Delwin | Military Theorist

My latest article « The trap of rational ruin » published in La Vigie. Many thanks to @egea_blog. In depth analysis of Ukraine’s economic prospects post-war and why can the continuation of war remain rational without offering any real strategic outcome? #Strategy #UkraineRussiaWar #Economy #Ukraine : Le piège du choix rationnel (Delwin) lettrevigie.com/ukraine-le-pie…

@NDniepr @egea_blog @clement_molin @AMK_Mapping_ @steven_seegel They changed it the next morning, no way with opsec that they have any intel from the unit on site.

@DelwinStrategy @egea_blog @clement_molin @AMK_Mapping_ @steven_seegel If you really believe DS mapped that zone just based on the video, it's more like you don't really understand what's going on,

It is not that I do not agree with their convention, which in itself is fine, it is that they do not apply that convention most of the time. And for good reason. In intense activity area, they cannot map for opsec reasons because they are not fully independent, of their own saying (they posted it in reply to AMK last week), and must abide by military regulations. Then it is up to analysts to cross other information to make informed assessment. And at the moment, I will publish soon, we are at something around 300km2 of controlled or greyzone areas unmapped.

@NDniepr @egea_blog @clement_molin @AMK_Mapping_ @steven_seegel So when DS immediately marks as retaken Odradne with 20km2 around it with for only proof one soldier raising a flag at the edge of the village, they lack osint discipline ?

@DelwinStrategy @egea_blog @clement_molin @AMK_Mapping_ @steven_seegel Map makers who immediately paint a massive circle of control around a 10-second flag video are usually chasing engagement or lacks OSINT discipline

Not if the map intends to show the maximum advancement. A map is a storytelling tool. Depending on what the story is then showing the line of maximum FLOT is a legitimate option. The reader just has to know what it is. There are doctrinal principles on how to assess control in military terms. And tbh no mapper has any viable intel from the ground beside micro tactical contacts for one sector, or is fed wrong / sanityzed intel. Do not be naive

@DelwinStrategy @egea_blog @clement_molin @AMK_Mapping_ @steven_seegel Basing maps on flag videos is the absolute zero level of terrain control analysis; there are dozens of posts by serious analysts on this subject. You need to cross-reference with other information, especially from the ground.

@NDniepr @M0nstas Not really. What matters most is to use the same map as baseline for comparison. I use only DS for this purpose.

@DelwinStrategy @M0nstas When the Russians aren't really advancing anymore, it's because DS is lagging behind, but when the Ukrainians suddenly make gains, DS's maps are relevant, and everyone stops talking about the maps of areas that were supposedly under Russian control

To be fair offensive started on May 13 and maps may lag behind.

@StretchVan Simplement parce qu’ils sont tellement en retard sur le marquage en « grey zone » des avancées russes qu’ils n’avaient rien à marquer comme repris suite à ces contre-attaques.

@DelwinStrategy D'un autre côté, Deep State n'a absolument pas "surévalué" les gains ukrainiens dans l'oblast de Dniepro en début d'année, contrairement à l'ISW notamment. Comment l'expliquez-vous ?

My latest article « The trap of rational ruin » published in La Vigie. Many thanks to @egea_blog. In depth analysis of Ukraine’s economic prospects post-war and why can the continuation of war remain rational without offering any real strategic outcome? #Strategy #UkraineRussiaWar #Economy #Ukraine : Le piège du choix rationnel (Delwin) lettrevigie.com/ukraine-le-pie…

Surprising considering this is located in the suburbs of #Pokrovske. Not impossible, though, since the February counterattacks were mainly a clearing operation to reduce strategic ambiguity. They passed through Russian positions in Hai, for instance, but have not necessarily remanned everything heavily. Either Russian units are infiltrating up to 15 km inward with the spring vegetation, or some of their forward positions were never cleared and they simply restarted where they left off last autumn. More information is required before drawing any conclusions. #UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy

They posted this last week: "while someone else is guided by conscience and Article 114 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Content promoting the Armed Forces of Ukraine is published exclusively with their approval, when it poses no danger to the infantry or the prospects of the operation." In any case, in military terms, control is not about freedom of movement (otherwise, nothing is control as artillery can hit 30km behind the lines a rear base). There are very clear doctrinal definition of this. I wrote about it some month ago. As a matter of fact, enemy passing through or able to assault your position, doctrinally does not negate control. In my assessment, this is a mix of contested ground still blank, and obvious controlled ground in grey zone or also sometimes blank. You also have discrepancies. For example, AFU raised a flag in Odradne and 20km2 were marked as retaken, russians raise flags several days in Verkhnia tersa over a fortnite, and there is no greyzone in a 5km radius. This creates a distorted picture, which needs to be adjusted to have the full story.

In fact, they applied that convention. They delayed the mapping of Pokrovsk for month, but we were still seeing videos from the city and Russia was not even advancing behind the city. In Pokrovsk'e, they didn't map all the nearly 400km that were later 'taken back' by the ukrainians because it was never really into russian control. Ofc they cannot say everything and you have to use multiple sources. For the 300km2, you really need to add a lot of disputed areas into the count. Imo, part of those are still contested and cannot be mapped as russian control when they have no actual control on these areas. Imo, control should mean you have logistics, artillery and your soldiers can easily move in and out. That applies for both sides.

It's not. Deepstate is much more independant than you think and they have a very clear methodology of mapping, which you disagree with. That's why they are much more conservative on every gain (even ukrainian ones) and the past few weeks proved them right. Rybar on the contrary is doing copy/paste on the MOD with maps that no one can understand.

Interestingly, Rybar is saying some things worth reading about the overall situation, especially with what is happening in Stepnohirsk : 📝Logistics Problems📝 Deeper Than They Seem The situation in Russia's southern regions is becoming increasingly threatening. Since early May, Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the number of drone strikes against vehicles transporting various goods to the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions and Crimea. There is a risk of shortages of certain goods on the peninsula, and fuel sales are restricted. The threat is not only the disruption of the Crimean holiday season or the shortage of certain products on the peninsula. Strikes against cargo carriers on the peninsula directly impact the combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces on the southern fronts, where the situation is already precarious. 🔻What's happening on the front? ➡️The enemy has been attacking the Kamenskoye area for a long time and has managed to advance in several areas, pushing back Russian forces: Stepnogorsk and Plavni have been nearly lost, along with virtually all territorial gains made by the Russian Armed Forces during the offensive that began in early 2025. ➡️There is a risk that the enemy will not only restore the status quo but also launch an offensive along the Kamenskoye-Shcherbaki line. Indirect signs indicate that the problems in this area have been addressed, but the situation remains difficult. ➡️Ukrainian drone operators have significantly increased their activity in strikes against Kamenka-Dniprovska, Vodyane, and Enerhodar. Every 20-30 minutes, local public groups report dozens of drone attacks on the city. There have been casualties among the local population. Employees of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant are also becoming targets, as officially reported by the company's resources. ➡️This may indicate that the enemy is preparing, if not a full-scale landing, then a diversionary strike through the reeds at the bottom of the former Kakhovka Reservoir. The loss of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant cannot be allowed: dislodging even small enemy forces from there will be an extremely difficult task. Moreover, the Russian Armed Forces will be severely limited in their means of destruction, as the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is not a target worth targeting with airstrikes. ❗️Considering that Ukrainian forces have already partially paralyzed the logistics of southern Russia in the land corridor to Crimea, it is not difficult to imagine what will happen if the Ukrainian Armed Forces manage to breach the Russian Armed Forces' defenses along the Kamenskoye-Shcherbaki line. 📌The Russian Armed Forces will have to deploy reinforcements along the route to Vasilyevka, the roads to which are already under frequent enemy attack. In the worst-case scenario, stabilizing the situation will require the deployment of additional forces via routes such as Tokmak and the more distant Berdyansk and Mariupol. Even the delivery of civilian cargo along these routes is already severely disrupted. ❓What can be done about this? The issue of organizing a "small sky" air defense system is clear and has been studied. It has also been discussed at the highest levels. The exponential increase in attacks after the May holidays is obvious, even though the roads were unsafe even before. Just in time for the beginning of May, the Ukrainian Armed Forces tested Hornets, and after the ceasefire, they began massive use, giving no respite to develop countermeasures. t.me/rybar/80586

@clement_molin @AMK_Mapping_ @steven_seegel Not necessarily because Rybar is the Russian version of Deepstate.

@AMK_Mapping_ @steven_seegel That's why it was interesting to share. Because if we compare Rybar map to yours in Pokrovsk'e for example, there are nearly 20km difference. If he says something about Stepnohirsk, it's probably because he is not so sure about what the MOD says...

I am increasingly convinced that the February counterattacks, for which we had limited video footage and evidence of success in the first place, left many Russian positions untouched across the heights south of Pokrovske. Those have been reactivated with fresh reinforcements, and the AFU seems unable to contend with the situation for now.

They should. All data points towards deterioration. X3 asset losses, superior casualties in OSINT for 2026, multiple under mapped areas. Too many observers miss the big picture by focusing on one data point, often maps based on DS, and not the overall picture. This is not an inflection point, just things continuing in the same direction as in 2025.

@M0nstas @DelwinStrategy No accounts are saying things are significantly deteriorating for Ukraine, only the opposite

@M0nstas Main lag in km2: - control: rai oleksandrivka sector - grey zone; east oskil bank - mix grey and control: west of huliailpole The Pokrovske area is too uncertain I will not even include it

@DelwinStrategy Suriyak 201 (↑349 ↓148) km², most gains at Pokrovske.

The situation in Kostyantynivka has deteriorated in recent days, with several Russian soldiers infiltrating the city center. Despite a confirmed Ukrainian presence in southern Kostyantynivka and nearby towns such as Illinivka and Novodmytrivka, Russian forces managed to bypass these positions and enter high-rise and industrial areas of the city center, where they came under attack. -> x.com/AudaxonX/statu… (example) While it is not always possible to confirm the elimination of infiltrators, a stable Russian presence appears unlikely. The area remains a patchwork of Ukrainian control and contested zones. Limited data make an accurate assessment challenging at this time. Russian control requires a permanent, continuous presence and the absence of Ukrainian forces. These conditions are not currently met. However, pro-Russian analysts are already depicting much of the city as under Russian control, disregarding the ongoing Ukrainian presence. A similar pattern to the battles of Pokrovsk and Toretsk is likely, where large areas remained contested and Ukrainian forces held key positions, preventing Russian control for an extended period. We will update the map this evening. -> map.ukrdailyupdate.com

In recent weeks, Russia's elite "Rubicon" drone unit has massively ramped up their usage of interceptor drones to shoot down Ukrainian FP-1 and FP-2 long-range UAVs. This is in response to the major successes Ukraine has had with their mid and long-range drone strikes on valuable Russian economic and military targets in the deep rear. In my opinion, we will see the production rate of these Russian interceptor drones increase significantly in the coming months, which would result in the decrease of the impact rate of Ukrainian drones. Ukraine has also been employing similar tactics with interceptor drones against Russian Geran-2 and Gerbera long-range drones for some time now, and is ramping up their usage day-by-day too.

@Phil6gbrt C’est surprenant effectivement.

@DelwinStrategy Lu il y a peu à ce sujet. À suivre …

@HistoryLegends_ @roshiajinjp And a loose formation could not stand any sort of cavalry charge

It's simple, because the effective range of muskets in battle was about 50 meters. At the same time, compact fire was the only way to deal significant damage at once to the enemy force, and break their morale. Muskets would also release a lot of smoke, so nobody would see anything after the first salvoes, making fire even less accurate. That's why bayonet attacks were still a thing. A loose formation was also synonymous with a unit about to flee from the battlefield.

Apparently during such attacks, a lot of soldiers would fall to the ground and pretend to be wounded. Others, like in this scene, would rescue their comrades as an excuse to leave the battlefield.

@Strike_Flanker Cela semble en effet être le cas. Malheureusement étant donné la sensibilité du site, nous n’aurons ni images ni confirmation

@DelwinStrategy En frappant Bila Tserkva, outre la base, ils éliminent également le stock de Su-24M stationnés sur place ainsi qu'une source de pièces de rechange pour la MCO de ces derniers.

Last night’s strikes were planned for weeks, not tied to the Starobilsk dormitory attack. Every casualty is one too many in this war. Based on available footage, air defence was rather ineffective against the missiles, and the claimed interception rate is overstated. This is as much a message to the international community as it is to the Russian domestic audience. Overall, even though it is difficult to assess precisely, damages to industrial targets seem important and reflect, despite improvements in Ukrainian capabilities, the asymmetry in damages from deep strikes between the two belligerents. Unfortunately, Ukraine keeps suffering compounded destruction, which raises the reconstruction bill and required in-year expenditures.