

Brian Stephenson🌻
9K posts

@BAStephenson60
Somewhat retired educator, lawyer, economist, socialpreneur, Prediction is hope or fear. Understand. Support what should happen. Oppose what shouldn’t. He/him






We stopped everything to write an answer (link below) to Paul Krugman's two posts of today (one informal, one with a simple model) arguing that Europe is broadly not falling behind the United States. The change measured by the Draghi report, he argues, is mostly due to growth in the technology industry, which has distorted GDP numbers without actually leading to higher standards of living. We should believe our eyes when we walk around France and walk around Mississippi. Krugman is wrong. The measures he uses understate European stagnation. This matters enormously. Divergence with the United States is the strongest evidence for reform in Europe. 1. The growth numbers Krugman compares the United States, France, and Germany at purchasing power parity in current prices. On that measure, France's and Germany's position relative to America has been roughly constant since 2000. But current price comparisons miss productivity gains in sectors where prices fall. If America produces twice as much software while the price of each unit halves, the value of American software output looks unchanged even though the volume has doubled. Most economists therefore use constant prices, which fix the base-year PPP level and apply each country's real output growth on top of it. American output growth has concentrated in tech, where prices have fallen tremendously as productivity rises. In terms of the volume of things produced, America has pulled away from Europe. 2. Is it all the tech industry? Krugman concedes this tech divergence but says it is not welfare-relevant. The American growth lead is an accounting artefact of measuring more iPhones at base-year prices, not a sign that Americans are actually richer, because Europeans buy the same iPhones at the same world prices. This is not the right way to think about the world today, as an earlier Paul Krugman would have argued. His model assumes tradable goods, interchangeable workers, marginal-cost pricing, and no profits. Each assumption fails. Most of what households buy is non-tradable: housing, healthcare, childcare, education. When American tech firms bid workers from haircutting to coding, American haircut wages rise. Germany has no growing tech sector to do the bidding, so German wages stay flat. Technology is not priced at marginal cost. Apple's margins are around 40 percent. Anthropic's inference margins are at 70 percent. The major platforms enjoy network effects, switching costs, and lock-in that hold prices well above what a competitive market would deliver. A large share of the productivity gains in technology stays as profit. A lot of the value of American technology dominance shows up in equity, not in wages. Apple, Microsoft, Nvidia, Alphabet, Meta, and Amazon together are worth $21 trillion, more than the entire combined stock market value of all European stock markets. Around 60 percent of US equity is held by American households. The median French or Spanish household holds almost no equity. The median employee at Meta, a company with almost 80,000 employees, earned $388,000 in 2025. This advantage is not going to go away. Krugman's own 1991 paper, cited in his Nobel prize, showed that comparative advantage in modern industries is produced by increasing returns to scale, specialized labor markets, supplier networks and the agglomeration of suppliers, workers, and ideas in particular places. Once an industry concentrates somewhere, the concentration is self-reinforcing. Europe is being pushed away from the next round of technology industries (AI!). 3. What about inequality? Another retort is that GDP per capita hides substantial inequality, and so even if America is rich on average, this is mostly due to the super wealthy. But despite the US's high pre-tax income inequality, it also achieves higher median incomes than Europe, in part because of such a high base, and in part because it actually redistributes more than many European countries. The cleanest comparison is median equivalised disposable household income: income after cash taxes and transfers, adjusted for household size and purchasing power. According to the OECD's 2021 numbers, the median American earns 30 percent more than the median Dutchman, about 31 percent more than the median German, and about 52 percent more than the median Frenchman. 4. What about hours worked? Krugman points out that while American GDP per person is higher, most of this is because Americans work more. For this divergence to be an hours worked story, Americans must work more relative to Europeans now than they did in 2000. The opposite has happened. Birinci, Karabarbounis, and See in a 2026 NBER paper show that about half of the American-European hours gap that existed in the 1990s has reversed by the end of the 2010s. Americans work fewer hours per person than they did in 2000, while most Europeans work more. 5. Is America not a bad place to live? Walk around Alabama and France: surely the former cannot be substantially richer than the latter? American cities often have poorer centres and richer suburbs or exurbs. European cities preserve richer and more attractive historic cores. A visit to a city as a tourist in America compared with a city in France will leave one having seen different spots on the income distribution. Americans in Europe go to the nicest and richest European cities. Rather than a walking around test, do a driving around test. Go to the periphery of any modern American city and see a level of new-built material wealth that is extremely uncommon in Europe, with thousands of enormous four- or five-bedroom homes. In the South, in places like Nashville and Austin, drive around the downtowns to see hundreds of luxury apartment buildings springing from the ground. This construction boom is replicated virtually nowhere in Europe today. The other question is generational. Housing often costs more in Europe than in the United States, despite the quality of the housing stock generally being much better. Europe has nice city cores but these are inaccessible to young Europeans. Consider the salaries available to entry-level workers. The starting pay for a London police officer is $57,000. In Washington, DC, $75,000. The entry-level Deloitte consultant job in Madrid pays around €28,000, roughly $33,000 per year. In Charlotte, the entry-level Deloitte job pays $63,000. There are many things to dislike about life in America. But relative to 25 years ago, the gap in material wealth has shifted dramatically in America's favor. siliconcontinent.com/p/european-sta…


Some reflections on the @lgaricano and @paulkrugman discussion. The key question in terms of numbers is -- how do u think about the value of goods whose price declines (a lot). Paul Krugman argues that in ppp at today's prices, the US-EU gap is not a big deal; Luis highlights

Some reflections on the @lgaricano and @paulkrugman discussion. The key question in terms of numbers is -- how do u think about the value of goods whose price declines (a lot). Paul Krugman argues that in ppp at today's prices, the US-EU gap is not a big deal; Luis highlights




My latest for WSJ "Female emancipation reduced the utility of...'low-value men'..in previous decades, monogamous marriage was 'DEI for men,' meaning it used to be easier for men to find partners, regardless of their own level of success or attractiveness" wsj.com/opinion/free-e…








My piece in Saturday’s paper: thestar.com/politics/polit… via @torontostar

The viral framing of UAE’s OPEC exit is that Abu Dhabi will flood the market and crash the price. Read the pipeline math. The framing is wrong. The Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which is UAE’s only crude bypass around the Strait of Hormuz, has nameplate capacity of one point five million barrels per day, expandable to one point eight million in surge. Lloyd’s List and Energy Intelligence both confirm the limit. In March 2026, with quotas suspended in everything but name and Hormuz throughput collapsed by Iranian enforcement, ADCOP utilization ran around seventy-one percent according to CNBC and Argus, leaving roughly four hundred forty thousand barrels per day of headroom. The second Jebel Dhanna to Fujairah pipeline that would add another one point five million remains pre-FID. No construction has started. Energy Intelligence dates the planning to October 2024 with a 2026 to 2027 operational target that has not been confirmed since. The UAE cannot flood the market. UAE can add roughly four hundred to seven hundred thousand barrels per day in 2026 against ADNOC’s five-million-barrel sustainable capacity target. The constraint is steel in the ground, not OPEC discipline. That constraint is what makes the OPEC exit interesting. If UAE could ramp two million barrels per day tomorrow, the OPEC exit would be a price-war declaration. Saudi Arabia would respond by flooding from its two-to-three-million-barrel spare capacity, Brent would crash through eighty dollars, and ADNOC’s revenue base would collapse along with everyone else’s. UAE knows this. The exit was timed precisely because Fujairah pipeline limits cap the ramp at exactly the level needed to monetize incremental headroom without triggering the response. The exit is calibrated, not aggressive. The exit is also not about oil at all. Mubadala holds approximately three hundred eighty-five billion in assets under management. ADQ holds another two hundred forty billion. ADIA holds approximately one trillion. MGX, which spun out of Mubadala and ADQ, made the largest sovereign-fund commitment to AI infrastructure in history, including the Stargate venture with OpenAI, Oracle, and SoftBank, and the forty-billion-dollar Aligned Data Centers acquisition. The Global AI Infrastructure Partnership with BlackRock and Microsoft passed one hundred billion in committed capital before April. Abu Dhabi is building the sovereign capital base for the AI infrastructure buildout, the way Riyadh built the sovereign capital base for the oil settlement system after the 1974 petrodollar arrangement. Same architecture. New commodity. The OPEC exit is the financing event, not the production event. Removing quota constraints lets ADNOC reprice the marginal barrel at full market value. The incremental revenue funds MGX deployments, Stargate phase one, the rare-earth and semiconductor partnerships, and the data-center expansion. The Fujairah pipeline limit is a feature, not a bug. It caps the production ramp at the level that maximizes revenue without triggering Saudi war. The capped ramp generates the cash flow. The cash flow capitalizes the AI franchise. The thesis falsifies if UAE accelerates the second Fujairah pipeline FID toward a three-million-barrel bypass that only makes sense as a price-war instrument, or if Saudi retaliates with a 2020-style production flood forcing UAE into defensive ramping. Abu Dhabi is not exiting OPEC to ramp oil. Abu Dhabi is exiting OPEC to liquidate the oil franchise into AI. The constraint is the calibration. The pipeline is the financing instrument. The exit is the strategy. The flood is the misread. The pivot is the trade. open.substack.com/pub/shanakaans…






Demographics are the most underrated crisis in the West right now. Our birth rates are plummeting, and literally no country has figured out how to reverse it. If we do not get more people, our economies and our militaries are going to collapse. It is just basic math