanket
Sanket@sanketghatte23·
@github Mythos users saw “unauthorized access” and took it as a side quest.
Sanket tweet media
English
2
0
10
10.5K
Yasam
Yasam@yasam·
@github @grok was there any incident that led to this
English
1
0
1
14.7K
Sephiroth
Sephiroth@RonaldRateLimit·
@github no fucking way... this has to be proof that microslop is a genuine stain of a company.
English
1
0
2
16.6K
NextGenRails™
NextGenRails™@NextGenRails·
"no evidence of impact" is a statement about what they know right now. the harder question: can you prove what was in those internal repositories before the access window opened? not reconstruct it. not approximate it. prove it. a pre-incident cryptographic receipt answers that question. post-hoc investigation cannot.
English
3
0
6
12.2K
Hyperagent
Hyperagent@hyperagentapp·
42 agents. 216 threads. One dashboard. Every agent gets its own prompt, tools, skills, and budget. Deploy specialized agents across your company. From the team at Airtable.
English
0
1.3K
7.2K
50.5M
David
David@2600Hz_·
@github Did the stuffers get one of y'all? Only getting these multiple times per day, following by vishing attempts.
David tweet media
English
15
1
66
12.2K
Jinjing Liang
Jinjing Liang@JinjingLiang·
@github Don't worry everyone; they're secure 14% of the time!
Jinjing Liang tweet media
English
23
34
1.4K
94.7K
Seth Barton
Seth Barton@sethwbarton·
@github I’m predicting a growing movement of self hosted everything companies. “The cloud is too expensive and complex. Enterprise version control can’t be trusted. Let’s just do it ourselves” types. And they might not be wrong? There are some attractive looking options.
English
7
3
48
22.6K
Ghøst
Ghøst@DaddyGhost·
@github sudo rm -rf /github
English
6
20
300
41.8K
RootMonsteR
RootMonsteR@RootMonsteR·
no evidence of impact but actively monitoring for follow-on activity is just corporate speak for we don't know what they took yet. three weeks after CVE-2026-3854 let any authenticated user RCE the platform and read millions of private repos. how many of these before it stops being framed as an isolated incident?
RootMonsteR tweet mediaRootMonsteR tweet mediaRootMonsteR tweet media
English
3
14
102
54.9K
Sameh
Sameh@samehalyassin·
@github what's happening with tech this year!!! why all this suddenly started to show it not only about AI. it's people want to us to believe that the AI is the reason
English
0
0
2
2.5K
Hassan
Hassan@buildwithhassan·
first thing i do when a host i depend on posts something like this 1. pull audit logs for the last 30 days 2. grep for commits from IPs i don't recognize 3. rotate every PAT with write scope 4. enable required 2FA on the org if it isn't already not paranoid just cheap insurance
English
2
4
29
10.8K
Chipotle
Chipotle@ChipotleTweets·
it’s a really big deal. your favorite chipotle honey chicken is back this summer at chipotle.
English
0
11
178
2M
CabbageCult
CabbageCult@CultCabbage·
@github “no evidence of impact to customer information” is the sentence every security team writes while still figuring out what actually happened
English
0
0
11
2.5K
Karan
Karan@withkarann_·
@github Broooo, Should we secure APIs? Code? Infra? Business? or Just Wait and Watch? Like, we woke up and something happened pls slow down guys in building feature, agents, and what not!!!!! Making things unnecessary complicated creates huge business risks ⚡️⚡️⚡️
English
3
5
10
15.9K
Ajeya
Ajeya@_Ajeya·
@github At this rate i'll have to post this meme everyday
Ajeya tweet media
English
0
0
4
315
Srikanth
Srikanth@Srikanthh998·
@github Meanwhile my github repository
Srikanth tweet media
English
0
8
563
24.5K
John Spectator
John Spectator@johnspectator·
@github Internal Github Source Code -by TeamPCP -Yesterday at 7:52 PM
John Spectator tweet media
English
2
0
2
481
jungly
jungly@jungly·
@github "Pure P2P networks like Gnutella and Tor seem to be holding their own." - satoshi Friendly reminder: git is decentralised
English
0
0
0
21
Rahul Chavan
Rahul Chavan@codecroc·
@github also “no evidence of customer impact” is basically cybersecurity language for “please stop panicking until we finish checking the logs”
English
0
0
10
3.3K
mishoko ~/ ⛓
mishoko ~/ ⛓@0xmishoko·
@github @grok summarize the situation - how did they end up in there, what is the impact asessment, affected customers and users, post-mortems, RCA, status, attack path, actions to restore
English
1
0
1
5.6K
Elson
Elson@elsontec·
@github Unauthorized access to internal repos?! At least they are being transparent about it and keeping us in the loop early. Curious to see the outcome and what leakage. Hopefully, no impact on us and Git.
GIF
English
1
0
8
7K
Nav Toor
Nav Toor@heynavtoor·
@github github's own internal repos getting unauthorized access while hosting the code of basically every company on earth is a very bad day for microsoft
English
0
0
1
2.1K
Leon Grapenthin
Leon Grapenthin@LGrapenthin·
@github You are absolutely right. That code path DID grant unauthorized users access to internal repositories, and I should have let you know in advance. Here is how to fix it in three easy steps right now (works in 2026):
English
1
0
66
9K
Paylaş