Yolo Keölæy 👾

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Yolo Keölæy 👾

Yolo Keölæy 👾

@Hockthus

Paris Katılım Nisan 2016
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@infraexplained Silly comparison—different countries, incomparable city boundaries. Fix real issues: dedensify the historic centre, build more family housing, massively improve inner suburbs. Quality of life is more important than population bragging
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Infrastructure explained
Infrastructure explained@infraexplained·
The city of Vienna will overtake the municipality of Paris in population this year for the first time I think ever There is only a 5 thousand 5 hundred difference now, and Paris continues to shrink and Vienna grow by over 10k a year each
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PBlanrue Par contre quand il s'agit d'imaginer un complot russe, on a tous les 'spécialistes' qui mettent leur grain de sel ..
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Paul-Éric Blanrue
Paul-Éric Blanrue@PBlanrue·
On assiste à la révélation d'un réseau mondial de pourris, mettant en lien des hommes politiques, des hommes d'État de tous les pays, des milliardaires, des financiers, des professeurs éminents, des stars, des banquiers, des économistes, des champions de la tech, avec un escroc condamné à de la prison ferme pour avoir développé un réseau de prostitution de mineures et dont la complice croupit dans les geôles pour le même raison - et ce qui scandalise les journalistes c'est que les "complotistes" vont s'en servir. Aujourd'hui, il faut le dire et le répéter, toute personne utilisant le mot de complotiste pour dénigrer une idée doit être considéré comme un vendu, travaillant à passer sous silence les crimes de ses employeurs et de la sphère dans laquelle ceux-ci évoluent.
Le Parisien@le_Parisien

Selon des spécialistes, «l'univers des conspirationnistes est réalimenté» par la publication des millions de documents sur Epstein où des noms et des informations ont été lâchés sans contexte ou vérification ➡️ l.leparisien.fr/b9ws

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Yolo Keölæy 👾 retweetledi
The Cradle
The Cradle@TheCradleMedia·
Israeli bullets found inside bodies of Iranian children killed in riots: Report ift.tt/q6NH9F7
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@davidwe24500 @ObsDelphi En quoi les chinois sont ils pires ? Ils ne forcent pas le monde à investir des milliards chez eux pour maintenir leur niveau de vie sous peine de sanctions extraterritoriales...
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djw 🇨🇵🇬🇧🇪🇺🇺🇦
C'est dommage dans le sens qu'au fond, les Chinois sont de pires maîtres que les Américains. Mais bon dans le sens que c'est bien fait pour l'intimideur Trump qui n'y pourra rien. Attendons que la même chose se passe en Europe. Les Américains risquent de perdre leur plus grand marché.
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Louis Duclos
Louis Duclos@ObsDelphi·
🇨🇦🇨🇳Une photo qui devrait tirer la sonnette d'alarme à Washington. Le Premier ministre du Canada, Mark Carney, est en visite d'État à Beijing pour la signature d'accords commerciaux importants. Un signe éloquent de la perte d'influence des États-Unis avec pour cause la politique étrangère insultante de Donald Trump envers ses alliés. À force de menacer, mépriser et harceler, le camp MAGA pousse de nombreux pays dans les bras de la Chine, lentement mais sûrement. Malgré les violations des Droits Humains, malgré les projets d'invasion de Taïwan, malgré la propagande et les attaques contre les démocraties occidentales, la Chine promet la stabilité économique là où les États-Unis semblent perdre en fiabilité. Menaces d'invasion, insultes envers le PM (traité de « gouverneur »), remise en cause de l'OTAN et projet impérialiste au Groenland, ce n'est plus une faille dans laquelle Xi Jinping se faufile mais un véritable gouffre qui lui tend les bras. L'occasion est trop belle pour les Chinois qui en profitent largement. Donald Trump croit nous atteindre nous mais en réalité il fragilise son propre pays avant tout et réparer les pots cassés avec ses alliés prendra de longues années. Mais que Carney n'oublie pas : quand on dîne avec le Diable, il faut amener une longue fourchette.
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@KareemRifai Based on 'international laws', Taiwan is widely seen as a province of China (even though not part of PRC). So yeah the US are the only ones violating international laws here
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@FrankiePu1itzer @mrjeffu It’s wounded pride. What they did is a blood spot no amount of anime can scrub away. China is a living reminder of atrocities they refuse to fully admit to. The racism is a defense mechanism: they can't reconcile their brand with their brutal past.
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Jeffrey J. Hall 🇯🇵🇺🇸
The Chinese government's call on its citizens to stop visiting Japan is hitting Osaka: some hotels are reporting 50-70% of room reservations have been cancelled. China was the #1 source of foreign tourists to Osaka this year.
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@nenem_lon @FrankiePu1itzer @mrjeffu This is just brainwashed anti-China propaganda. White tourists (esp. German, British, American) are statistically much more disrespectful regarding alcohol, fighting, and public disorder-just look at the new laws in Spain and Bali targeting them. Your bias is showing.
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@ZhaiXiang5 People like to talk about cultural genocide today, Ryukyu is a prime example. Japan crushed language via Hogen Fuda, renamed Tō-de to Karate (their national sport). Okinawa was the WWII Suteishi (sacrificial pawn). Today, they host 70% of US bases to shield the Yamato mainland.
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Zhai Xiang
Zhai Xiang@ZhaiXiang5·
x.com/ZhaiXiang5/sta… I truly appreciate the attention many of you have shown to my Stanford thesis on the question of the Ryukyus. If yesterday's post was about how the great-power dynamics among the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan shaped the fate of the Ryukyus, then today, I want to turn to the group who lived the consequences, was most often overlooked, yet deserves being seen: the Ryukyuan people themselves. In October this year, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Sun Lei, publicly urged Japan to "end its discrimination and prejudice against the indigenous people of Okinawa." Many assumed this was just routine diplomatic language-but in fact, it carries very deep, very painful historical roots. After Japan annexed the Ryukyus, for a long while it never truly treated the Ryukyuan people as part of its "Yamato" nation. In 1904, Japanese anthropologists published "Studies on Human Races," openly stating that: "The racial status of the Ryukyuan people is even lower than that of the Taiwan aboriginals." The justification? Their supposedly "ugly appearance" and "weak physique." Even today, reading these words is shocking. It is difficult to see any trace that Ryukyuans were ever regarded as "fellow Japanese." By the end of the 1945 Battle of Okinawa, the Japanese military even forced large numbers of Ryukyuans to commit mass suicide. Scholars still debate the exact number, some estimates go above 100,000. Having spoken with several American veterans who witnessed the battlefield ten years ago, I believe this much is clear: Tens of thousands certainly lost their innocent lives. As early as 1879, right after Japan forcibly annexed the Ryukyu Kingdom, Ryukyuans traveled to Beijing to plead for China's help. And after WWII, with Okinawa reduced to ruins, one cannot avoid asking: How would the people of a devastated Ryukyu view Japan after all of this? The answer lies buried in the archives. Today, I want to share the story told in Chapter Two of my thesis: how, after WWII, some Ryukyuan people, led by Kiyuna Tsugumasa (喜友名嗣正), repetitively submitted a request to China that was astonishing, yet entirely consistent with their historical experience. It is a story buried in the margins of history for almost eighty years, and almost no one has ever truly read it. Also, based on my archival studies, the Chinese government did, in fact, seriously consider a plan for Ryukyu to break away from Japan after the war. But as China's civil war escalated, this issue was quickly pushed out of Chiang Kai-shek's priority list, swallowed by the political turmoil of the era. Following Japan's surrender in 1945, the Ryukyu issue gradually emerged on the agenda. China's Foreign Affairs Ministry hosted a panel discussion concerning the issue on August 7, 1947 with Foreign Minister Wang Shijie (王世杰) as the host. The ministry had prepared a plan in which China would object to a full or partial restoration of the Ryukyus to Japan, so as to prevent Japan from using the islands as a platform to invade Taiwan (yes, China has foreseen what Japan might do today back then) and, thereby, to be able to threaten the naval defense of East China. "At the Cairo Conference, the Generalissimo", Wang announced in the panel discussion, "expressed that we do not necessarily need to demand the Ryukyus as our territory." Wang then presented the discussants with three proposals: (A)whether to partially or fully recover Okinawa; (B) whether to administer Okinawa together with the US; (C) whether to put Okinawa under a joint-trusteeship. On September 23, 1947, the National Political Council passed The Recommended Proposal on the Peace Treaty with Japan. In view of the agreement reached at the Cairo Conference, the proposal advised the Nationalist Government that the Ryukyus should be placed under China's trusteeship. On October 18, 1947, Zhang Qun (张群), President of the Executive Yuan (equal to premier of China), noted the Ryukyu issue in his report to the Council. The Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, Zhang Qun pointed out, had delimited the territory of Japan. At that point, the ownership of only a few islands remained unsettled, and "the Ryukyu Islands are most closely associated with us." The resolution of the Ryukyu problem, Zhang argued, could only involve restoration to China, a joint-ownership between China and the US, or trusteeship under the United Nations. He also assured the audience the Chinese government was closely following the progress, and, in any case, would object to restoring the islands to Japan. Chiang, probably overwhelmed with his civil war against the communists, did not discuss the islands in his diaries over the course of that year. While his approach to Okinawa seemed to have stalemated, the visit to Nanjing during the summer of 1948 by Kiyuna Tsugumasa (he also had a Chinese name: Cai Zhang/蔡璋), head of Okinawa's "Revolutionary Society (琉球革命同志会)", brought Chiang a new chance to move forward. Established in the early 1940s, the Ryukyu Revolutionary Society was committed to anti-Japanese activity and clearly demonstrated its pro-China stance. As early as 1946, the Society wrote to Chiang and voiced its loyalty, vowing to subordinate Okinawa to the rule of China. However, Chiang only asked his Foreign Affairs Ministry "study the matter and report back," and nothing further happened. In the autumn of 1947, Kiyuna submitted another petition to Chiang, urging the China to direct its diplomats at the upcoming peace conference with Japan to demand that the Ryukyus be incorporated into China's territory. He wrote that "China and the Ryukyus have maintained relations for over a thousand years; in politics, economics, culture, customs-there is nothing that does not trace back to China." He warned that "Japan has resorted to base and shameless tactics, currying favor with foreign powers, conserving its strength, and hoping for a future resurgence," and expressed concern that China, "out of excessive leniency," might allow Japan's ambitions to take shape. Kiyuna emphasized that although the Ryukyus were small, they were crucial to China's national defense. This petition was forwarded by the head of the KMT's Organization Department to Chiang, after which it again vanished without a trace. I could not find any response from Chiang in the archives. It was not until early 1948 that the Foreign Ministry finally addressed the matter. On March 3, the ministry submitted a report to Chiang and Zhang Qun, stating that "China's present strength is insufficient; we may not be able to adequately defend or administer the islands." On March 31, China's Ministry of National Defense presented Chiang with an impression of the "Seal of the King of Ryukyu," provided by the Ryukyu Revolutionary Society as historical evidence of Ryukyu's ties to China. The ministry also warned that "both Japan and the United States intend to seize this territory after victory," and recommended that the matter be referred to the relevant departments for further study. The Ryukyuan petitions finally caught Chiang's attention. The next day, on April 1, Chiang drafted an order, and on April 2 instructed Foreign Minister Wang Shijie to consider the issue carefully. On June 15, Chiang ordered Wu Tiecheng (吴铁城), Secretary General of KMT's central committee, to consider how to deploy the Ryukyu Revolutionary Society to achieve the recovery of Okinawa. According to Chiang, "the Ryukyus previously belonged to our country", and the Okinawan public sentiment favored Chinese rule despite American governance. Thus, Chiang intended to "secretly utilize" the Society. Chiang further expected that, through the Society, the Ryukyu people would vote for Chinese governance or self-governance, while the Allies were convening the peace conference. Unlike Yang Yunzhu (杨云竹), the Foreign Ministry official in charge of Japanese affairs at the time, who repeatedly stalled and raised objections, Wu and his team responded with unusual enthusiasm. They argued forcefully that China had compelling strategic reasons to contest the future of the Ryukyus, given their immense value for national defense. Wu further recommended that the Nationalist Government actively support and assist the activities of the Ryukyu Revolutionary Society. On July 25, Kiyuna and 16 other members of the Ryukyu Revolutionary Society filed a petition again to Chiang Kai-shek, who had assumed the Chinese presidency on May 20. The 17 "representatives of the Okinawan people" stated that everything in the Ryukyus originated from China and analogized the close relations between China and the Ryukyus to those between a father and a son. Because Okinawans endured humiliation and struggled against the Japanese for over 400 years, stated the petition, the 700,000 Okinawan people wished "to foster the spirit of righteousness and to return to the motherland [China]", while pledging their lives "to guard against the reappearance of Japanese enslavement." This earnest passage reflected the burning desire of some Okinawa natives. On August 2, Wu reported that Kiyuna had arrived in Nanjing and wished to extend his salute to Chiang in person. Chiang received Kiyuna on August 9 and, on the following day, the Central Committee of the KMT telegraphed the Foreign Affairs Ministry five proposals that included alleviating restraints on the Ryukyu compatriots in Taiwan and dispatching elementary school teachers from Taiwan to impact the second generation there. In contrast to Zhang Qun, China's premiership had by then passed to Weng Wenhao (翁文灏), who showed little interest in the matter. In his reply on August 11, Weng noted that Chiang had already reached a tacit understanding with Roosevelt and Churchill at the Cairo Conference, and warned that secretly mobilizing the society might "damage the feelings of our American and British friends and lead to misunderstandings." He therefore urged caution, suggesting the issue be left for future diplomatic settlement. Yet even the Premier's objections did not extinguish Chiang's intentions. On August 14, Chiang instructed the Foreign Ministry to "study in strict confidence" the Ryukyu Revolutionary Society's request for China to reclaim the islands. In its top-secret report submitted on August 26, the ministry argued that the Cairo Declaration had not explicitly mentioned the Ryukyus; that the United States, having suffered heavy casualties in the Battle of Okinawa and having built significant bases there, would "never agree to relinquish" the islands; and that the Ryukyus, "poor in resources and impoverished in population," could not sustain themselves, especially after "seventy years of Japanese indoctrination." Therefore, neither restoration to China nor immediate independence was feasible. The ministry proposed international trusteeship as "the only practicable solution," stressing that any arrangement would require American consent because the islands were under US occupation. Despite the Foreign Ministry's cautious stance, the Nationalist Government's delegation in Japan proved strikingly farsighted. In confidential communications to Nanjing, the delegation argued that the key boundary question concerned whether the Yaeyama (八重山) and Miyako island (宫古岛) should be included within the Ryukyu domain, recommending that China invoke the 1880 agreement to claim both groups. If these two island chains could not be secured, the report noted, "the matter of the 'Senkaku Islands (钓鱼岛)' and Chiwei Island (赤尾屿) is likewise worthy of attention." The same archival file even contains an English-language draft of a proposed "Sino-American Joint Trusteeship Agreement for the Ryukyu Islands." In short, some Chinese officials grasped the strategic stakes far more clearly than the leadership in Nanjing. Yet their insight never translated into action. In October 1949, Kiyuna petitioned Chiang once again, this time to establish a KMT branch in Okinawa. Kiyuna advocated for a stronger relationship between China and Okinawa: "the Ryukyus were part of China, and the Ryukyu people are the Chinese people," though unfortunately "the compatriots had lived in great distress for over seventy years since the 1870s." The guidelines that Kiyuna designed were rather detailed and comprehensive, ranging from politics to economics and culture. His primary goals were to advocate for "China and the Ryukyus in One," to emancipate the Ryukyus, and to restore the Ryukyus to China in the near future. Staff members of Chiang's advisory office remarked Kiyuna's guidelines implied that the Ryukyus would independently organize this KMT branch. They thus proposed that Chiang meet with Kiyuna as a gesture of support; the two also suggested that aid be provided should the KMT branch operation prove highly successful. On November 18, Chiang received Kiyuna in Taiwan. But neither Chiang's meeting with Kiyuna nor the KMT Central Committee's active response seemed to guarantee concrete support to any degree. On December 14, 1949, Kiyuna wrote to Chiang requesting provisions of ships to transport Ryukyu Revolutionary Society members and equipment to print propaganda materials in Japanese. Having not received any response, Kiyuna wrote to Chiang's advisory office again on January 18, 1950, reminding the staff members of his eagerness to "reciprocate the generosity of the mother country." By the time, Chiang had lost the civil war and control of most of the Chinese mainland. This time he did receive news. Gui Yongqing (桂永清), commander-in-chief of Chiang's naval force, informed Kiyuna, disingenuously, that all the vessels in Taiwan had been requisitioned for military purposes and that not a single boat was available for the evolutionary society. The advisory office also regretted that they could not appropriate any printing equipment for Kiyuna at this point. "If there is a chance in the future, we would do what we could for you." By the late 1940s, as Chiang's government was collapsing under the pressures of the civil war, a shortage of resources was understandable. Yet the refusal to provide even a small fishing boat or basic printing equipment to Kiyuna makes it difficult to discern any genuine willingness to support pro-China activities in the Ryukyus. My archival research shows that Kiyuna met Chiang on two occasions-neither of which left even a single line in Chiang's diary. This silence, combined with the formulaic, bureaucratic tone of Chiang's subordinates, effectively extinguished the enthusiasm of Okinawans who still placed their hopes in China, or in Chiang. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Kiyuna continued petitioning Chiang and "Vice President" Chen Cheng (陈诚), only to encounter the same indifference. I will discuss more of Kiyuna's efforts, and how the San Francisco Treaty concerned the fate of the Ryukyus, in my next tweet. In 2013 and 2015, I traveled twice to Taipei to examine archives there, where I read a large number of letters written by Kiyuna to Chiang and various departments of his nationalist government. Kiyuna's Chinese handwriting was not elegant, but his thoughts were sharp, his logic rigorous, and his prose vivid. More importantly, between the lines, I saw a man who loved the land of Ryukyu with all his heart, a soul who, standing amid the ruins of WWII, devoted every ounce of strength to freeing his homeland from a colonial fate. Across time, those letters moved me deeply, and they pained me. Such talent and fervor, yet met with years of indifference. Such earnest pleas, swallowed again and again by a bureaucratic abyss. After the 1960s, Kiyuna was further marginalized in Taiwan; according to what I found, even the small stipend he once received may have been taken away in his later years. In 1972, the year Okinawa was "returned" to Japan, he went back, where he lived out the rest of his life, passing away in the late 1980s (top left, he's the person on the right). I cannot imagine the bitterness he must have carried in his heart at the end. It often occurred to me that if we had lived in the same era, I would have gone to him in person and said: "Your efforts do not deserve to be forgotten by this world." From the archives, I discovered that in 1948, Kiyuya stayed in Room 235 of the Overseas Chinese Guesthouse (华侨招待所) in Nanjing. I was thrilled (top right). In 2008, when my cousin, who had been living in the UK, returned to China for a visit, she, my grandfather, and I traveled to Nanjing together. We stayed at a hotel called Yishiyuan (议事园), which now serves as the guesthouse of the Jiangsu Provincial People's Congress. We checked into the new building, but right beside it stood the preserved old one, the original Overseas Chinese Guesthouse where Kiyuna once lived when he visited the Chinese capital trying to plead for Okinawa (bottom left). In May 2016, while passing through Nanjing again on a trip, I went to the site, hoping to find Room 235. I could not. So I knocked on the office door of the hotel's general manager, introduced myself as a scholar freshly graduated from Stanford, and told him about Kiyuna, the man whose story I had traced through my thesis. The manager was deeply moved, but he told me that the old wing had long been rebuilt internally, and all historical records had been lost. No one could ever know where Room 235 once stood. As I walked out of the hotel, a wave of indescribable sadness heaviness settled over me: There are people in this world who give everything to a cause, yet leave behind so little that even the memory of a single room cannot be traced. In July 2018, I traveled to Okinawa for the second time, visiting Naba and the Yaeyama Islands (bottom right). I longed to pay respects to Kiyuna's grave and lay a bouquet of flowers there-he's my hero. But I do not speak Japanese, and I could find no reliable information about its location. Once again, I left with regret. In August 2015, Stanford News published a feature interview about my thesis. I was told I might have been the first humanities student in Stanford's history whose thesis was covered by the university's media-an honor that humbled me deeply. At the time, I was already working in Washington DC, and the director interviewed me over the phone. We spoke at length. I remain grateful to her-her prose was elegant, measured, and faithful to our conversation. My only regret was this: I had asked whether Kiyuna's name could be included in the report. But due to space constraints, he ultimately did not appear. Today, through my own platform, I can finally tell this eighty-year-old history, and reintroduce to the world a man who burned his entire life's worth of passion for the fate of Ryukyu, yet was almost erased by time. He spent his life waiting for an answer that never arrived. My only wish is that history grants him what his own era did not- to be remembered, and not silenced again.
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Zhai Xiang@ZhaiXiang5

x.com/Stanford/statu… I think China may have just quietly reopened the Okinawa question-and this could reshape Asia's balance of power in ways few people are ready for. Although China usually keeps a low profile on Okinawa, several recent statements by Takaichi- including her implication of potential armed intervention in Taiwan, Japan's continuted deployment of strategic assets in Okinawa, and her Nov. 26 assertion that "according to the Treaty of San Francisco, we are not in a position to recognize Taiwan's legal status"-appear to have prompted China to revisit the question of Okinawa, assumed by many as long dead. This past month, a spokesperson from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted excerpts from the Potsdam Declaration outlining Japan's post-WWII territorial boundaries, which has been speculated as a hint towards Okinawa. If that wasn't clear enough, yesterday, China's second-largest news agency, China News Service, published an article titled "The Issue of Ryukyu Sovereignty: It's Time to Settle This Old Account," openly questioning Japan's sovereignty over Okinawa. Unsurprisingly, the move drew immediate attention at home and abroad. When I studied China-US-Japan relations at Stanford, my advisor was Gordon H. Chang, a rational, rigorous, and deeply respected scholar of US-China relations. He was also the one who first told me about the other Gordon Chang, my fellow Cornell alumnus and the author of the "China collapse theory." Actually, last week, the other Gordon retweeted two of my posts analyzing Sino-Japanese relations without any provocative comments. I disagree with almost everything he writes, but I really appreciated his restraint this time. Shortly I started at Stanford in 2012, I had my first annual discussion with Gordon about my study plan, and we discussed the Diaoyu Islands and the Ryukyus, both of which interested us. He suggested I focus on the Ryukyu issue for my thesis. Later, I was fortunate enough to secure a part-time research position at Hoover, where I worked on organizing valuable archives such as Chiang Kai-shek's diaries. Stanford also generously provided multiple scholarships, allowing me to visit the FDR Presidential Library in New York and Taipei to examine original archives from both the Chinese and American sides regarding the Ryukyu issue. These experiences formed the core of my Ryukyu research. In my Stanford thesis, I approached these questions with as much historical rigor and objectivity as possible. In 2015, it was published in JCC, the leading American journal on Chinese studies, and Stanford News Center wrote a report about my thesis too. Hoover also featured my thesis on their website. Few people today realize this, but Ryukyu's fate was once one of the key topics among the Allies-Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, Chiang… all held a clear position. And: How did the Ryukyu Kingdom become today's Okinawa under Japanese rule? And why does this history matter again in 2025? To understand that, we must return to the beginning. The Ryukyus are a chain of volcanic islands that stretch southwest from Japan's Kyushu to China's Taiwan. Starting in 1372, the Ryukyus paid tribute to China and became a member of the tributary system under the Chinese imperium. As a result of the attack by Shimazu Tadatsune in 1609, the Ryukyu Kingdom started paying additional tribute to the Kyushu-based Shimazu clan, which considered the islands a domain of Satsuma. From 1609 until the early 1870s, the Ryukyus functioned as a tributary state for both China and Japan. Yet the rapid rise of Japan after its Meiji Reform soon broke the balance that had lasted for more than two centuries. In 1874, Japan shifted the Ryukyus from the Foreign Office to the Home Ministry and, by 1879, had incorporated the islands as a prefecture. Seized with panic, China reached out to former US President Grant, who was on a tour around the world, wishing to resolve the issue through his arbitration. Having visited Beijing and Tokyo, Grant quickly devised a proposal to China, with the northern part ceded to Japan, the southern part to China, and the rest restored to the previous kingdom (top left). On April 17, 1880, the Japanese government raised the proposal to divide the Ryukyus in two, with the Miyako-jima (宫古岛) and Yaeyama Islands (八重山群岛) put under the rule of China. On October 28, 1880, the Chinese government accepted the proposal, and agreed to grant Japan most-favored nation status as reciprocity. However, China and Japan never implemented this agreement, and the problem of the Ryukyu Islands remained unresolved, with Japan continuing to control the islands until the end of World War II. Despite rarely mentioning this issue since the Japanese annexation of the Ryukyus, successive Chinese administrations have never officially recognized Japanese sovereignty over these islands, nor have they relinquished their proper rights to the Ryukyus. Chiang Kai-shek, China's supreme leader from the late 1920s to 1949, despite carrying much historical controversy, did not recognize Japan's control over the Ryukyu Islands either and attempted to address this issue. On September 13, 1932, close to the one-year anniversary of the Mukden Incident in which Japan launched a surprised attack on northeast China under the excuse of a "survival crisis (sounds familiar?)", Chiang wrote in his diary, expectantly, by the Moon's Festival in 1942, we should be able to recover Manchuria (northeast China), liberate Korea, and take back Taiwan and the Ryukyus." On a night in late September 1940, Chiang coincidentally reviewed the diary entry written down eight years before. Still, he believed that his Nationalist Government had a chance "to recover the Ryukyus". During a press conference held in early November 1942 in America, T. V. Soong, China's Foreign Affairs Minister and Chiang's brother-in-law (I met with one of Soong's granddaughters when she visited Hoover by offering her an archival tour, a very elegant lady), indicated that China should take back northeast China, Taiwan and the Ryukyus, and that Korea had to become independent. In late November that year, Madame Chiang Soong May-ling left for the US. Her speech at the US Congress is still regarded as a classic to this day. Before her departure, Chiang Kai-shek meticulously prepared her for talks with Roosevelt. The very first point was that Manchuria, Taiwan and the Ryukyus should be returned to China, and China would approve of America using naval and air bases at these locations. Having met with FDR, Soong May-ling informed Chiang in her telegraph on March 1, 1943 of Roosevelt's agreement that "the Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan should be reverted to China in the future." In the same month, Chiang published his renowned China's Destiny, in which he discussed his vision of China's future and the Ryukyus' importance to China's national defense. Thus, by the eve of the Cairo Conference, recovery of the Ryukyus had been one of China's established policies. And my archival studies have shown Roosevelt, Churchill, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and Josef Stalin all agreed to return Okinawa to China after WWII during or around the time of the 1943 Cairo Conference. Though Chiang was soon to retreat from this demand, his determination to take Okinawa back attracted the top attention within the Allies. Preparing for the Cairo Conference that took place in November 23-26 1943, China's Advisory Office of the Military Commission envisioned a comprehensive plan that the Generalissimo would raise during the meeting. According to the draft, Japan should retreat from all the territories that it had occupied since September 18, 1931, and restore to China Taiwan and the Ryukyus. The draft even included a flexible back-up plan that Okinawa could either be put under international trusteeship or designated as a demilitarized zone. However, by November 15, 1943, Chiang apparently had changed his mind. In the entry on that day, Chiang argued that the status in history of the Ryukyus and Taiwan was different: "The Ryukyus as a kingdom resembles Korea in this position" and, therefore, Chiang decided not to raise the issue regarding these islands during the conference. To Chiang's surprise, on November 23, Roosevelt took the initiative to bring up the Ryukyu issue during his meeting with Chiang. According to the FRUS: "The president then referred to the question of the Ryukyu Islands and enquired more than once whether China would want the Ryukyus. The Generalissimo replied that China would be agreeable to joint occupation of the Ryukyus by China and the United States and eventually, joint administration by the two countries under the trusteeship of an international organization." As Chiang wrote in his diary on the same day, he attended a dinner meeting with FDR at Mena House that started at 7:30 pm and lasted well beyond 11:00 pm. The discussion went on so long that when Chiang left, there was still a range of issues to be discussed. Roosevelt and Chiang thus decided to resume the discussion the following day. Concerning territorial issues, "Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores should all be restored to China. However, the Ryukyus could be put under joint trusteeship of China and the US under the international mandate." Chiang Kai-shek, often known as a cold and ruthless "tyrant" for many pro-independence Taiwanese, displayed a surprising indecisiveness when it came to the Ryukyu issue. Based on Chiang's diaries, he might have softened on the Ryukyu issue for three reasons. First, other lost territories of China, such as Manchuria and Taiwan, weighed more heavily on his heart. Faced with a considerable number of issues to settle during the conference, Chiang was too exhausted to address each and every issue that he might have wished to bring to the table. The restoration of the Ryukyus, thus, did not become a consistent thread in Chiang's agenda for the post-WWII settlement. Second, Chiang was concerned about America's sincerity. Roosevelt's offer to allow China to take over these islands of such great strategic importance might have sounded too good to be true to Chiang. In addition, Chiang, being diplomatically inexperienced, was suspicious as to whether Roosevelt was testing China's ambitions on expansionism. Third, the Ryukyus were a tributary state of China rather than an inherent part of the territory of China, similar to the status of Korea historically. The close historical relations between China and the Ryukyus remained suzerainty ties, while China had never exercised direct control there. Chiang, as one of "the Big Four Leaders" of the Allies, grandly proclaimed that he coveted "no gain" and entertained "no territorial expansion." Consequently, attempts to incorporate the Ryukyus into Chinese territory seemed inconsistent with Chiang's moral claims. Chiang would meet Roosevelt again on 24 and 25, yet neither his dairies nor sources from the American side indicated that the Ryukyus were a topic discussed between them again. On December 1, 1943, the Three Great Allies (top right) jointly issued the Cairo Declaration that stipulated: "It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed." The future of the Ryukyus was not mentioned in this document, though the statement that "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed" may still have served Chiang in his future claim on the islands. At the Tehran Conference, Stalin told Roosevelt that the Ryukyus, which Japan forcibly annexed in 1879, should be returned to China. Two years later, at the Potsdam Conference, the four great Allies reached a final decision over the unresolved Japanese territorial issue. With reference to the Cairo document, the Potsdam Declaration defined the limits of the post-war "to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." However, the Potsdam Declaration that Truman, Churchill and Stalin issued jointly with the absent Chiang on July 26, 1945, like the Cairo document, made no mention of the islands. In the end Chiang missed a golden opportunity to restore the Ryukyus to China. Months earlier before Potsdam, on March 31, Admiral Nimitz issued US Navy Military Government Proclamation no. 1, placing the Ryukyus under US military administration, 13 days before FDR passed away. Over the past few weeks, the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation have frequently appeared in official statements from both China and Japan. They are not relics of a bygone era, but critical milestones that have shaped the fate of millions and laid the foundation for the postwar world order that defines the world day. As for the Potsdam Conference, I visited its site in July 2016 (bottom left). It was an unforgettable journey. Back then, I was traveling alone, carrying a backpack and started from Beijing, traveling by train across Mongolia, Lake Baikal, Siberia, Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and Minsk, then onward to Warsaw and finally Berlin. And my very first stop upon arriving in Berlin was to visit Potsdam. Alongside Greece, it remains one of the most sacred and memorable moments of my trip through Europe. I also stayed at the site of the Cairo Conference during my honeymoon around this same time two years ago (bottom right). The property, close to the pyramids, is now part of the Marriott Mena House, where the hotel generously upgraded my reservation to a suite and offered exceptional hospitality. Unfortunately, the building where the Cairo Conference had taken place was under renovation. I made several requests to visit, and even a senior official from the Egyptian Antiquities Authority came in person to help communicate on my behalf. Yet in the end, I still was not permitted to enter. It was, undeniably, a great disappointment. But even so, I did not feel discouraged. History does not become distant simply because we cannot step through one door. In fact, these moments remind me that respect, patience, and understanding are themselves ways of touching history. Tomorrow, I'll share something even more surprising-the petitions Ryukyuans sent to China after WWII, and why they were buried for decades. May change how you see East Asia entirely.

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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PlusLibQ @joequant @royngerng Ce sont les jeunes de moins de 18 ans qui ne peuvent pas voter. Et oui désolé de vous le dire et de vous le répéter encore, mais une identité c'est complètement malléable et a la guise de volontés politiques, les exemples se comptent par milliers...
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Edouard 🌐👶🇺🇦🇹🇼🇮🇷
"Identité malléable" - Non. L'article montre que la propagande chinoise intensive via TikTok essaie d'influencer les jeunes, mais ça ne fonctionne pas pr changer leur identité fondamentale. Les jeunes restent massivement Taïwanais. Ils peuvent être moins hostiles à la Chine culturellement, mais ça ne signifie PAS qu'ils veulent l'unification politique. Vous confondez : - Consommer de la culture chinoise (films, musique, réseaux sociaux) - Vouloir être gouvernés par le PCC Ce sont deux choses TOTALEMENT différentes. Les Européens consomment massivement la culture américaine. Ça ne veut pas dire qu'ils veulent devenir des états américains. Et les FAITS électoraux : le DPP a gagné en 2024. Si la jeunesse était vraiment "pro-Chine" comme vous le prétendez, le KMT aurait écrasé les élections. Ce n'est pas le cas. L'identité taïwanaise reste robuste malgré la propagande chinoise intensive. C'est exactement l'inverse de votre thèse. Il faut vraiment arrêter avec vos fantasmes irrédentistes.
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PlusLibQ @joequant @royngerng J'ai jamais dit que c'était une question d'ancêtres, je dis qu'une grande partie des Taïwanais s'identifient aussi comme 中國人 et pas juste 華人. Qu'importent s'ils votent DPP ou KMT?
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Edouard 🌐👶🇺🇦🇹🇼🇮🇷
Non, vous vous tirez une balle dans le pied. Si 中國人 signifie juste “localité géographique/origine”, alors pourquoi les réponses à cette question corrèlent-elles PARFAITEMENT avec : 1. Les votes DPP (indépendance) vs KMT (rapprochement) 2. Les positions sur l’unification (pour/contre) 3. Les attitudes envers Pékin Si c’était juste géographique, ces corrélations n’existeraient pas. Les gens qui disent “Taiwanren uniquement” votent massivement DPP et rejettent l’unification. Ceux qui disent “Zhongguoren” votent KMT et sont plus ouverts au rapprochement. C’est ÉVIDEMMENT une question d’identité POLITIQUE et nationale, pas juste “d’où viennent mes ancêtres”. Les chercheurs taïwanais qui analysent ces données depuis 30 ans le comprennent parfaitement. Vous essayez juste de manipuler la sémantique pour nier l’évidence. 60%+ rejettent fermement l’identité chinoise. Point.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ acceptez la réalité. Stop l’impérialisme chinois.
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PlusLibQ @joequant @royngerng Ça montre surtout qu'une identité est complètement malléable. Que la nouvelle génération est plus favorable à la chine car elle est davantage exposée aux médias chinois avec lesquels ils créent un lien affectif, ce qui n'existait pas auparavant.
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Edouard 🌐👶🇺🇦🇹🇼🇮🇷
Cet article prouve exactement ce que JE dis, pas vous. L’article cite Mindy Huang qui dit clairement : “Most Taiwanese, we see ourselves as Taiwanese. We see ourselves as an independent country different from China.” Elle dit que certains jeunes “sont prêts à se rapprocher de la Chine” - ça ne veut PAS dire qu’ils veulent l’unification. Ça veut dire moins d’hostilité, plus d’échanges. Nuance énorme. Et même l’article explique POURQUOI : guerre cognitive chinoise via TikTok, propagande sur les réseaux sociaux, fatigue face aux menaces constantes du PCC. Mais regardez les faits : le DPP pro-indépendance a gagné les élections de 2024. Si la jeunesse était vraiment pro-Chine, comment expliquez-vous ça ? “Threat fatigue” ne signifie pas “vouloir rejoindre la Chine”. Ça signifie minimiser le danger par lassitude. Ce sont deux choses différentes. Les sondages NCCU restent clairs : moins de 10% veulent l’unification. Votre article ne contredit pas ça.
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PlusLibQ @joequant @royngerng Voilà c'est exactement où je voulais en venir, 40% qui se considèrent Chinois, pas seulement par ethnie, mais surtout par localité géographique. Sinon le terme utilisé aurait été 華人. Vous voyez quand vous voulez vous êtes capable de comprendre
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Edouard 🌐👶🇺🇦🇹🇼🇮🇷
Vous jouez sur les mots en chinois mais la question est très claire dans son CONTEXTE et son INTERPRÉTATION. 臺灣人 (Taiwanren) vs 中國人 (Zhongguoren) dans ce sondage fait référence à l’identité NATIONALE, pas juste géographique. C’est évident par : 1. Le contexte du sondage : mesurer l’évolution de l’identité nationale taïwanaise 2. Les résultats corrélés avec les positions politiques sur l’indépendance/unification 3. L’interprétation académique unanime de ces données Si c’était juste “parisien vs français”, pourquoi les résultats corrèlent-ils parfaitement avec les votes pour DPP vs KMT ? Pourquoi ceux qui disent “Taiwanren uniquement” sont massivement contre l’unification ? Vous essayez de noyer le poisson linguistiquement pour nier ce que tous les chercheurs taïwanais reconnaissent : c’est une question d’identité nationale. Les Taïwanais comprennent très bien ce qu’on leur demande. Et 60%+ répondent “taïwanais uniquement, pas chinois”.
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PlusLibQ @joequant @royngerng cbc.ca/news/world/tai… La génération des tournesols (déjà il y a 10 ans) n'est plus considérée comme la jeune, je suis désolé. Et moi, contrairement à vous, je suis capable de comprendre des interviews de taïwanais dans des journaux Singapouriens, hongkongais ou même taïwanais.
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Edouard 🌐👶🇺🇦🇹🇼🇮🇷
Je ne parle pas "au nom" des Taïwanais. Je cite des SONDAGES de la NCCU (National Chengchi University), l'institution taïwanaise la plus respectée sur ces questions, qui interroge des milliers de Taïwanais régulièrement. VOUS, sur quoi vous basez-vous ? Vos impressions ? Vos fantasmes ? Quelques conversations anecdotiques ? Les données sont claires : - 60%+ s'identifient exclusivement comme taïwanais - Moins de 10% veulent l'unification avec la Chine - 82% veulent maintenir le statu quo (= séparation actuelle) "La jeunesse pas aussi anti-chinoise" - Les jeunes Taïwanais sont en fait les PLUS pro-indépendance dans les sondages. Ce sont eux qui ont mené le Mouvement Tournesol en 2014, par exemple. Si vous avez des DONNÉES qui contredisent les sondages NCCU, présentez-les. Sinon, arrêtez de projeter vos fantasmes sur 23 millions de personnes.
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PlusLibQ @joequant @royngerng Vous citez des sondages sans même les comprendre, vous ne lisez même pas les questions originelles sans en comprendre les subtilités des mots chinois (différence entre indépendance ROC ou ROT), entre chinois (pays ou ethnie).
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PlusLibQ @joequant @royngerng Ah oui? Laissez moi rappeler la question alors: 我們社會上,有人說自己是『臺灣人』,也有人說自己是『中國人』,也有人說都是。請問您認為自己是『臺灣人』、『中國人』,或者都是?voilà merci de m'identifier le NATIONAL dans les caractères utilisés
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Edouard 🌐👶🇺🇦🇹🇼🇮🇷
Faux. Les sondages NCCU demandent explicitement si les gens s'identifient comme : - Taïwanais uniquement - Chinois uniquement - Les deux Ce n'est PAS "parisien et français" - c'est "français ou allemand ou les 2". C'est une question d'identité NATIONALE, pas régionale. Et les résultats sont clairs : 60%+ disent "taïwanais uniquement", pas chinois du tout. Seulement ~5% disent "chinois uniquement". Si Taiwan était vraiment "chinoise", pourquoi 60%+ rejettent-ils complètement cette identité ?! Vous manipulez les données pour nier la réalité : les Taïwanais ne se considèrent pas chinois. Acceptez-le, ça suffit de vivre dans un monde imaginaire.
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PlusLibQ @joequant @royngerng Puis j'en ai un peu marre de vous voir lire parler au nom des Taiwanais, vous êtes allé sur le terrain échanger avec eux? Avec les habitants de Matsu peut être? Avec la jeunesse qui, o stupeur, n'est pas aussi anti chinoise que la génération DPP?
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Edouard 🌐👶🇺🇦🇹🇼🇮🇷
Vous ne savez manifestement pas lire un sondage, donc je vais expliquer lentement : Identité : 60%+ exclusivement taïwanais, ~30% “taïwanais ET chinois”, ~5% uniquement chinois. Total qui s’identifient comme taïwanais d’une manière ou d’une autre : 90%+. Status quo : 82% veulent le maintenir. MAIS le status quo actuel = Taiwan fonctionnant comme pays indépendant, séparé de la Chine. Ce n’est PAS “attendre la réunification”. C’est maintenir la séparation actuelle. Unification : Moins de 10% la veulent, même “plus tard”. C’est ultra-minoritaire. Les Taïwanais veulent rester exactement comme ils sont : séparés de la Chine, indépendants dans les faits. Ils ne veulent juste pas provoquer Pékin en le déclarant formellement. “Soutien non désiré qui détériore la paix” - NON. Ça suffit de blâmer les victimes. C’est les menaces d’invasion chinoises qui détériorent la paix. Soutenir une démocratie menacée par un régime autoritaire n’est pas “irrationnel” - c’est LA chose morale à faire. Vous défendez l’agresseur.
Edouard 🌐👶🇺🇦🇹🇼🇮🇷 tweet mediaEdouard 🌐👶🇺🇦🇹🇼🇮🇷 tweet media
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PlusLibQ @joequant @royngerng Vous auriez beau clamer une indépendance de fait, elle n'a pas de valeur légale, et malheureusement (ou heureusement) le monde est régi par les lois internationales... Sinon même daech qui a eu son indépendance de fait aurait pu prétendre à une reconnaissance internationale !
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Edouard 🌐👶🇺🇦🇹🇼🇮🇷
“Personne ne le nie, pas même la RPC” - La RPC nie constamment que Taiwan est indépendant dans les faits. Xi dit que la “réunification est inévitable”, menace d’invasion, refuse de renoncer à la force. “Chinois officiellement” - Officiellement selon QUI ? Selon Pékin qui n’a aucun contrôle ? Le “statut ambigu” existe uniquement à cause des menaces chinoises, pas parce que Taiwan EST chinois. Le jour où la Chine arrête de menacer constamment l’invasion, aucun doute que la République de Taïwan renaîtra rapidement. “Stupide gif montre drapeau chinois” - Le drapeau ROC est un vestige historique. Si Taiwan changeait de drapeau, Pékin menace d’invasion. C’est du chantage, pas une preuve que Taiwan est chinois. Vous admettez vous-même que Taiwan est “indépendant dans les faits”. C’est EXACTEMENT mon point. Après 76 ans, les “faits” créent la réalité. L’ambiguïté n’existe que parce que Pékin refuse d’accepter ce que tout le monde voit : Taiwan est un pays indépendant.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ Dans lequel plus de 90 % de la population refuse d’être annexé par leur voisin.
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PlusLibQ @joequant @royngerng En clair, je crains bien que vous illustrez bien le soutien pro taïwanais complètement irrationnel et sans queue ni tête, alors que ce soutien est souvent non désiré par les Taiwanais eux mêmes car cela ne fait que détériorer la "paix" qui règne dans la région
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Yolo Keölæy 👾
Yolo Keölæy 👾@Hockthus·
@PlusLibQ @joequant @royngerng Si je résume, d'une part vous me parlez de sondage qui montre que 80% veulent un status quo, d'autre part que 40% s'identifient comme chinois, qu'ils veulent l'indépendance puis qu'ils veulent le status quo (qui n'est pas explicitement pas une indépendance dans le sondage)
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