kaung wong justin
147 posts

kaung wong justin
@Justin15647
BTC and Mining Stocks $IREN





This is INSANELY bullish. $IREN moved earnings up: Feb 11 → Feb 5. You don’t pull earnings up unless you’ve got good news. Last time: MSFT deal dropped 3 days before earnings. 14 days until 2/5. Bookmark this. Deal before earnings again?





I am bidding for more ASST but I am concerned that unless BTC goes back under $100,000, it may be difficult to buy a large amount of shares under $1.30 going forward.


6.5 万枚 ETH 处于清算边缘的巨鲸/机构,在 4 小时前从 Bitfinex 提出 2,000 ETH ($3.75M)、币安提出 154 万 USDT 补充抵押品和还款。将清算价格从 $1,932 下降到 $1,836。 这个价格仍然非常危险,现在 ETH 价格距离他的清算价格,仅有 $50 刀。 噢,对了。这个巨鲸/机构作为抵押品的 ETH 主要都是在 2022 年 5 月以循环贷方式买的,成本均价差不多 $2,088。目前亏损超过 $1400 万。 debank.com/profile/0xab7b… 本文由 #Bitget|@Bitget_zh 赞助


$IREN has a serious problem... In this deep-dive post, I’ll shed light on $IREN's Achilles' heel: its Investor Relations (IR) & Communications Strategy. Although $IREN is one of the best-positioned data center companies in this AI-driven paradigm shift, its stock trades like a memecoin or a micro-cap penny stock. There is a serious disconnect between the company’s fundamentals and its share price. $IREN's executive management & IR team have done an incredibly poor job of controlling the narrative surrounding the company. This has been an ongoing issue for at least a year (since I started covering the stock), but it has become glaringly obvious in recent months. It’s now so out of hand that $IREN has drastically underperformed its $BTC mining peers during the recent $BTC sell-off—even though it has the highest operating margins and is the fastest-growing company in the segment. If anything, $IREN should be the stock least susceptible to these kinds of $BTC-driven pullbacks, given its industry-leading break-even point. I’m fully aware that no company has 100% control over its share price. Capital markets are dynamic and influenced by countless factors. However, having covered this stock extensively over the past year, I can see a massive misalignment between investor perception and reality. This misalignment has left a large gap for content creators like @FransBakker9812, @TheKamaHsutra, and myself to fill. Thanks to IREN’s weak IR strategy, there is huge demand from its retail investor community for explanations about IREN’s business model, its competitive moat, and the trajectory it’s on. But this issue isn’t just limited to retail investors. During the last earnings call, institutional investment analyst @StephenGlagola questioned the viability of IREN’s remote data center sites in West Texas for AI workloads—echoing a common narrative on X: "Remote sites aren’t viable for AI workloads. Only metropolitan sites are." Anyone who has spent a decent amount of time researching this topic knows this is completely false. The question should have been an easy layup for Co-CEO @danroberts0101 to refute and set the record straight. Instead, Dan appeared irritated by the question and didn’t even bother to give a comprehensive answer. He likely assumed everyone should already know better. The problem? They don’t. Yes, $IREN made an investor presentation last July highlighting its sites’ suitability for AI/HPC, but that was 8 months ago. You can’t expect to change a narrative with a single investor deck. IREN’s infrastructure is literally its biggest moat. Every earnings presentation, every investor update should hammer home the fact that its sites are AI/HPC-suitable. Every potential investor should know this. To make matters worse, executives from other aspiring AI/HPC companies like $BTBT, $MARA, $WULF and $CORZ are now actively spreading this false narrative about remote sites being unsuitable for AI. In my opinion, these companies can’t secure thousands or even hundreds of MWs and are instead forced to pick up smaller sites near metro areas. So they spin the narrative in their favor (credit to @TheKamaHsutra for pointing this out to me). The end result: Retail & institutional investors alike are starting to believe $IREN's 2.4-3 GW portfolio is worthless for AI/HPC. As someone who has spent hundreds, if not thousands, of hours studying & covering $IREN, this is beyond frustrating—because it’s entirely avoidable. The $1B ATM: A Self-Inflicted Wound 👇 Another massive overhang on the stock—undoubtedly a key factor in the severity of the recent sell-off—is the poorly communicated $1B ATM announcement. As recently as the prior earnings call, management signaled that dilution was largely over and that future capital needs would be met through debt, even mentioning potential shareholder distributions by late 2025. Then, just ~2 months later, $IREN dropped a $1B ATM, *potentially* diluting shareholders by well over 40% at these levels. The only explanation so far? "IREN needs to fund Horizon 1 (AI/HPC expansion), Sweetwater substation, and 2 additional EH/s (including ASIC upgrades), which together cost ~$500M." Meanwhile, the company is generating $20M-$25M in monthly cash flow even at these suppressed $BTC prices. So why the $1B ATM? Why not $400M or $500M? There’s a huge, unexplained gap. All we get from management is the vague excuse of "financial flexibility." Unsurprisingly, many investors assume the worst—that $IREN is recklessly using ATMs without regard for shareholder equity. Even institutional investors (that I'm in contact with) who reached out to IREN's IR department got the same lazy response: "financial flexibility" and "funding of additional growth initiatives." That’s not a sufficient justification for a potentially excessive capital raise. The Likely Truth about the ATM (That Should Have Been Communicated) 👇 I actually do think there’s a reasonable explanation for the ATM size. Multiple industry sources have pointed out that in today’s environment, proof of funds is a key factor in closing large-scale deals. It’s highly likely that the $1B ATM was structured this way as a show of capital strength to aid in negotiations. But if that’s the case, why wasn’t that clearly communicated? This is yet another case of poor IR strategy hurting shareholder goodwill. ❌ It’s incredibly frustrating because this is entirely avoidable. $IREN's fundamentals—both operational and financial—are exceptionally strong. Yet its IR team fails to capitalize on this. Most investors, especially in such a tech-heavy industry, aren’t well-versed enough to grasp IREN’s moat and growth potential on their own. It took me over 100+ hours of research to fully understand it—and almost none of that knowledge came from direct $IREN related sources. Investors shouldn’t have to do all the heavy lifting. It’s IREN’s job to set the tone and steer the narrative surrounding its company—just like every other public company does. Below, I break down three false narratives that are currently gaining traction and debunk them one by one (something IREN’s IR team should be doing).👇 On paper, $IREN is one of the best risk-adjusted opportunities in the market right now. Its infrastructure portfolio of 2.4 GW (soon likely to be 3 GW) alone is likely almost worth as much as the company's entire market cap of ~$1.75 billion (if it were to be sold). However, in my view, this gap between fair value and actual market cap is largely self-inflicted. $IREN needs to open a new chapter of strategic investor communication. There’s so much the company could do—from educational posts on X to detailed investor decks and presentations that clearly articulate their vision and the rationale behind their decisions. Right now, $IREN is underselling itself, and from the outside, it almost seems like they suffer from imposter syndrome. Having spoken to people inside the company and conducted extensive research, I know $IREN is the real deal. At their core, they are infrastructure developers—they excel at building massive greenfield sites from scratch at record speeds and designing cost-effective, power-dense data centers at scale. What they are not good at—at all—is selling their vision and technical competency to investors. And when a company relies on ATMs to raise capital, this becomes a critical issue. An undervalued company issuing new shares to fund growth faces a real opportunity cost in the form of excessive dilution. ❌ Co-CEO @danroberts0101 recently admitted to having made plenty of mistakes in the past, but he also emphasized that he and his brother are willing to adapt and change course when needed. That level of flexibility is one of the most valuable qualities a management team can have. I’m convinced now is the time to be nimble once again—to course-correct and address $IREN's IR shortcomings. And I’m not alone in this view. Every $IREN investor I’ve spoken to shares this concern. I’ve had discussions with institutional investors like @BCryptM, major shareholders such as @Umbisam and @litigious_dulce, and retail analysts including @FransBakker9812, @TheKamaHsutra, @benemodi, and plenty more—all of whom see the same glaring issue. I would go as far as to offer my help directly. I’m young, ambitious, and passionate about $IREN's future. If needed, I’d even consider relocating to Australia to work under Lincoln Tan, $IREN's Head of Investor Relations, helping to reshape and execute a stronger IR strategy. While I’m serious about this offer, I’d already be satisfied seeing $IREN take this feedback constructively and start moving in the right direction on this matter. Thank you for reading, cheers! 🤝






my unfortunate OPINION; the past 7 days have essentially destroyed the $IREN bullish case for the short to mid term timeline. Only things to be relatively optimistic about are low RSI and historically random behavior of the stock in general, which is basically “fingers crossed”.









