David Vallance

Very pleased to be able to share this @LowyInstitute analysis in which @SamRoggeveen and I examine what China's long-range strike capabilities could do to Australia, now and in the future. 1/ lowyinstitute.org/publications/u…

Read more about Chinese growing long-range capabilities in @SamRoggeveen and my recent @LowyInstitute analysis. lowyinstitute.org/publications/u…

Some reflections for The Guardian on the PLA’s SLBM test yesterday. Don’t think of it as a demonstration of 🇨🇳 power after the 🇦🇺🇫🇯 treaty. Think of it as an illustration of the PLA’s growing long-range capabilities, and its willingness to show them off. theguardian.com/commentisfree/…

New today! Glad to provide revised Foreword for updated “Modern Chinese Maritime Forces”—Most Comprehensive Unclassified Order of Battle for #China’s #Sea Services! wargamevault.com/en/product/443… Curated #OpenSource content: bit.ly/ModernChineseM… Andrew S. Erickson, “Foreword,” in Manfred Meyer (edited by Larry Bond & Chris Carlson), Modern Chinese Maritime Forces, 2nd Edition (Admiralty Trilogy Group, 1 July 2026), 3. FOREWORD Ships are the ultimate embodiment of maritime strategy. Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s military maritime forces have the most ships of any nation. This pathbreaking book documents their force structure in unprecedented detail, making it an invaluable reference for all who seek to understand Beijing’s seaward surge & its manifold impacts & implications. China has gone to sea dramatically in both commercial & military dimensions. It is arguably the 1st continental power in 2 millennia to become a successful hybrid land-sea power & keep that sea change on course. Powered by the world’s 2nd-largest economy & defense budget, & what until very recently was indisputably the world’s largest population & fastest-growing multi-trillion-dollar economy, the PRC has surged seaward with scale, sophistication, & superlatives that no continental power ever before achieved in the modern era. Amid European decline & American fiscal & strategic challenges, this historic transformation has the potential to end 6 centuries of largely Western dominance of the world’s oceans. Paramount leader Xi Jinping is personally guiding China’s transformation into a “great maritime power.” He is China’s 1st great navalist statesman, the world’s foremost navalist statesman today, & the greatest navalist head of state since World War II. Over the past 8 decades, no other national leader has placed such a concerted emphasis on naval development over so many years (13 & counting) & mobilized so many resources to achieve such dramatic growth in fleet numbers, associated systems, & related capabilities. Rather than operating on exterior lines like such geographically advantaged sea powers as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, & Australia, China must radiate sea power from interior lines in a way that prioritizes increasing control over its disputed sovereignty claims in the “Near Seas” (the Yellow, East, & South China Seas) while seeking growing influence across the Indo-Pacific region & nascent global presence. To pursue these radiating ripples of maritime interests & activities, Beijing draws on 3 sea forces, each the maritime component of one of its 3 armed forces: the (1) People’s Liberation Army #Navy (PLAN), (2) China Coast Guard (CCG), and (3) People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Each PRC sea force has the world’s most ships in its category. China has the world’s most numerous conventional submarine force & is now focusing on 3rd-generation nuclear submarine production. This volume tracks all 3 PRC sea forces in unrivaled detail. China’s military has the world’s largest fleets of space support ships & oceanographic research vessels at its call. China boasts the world’s largest port system. It consistently logs 6 of the world’s 10 busiest container ports by container throughput. PRC ports account for >40% of global container traffic. Other military-relevant PRC assets include global port infrastructure networks, logistics support, & emerging overseas facilities. On the civilian side, PRC sea power is supplemented by the world’s largest marine sector overall; including the world’s largest commercial fleet in terms of gross tonnage in shipping capacity, merchant marine, fishing fleet, number of fishers, & aquaculture & pisciculture industries; as well as a large nationally flagged tanker fleet. PRC ship numbers matter greatly, but China increasingly enjoys both quantity & quality at sea. In recent years China has transcended Cold War shipbuilding that produced crude Soviet-style, post-World War II ship designs. The PLAN, naturally China’s most advanced sea force technologically, has most dramatically replaced backward rust buckets with increasing numbers of sophisticated platforms. But the CCG and PAFMM are also modernizing significantly. Of China’s 3 sea forces, its coast guard has grown the most rapidly in numbers, enjoys the greatest global numerical superiority, & operates the world’s largest platforms. China’s shipbuilding juggernaut has sustained rapid modernization of all 3 sea forces even as numbers of modern vessels grow substantially. Beijing’s sea forces are supported by the world’s largest shipyard infrastructure & naval-industrial ecosystem, which has achieved the largest, fastest production-capacity expansion since the Second World War. China accounts for more commercial shipbuilding output than any other country in history & is commissioning major warships at a pace unmatched by any navy in recent decades. This is part of the largest postwar military buildup, for which Beijing leverages the world’s largest human-organizational technology acquisition and application infrastructure. PRC commercial shipbuilding subsidizes overhead costs for construction of all three sea forces’ vessels, an impossibility for America’s military-focused shipbuilding industry. CCG construction is particularly economical and efficient: commercial off-the-shelf drivetrains and electronics, together with a lack of complex combat systems and weapons, facilitate rapid assembly with multiple units constructed simultaneously. PAFMM vessel building is even easier and cheaper. Worryingly, Beijing has the world’s most numerous and extensive disputed island & feature claims, with the largest number of other parties. No flashpoint looms larger than Taiwan, & Xi’s Centennial Military Building Goal of 2027 risks making the 2020s a decade of maximum danger of heightened tensions, crises, & even conflict with the United States as well as key allies & partners. Beyond that, Xi seeks to basically complete naval/military modernization by 2035, & to achieve a “world-class military,” including a “world-class navy” 2nd to none, by 2049—potentially well before. For all these reasons, a full accounting of China’s Navy, Coast Guard, & Maritime Militia has long been needed. This pioneering volume has filled that vital void by offering the most comprehensive unclassified, open-source PRC sea forces order of battle, data, & ship drawings available anywhere. Even casually perusing its pages reveals the staggering scope & extent of Beijing’s sea power today. This 2nd edition includes new sections for PLA Army & Air Force watercraft; the latest data updates, particularly concerning nuclear-powered submarines; & a flotilla of new illustrations. I commend it to everyone seeking to understand how China is making such great waves on the world’s oceans, & what course it may take in coming years. Disclaimer: The opinions & views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Government, U.S. @DeptofWar or its components, to include the @USNavy or the @NavalWarCollege. @AndrewSErickson @ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Newport, Rhode Island

Don't be fooled by news from 🇬🇧: uncrewed systems will proliferate, but they will not do away with crewed platforms. China's investment in both kinds of systems are proof enough of this, but our old friend Clausewitz would say the same: you cannot change the nature of war.

Making its debut in China: a mobile EMALS catapualt for UCAVs/UAVs. The PLAN's Type 76 LHD also has this capability, likely for the GJ-11J UCAV. Yet another way China is increasing its combat mass. twz.com/news-features/…

NB: The UK’s nuclear enterprise consumed 18% of its defence budget last year or nearly AU$21 billion WHICH IS greater than the funding for the RAN’s capabilities, sustainment, and nuclear-powered submarine program combined

The cost of a nuclear program is also prohibitive. The UK’s nuclear enterprise consumed 18% of its defence budget last year or nearly $21 billion AUD greater than the funding for the RAN’s capabilities, sustainment, and nuclear-powered submarine program combined. /4

Some reflections on a troubling sign from this year’s @LowyInstitute Poll by @cnlyonsjones. Australians’ attitudes to nuclear weapons have softened ten points since 2022, reflecting widespread anxiety about the world. /1 lowyinstitute.org/the-interprete…

It is understandable that Australians feel anxious about the state of the world - there is much to be anxious about. But nuclear weapons will not assuage this anxiety. In fact, they would make 🇦🇺 less prepared for the many challenges this century will present. /7

Nuclear weapons themselves are also no guarantee of peace. They may prevent major wars, but not limited ones. /6 armscontrolwonk.com/archive/402911…

Lowy Poll 2026: Australia’s nuclear taboo is under scrutiny | David Vallance ift.tt/Q16L3E5

I hope the name change comes with some complementary TLAMs

More meaningless revisionism for the sake of revisionism, that wont move the needle for any relevant capability changes on the ground (or in the water).

China's growing cyber and long-range strike capabilities are changing Australia's strategic reality, writes @DavidGVallance in @Diplomat_APAC. thediplomat.com/2026/06/what-t…

The paper is not saying China is an enemy or a friend, a partner or an adversary. It makes no judgments about those questions. In fact, we're implicitly saying that such questions need to be set aside when planning the nation's defence.

In response to some commentary about the @LowyInstitute paper I co-authored with @DavidGVallance, published yesterday, a few thoughts on military capabilities and the intentions to use it: lowyinstitute.org/publications/u…