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The Erosion of American Military Capacity Why the US shows limited capacity in prolonged wars and in protecting its bases and allies, sending signals that should draw attention from Asian countries. Benjamin Netanyahu did not only err in assessing Iranian capabilities; he also overestimated the American capacity to sustain him in a high-intensity conflict. Despite spending nearly US$ 1 trillion on defense, the United States today possesses an industrial and logistical base that is significantly inferior to what it had decades ago. This fragility is the result of a long process of atrophy of the defense industrial base, which began after the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, the Pentagon had 51 major prime contractors competing for significant contracts. Today, only five giants remain: Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing. This extreme consolidation, nicknamed “The Last Supper,” drastically reduced competition and the capacity for large-scale production, sharply driving up prices. It is the typical model of the Western defense industry that grows through mergers, acquisitions, and market contraction rather than through productive efficiency. The numbers by segment are alarming. In the military aircraft sector, the number of suppliers fell from 8 in 1990 to just 3. In tactical missiles, around 90% of current production depends on only three sources. In the case of ground combat vehicles, there were 3 manufacturers in 1990; by 2020, only one remained: General Dynamics. The specialized workforce has also shrunk: the defense sector has lost nearly 2 million skilled workers since 1985, falling from about 3 million to approximately 1.1 million. Ammunition production reveals the same loss of “mass.” During the Cold War, American factories could produce up to 438,000 artillery shells per month under full wartime conditions. Before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, monthly production was only 14,400. Even after billions of dollars in investments, between 2024 and 2026 the capacity rose to something between 40,000 and 55,000 shells per month, still far from the target of 100,000. The naval decline is equally worrying. In 1991, the US maintained 8 public naval shipyards; today only 4 remain (Portsmouth, Norfolk, Puget Sound, and Pearl Harbor), dedicated almost exclusively to maintenance and repairs, and not to new construction. Private shipyards capable of building large ocean-going ships have decreased by more than 80% since the 1950s. Currently, the construction of large combat ships is concentrated in only seven main shipyards, controlled by a few companies. Read the full article: open.substack.com/pub/global21/p…
Marco Rubio: "Unlike them, we're hitting military targets"
The Erosion of American Military Capacity Why the US shows limited capacity in prolonged wars and in protecting its bases and allies, sending signals that should draw attention from Asian countries. Benjamin Netanyahu did not only err in assessing Iranian capabilities; he also overestimated the American capacity to sustain him in a high-intensity conflict. Despite spending nearly US$ 1 trillion on defense, the United States today possesses an industrial and logistical base that is significantly inferior to what it had decades ago. This fragility is the result of a long process of atrophy of the defense industrial base, which began after the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, the Pentagon had 51 major prime contractors competing for significant contracts. Today, only five giants remain: Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing. This extreme consolidation, nicknamed “The Last Supper,” drastically reduced competition and the capacity for large-scale production, sharply driving up prices. It is the typical model of the Western defense industry that grows through mergers, acquisitions, and market contraction rather than through productive efficiency. The numbers by segment are alarming. In the military aircraft sector, the number of suppliers fell from 8 in 1990 to just 3. In tactical missiles, around 90% of current production depends on only three sources. In the case of ground combat vehicles, there were 3 manufacturers in 1990; by 2020, only one remained: General Dynamics. The specialized workforce has also shrunk: the defense sector has lost nearly 2 million skilled workers since 1985, falling from about 3 million to approximately 1.1 million. Ammunition production reveals the same loss of “mass.” During the Cold War, American factories could produce up to 438,000 artillery shells per month under full wartime conditions. Before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, monthly production was only 14,400. Even after billions of dollars in investments, between 2024 and 2026 the capacity rose to something between 40,000 and 55,000 shells per month, still far from the target of 100,000. The naval decline is equally worrying. In 1991, the US maintained 8 public naval shipyards; today only 4 remain (Portsmouth, Norfolk, Puget Sound, and Pearl Harbor), dedicated almost exclusively to maintenance and repairs, and not to new construction. Private shipyards capable of building large ocean-going ships have decreased by more than 80% since the 1950s. Currently, the construction of large combat ships is concentrated in only seven main shipyards, controlled by a few companies. Read the full article: open.substack.com/pub/global21/p…
