Deepcryptodive.eth 🏴‍☠️⟠

@dcinvestor @AaveAave @iearnfinance Or like the @Meta_Cartel would say....

@PaulFrambot Hard times create strong men 💪

Hard to disagree these days...

@Nomaticcap @kpk_io Fun fact: the curation lead indeed built a hydrogen rocket about 10 years ago. How did you know?😆

Serious question for allocators: do you know what your curator does at 3am when an oracle gets compromised? @kpk_io does. Their agents exit the affected market in about ~24 seconds. No humans needed. Rocket scientists are building DeFi curation now, apparently. Thread 🧵

@pierre_crypt0 Time Based Capitulation

Bankless, Cuban… more of this please

@pcaversaccio 👏 hear hear

ethereum isn't a fucking company and you don't "fix" it by building a $1b command center with a board & a mandate to pump eth. the moment you route staking or fee revenue into a central org "aligned with price", you've built a capture machine and called it accountability. that's _not_ alignment, that's governance gravity - power concentrates, others defer, and it slowly becomes the system's real control layer. cypherpunk systems don't win by optimising some retarded balance sheet, they win by resisting control, staying permissionless, and never creating a single point of pressure, bribery, or capture. period.

@newmichwill @dankrad ETH price go up

@dankrad What's the main objective of such an organization? What is the main precisely defined metric?

The way to save Ethereum: The community needs to create an organization that's economically aligned with Ethereum and accountable to it. The EF now holds less than 0.1% of all ETH. There is no flow of Ethereum staking or fee revenues to it. If we want to get Ethereum back to winning: - create an organisation with credible funding, minimum $1b as a start. That's very reasonable for an ecosystem with $250b market cap - find a leader who is competent and wants to fight - make it accountable: a board of people who want ETH to go up, and a charter that holds the org accountable to it - fund it permanently: A significant amount of staking revenue needs to go to it. A governance mechanism that can adjust it (also part of accountability). Very hard to imagine now, but I think this is the only way (and it will probably happen, but it might take a long time before it is consensus).

saying the quiet part out loud: this is the safest USDC vault on @Morpho. Period. Insurance via @NexusMutual & @OpenCover dropping soon across all KPK vaults 👀

@yevhenx @kpk_io A breakdown of which markets actually contribute most to the historical yield I.e. historical "interest earned" per collateral or market Gives a good idea of how well the risk/reward is, in vaults with more exotic collateral

@deepcryptodive @kpk_io btw which features you would like to see on the dashboard that I’m missing right now?

Ethereum lending dashboard is live. rld.fi Full coverage of 6 protocols and 1336 markets: AAVE, Spark, Morpho, Fluid, Compound, and Euler. Trace credit risks in real-time: flows, rates, allocations, ltv distributions, and data for >205k individual positions.

@yevhenx @kpk_io Appreciate it More and more TVL is moving to v2 vaults 🫡

@deepcryptodive @kpk_io I just checked that all kpk vaults are v2, will cover them soon 🤝

@yevhenx @kpk_io also, seems like you are missing all Morpho v2 vaults and only track v1? 🤯

@yevhenx Love it! how do we get @kpk_io data on there? 👀 We're at >$40M TVL on Morpho

> The morpho market prices via exchange rate Sort of. The oracle is "delinquency-aware"; i.e. it tracks how long Wintermute has been behind on repayments to the Wildcat market and discounts the token accordingly. So, the price drops as repayments are delayed, not just due to the exchange rate. The interesting part: positions on Morpho only become liquidatable when Wintermute falls behind (oracle discount kicks in). But the moment that happens, the Wildcat redemption queue is also stuck --> so a liquidator who seizes the collateral can't get USDC out either. Trigger and exit are coupled to the same event. So in practice: the collateral is effectively an uncollateralized credit claim on Wintermute, to which vault depositors are exposed, and the liquidation backstop only works if Wintermute repays externally. Looks permissionless, but it all depends on Wintermute. Creative design, not going to lie! (Ps: happy to be corrected if I'm missing context)

Worth flagging: Wintermute Select Vault on Morpho has whitelisted a Wildcat token representing uncollateralised USDC lent to Wintermute. The morpho market prices via exchange rate, so in a very unlikey event that Wintermute default on Wildcat would propagate to this vault. Wintermute is a top-tier player and probably the most reputable counterparty available for this kind of structure. But once an uncollateralised credit position becomes composable collateral, downstream depositors should have visibility. A PoR for the loan position (similar to Ethena's reserve transparency model) would be a meaningful upgrade for the industry as these structures grow.

@udiWertheimer Because they cripple the web versions. Can't run scripts on them, can't crawl the web, no access to the native tools on my machine, etc

i never quite figured out why codex and claude code run locally by default. makes very little sense in 2026 coders like it because they're used to having their laptop as their main power tool, but everyone else in the world just uses their phone obviously consumer agents will run in the cloud and won't require a laptop or a mac mini

codex and claude code (and openclaw and hermes) are great, if you're a tech snob most of the world has no idea they exist and they're still difficult to use if you're not tech savvy gemini spark looks like it could bring this same power to everyone. can't wait to try it. (and it runs in the cloud, so you don't need a Mac mini lmao)

@nethan_eth @0xsvjstu Had it happen to a family member as well. It was a fake USDC or USDT token that was shown as being worth $1 on some wallets, but was actually worthless. Looks like the same pattern here

@0xsvjstu I need to review that but it was viewable on Base

a member of my family is being targeted by a scam he sent me this screenshot and tells me he sent €500 to some random website to invest (already told him that they are gone) the said investment is now supposedly worth $180,000+, they sent him an address where the tokens are, indeed worth this amount. he’s been in touch with a guy via WhatsApp doing video calls who sent him the address where the funds are, telling him to contact @coinbase support to access this money I have been able to see the address on (the official) Base app (on SOL) but it needs SOL to withdraw so he cannot told him not to do anything, especially not anything that the guy says, but he’s going crazy as he wants the (life changing) money what do

@Schlagonia Meow 😺

Looping just got a face lift. Set your own interest rates. No more utilizaton curves. Loop yvUSD at up to 10x leverage for over 35% APR right meow.

Atomic liquidity is something we do not take lightly.

@drjasper_eth We just created a rETH/ETH and rETH/USDC market on @Morpho for all Rocketpool holders Seeding liquidity on Wednesday 🫡

@aarongeryt @PaulFrambot @KelpDAO Devil's advocate: Morpho had rsETH market at the time of the exploit. But it only had ~$1M of liquidity, not $300M like the shared Aave pool See app.morpho.org/ethereum/marke… That's the power of isolated markets that Paul mentioned. Which both Euler and Morpho are great examples of

Three days ago, @PaulFrambot: "Recent events have made the case for Morpho obvious: permissionless, isolated lending markets are the only architecture that can scale onchain finance safely" Spent some time on Euler's side of the @KelpDAO recovery. Worth testing that claim against what would have actually happened if more of the attacker's stolen rsETH had ended up on @Morpho. Recovery on @aave, @Compound_xyz, and @eulerfinance required governance, on every one of them. The rsETH oracles tracked the underlying exchange rate, not market price. The rsETH drained from the bridge didn't move the oracle's price (the Ethereum-side per-token claim on Kelp's staking was technically intact), and the attacker's collateral kept reporting full value. No liquidation bot had a profitable opening. Governance had to manually enable liquidation by adjusting the oracle path. A Morpho Blue rsETH market would almost certainly use the same kind of oracle. That's how LST markets work in practice. On Morpho Blue, the oracle and every other market parameter are immutable. Governance cannot adjust them. Assuming the market uses an exchange-rate oracle (as Aave/Compound/Euler did, and as LST markets generally do), liquidation only ever becomes possible through one of: - WETH utilization stays pinned at extreme levels -> borrow rate spikes for the entire market -> attacker is in a negative carry trade, debt grows until LTV crosses LLTV. But that rate applies to every honest borrower in the same market. The "recovery" forces innocent users into liquidation alongside the position you're trying to clear. - Kelp coordinates an explicit haircut to the underlying exchange rate -> liquidation triggers immediately, but every other protocol pricing rsETH off the same primitive takes the same shock. Alternative could be to pressure the oracle provider like @chainlink or @redstone_defi to adjust its feed. Same blast radius - every other protocol consuming that feed takes the shock - and you've established that shared infrastructure can be leaned on to misreport when one protocol needs an out. That's its own threat to every other protocol downstream. On an immutable protocol usually there's nobody that can do anything. You sit and wait, or you eat the bad debt forever. And note: even on the protocols that did have a governance recovery path, organic liquidation wouldn't have helped much immediately. The moment the exploit happened, rsETH liquidity across DeFi dried up. There was no reliable market price for an unbacked LST. No liquidator had a way to value the position, and no exit path for anyone who took rsETH onto their books. What made coordinated recovery viable wasn't speed. It was the ability to wait - for Kelp to commit to restoring backing, for @definunited to assemble $300M in coalition ETH, for the technical plan to converge. Only then did the math close. None of that is reachable from inside an immutable market. "The only architecture that can scale onchain finance safely" is a story about where the risk lives, not whether the risk is smaller. The protocol is "just infrastructure." Curators are nominally responsible. Direct depositors are on their own; that's what they opted in for after all. Every link in that chain has a deflection problem. A direct Blue-market depositor has no protocol risk team and no curator watching. A curator-vault depositor has someone nominally watching, but curator quality varies wildly, accountability often gets deflected further, and even the competent ones race each other to exit first - the fastest win and the rest hold the bag for their depositors. That's not strictly safer. It's a story about pushing risk onto people who didn't sign up to absorb it. The Kelp recovery is evidence against the framing, not for it: the protocols that recovered did so by acting - seizing the attacker, restoring backing, coordinating capital. Immutable markets can't act. They can only wait. Trillions? Are we sure?

@drjasper_eth @Morpho We might even be cooking a fixed-rate borrow market that goes love June 1st 😄 should make the borrow experience way more predictable

Make it make sense