Scott Kennedy

My NEW report from @CSIS! Coming in at a svelte 147 pages, the report argues that China’s advancement across high-tech sectors has directly strengthened the country’s international power and influence, and that other governments need to respond pragmatically to reduce the downside costs and raise the upside opportunities to make the most of these developments. csis.org/analysis/power…

“Replicating the infrastructure, research, software, manufacturing and supply chains currently reliant on China would cost the US $13.7tn, the Eurozone $9.1tn and the UK $800bn by 2050.” ft.com/content/c6c1f5…

Starting at 10:00 am US ET csis.org/events/china-a…

Excellent piece documenting the decline in US-China scholarly exchange. If not reversed, the costs from the consequent lack of understanding will inevitably grow over time. straitstimes.com/world/fewer-am…

TUNE IN on Monday, July 13, 10-11 am for this @CSISCBE online event about the U.S.'s various Section 301 investigations and their implications for US-China relations, w/ a fantastic line-up of experts: @AsiaPolicy @wendyscutler, @MIIS Wei Liang, @PIIE @melovely_max, & Claire Reade. csis.org/events/china-a…

@MichaelKovrig What are the best Canadian-made EVs consumers should consider as an alternative to Chinese brands? If more expensive, is the Canadian government prepared to provide subsidies for these alternatives?

Radio host Mike Smyth asked why Canadians shouldn’t buy Chinese EVs. Because the hidden costs are high. The short-term price advantage is real. But the playbook is well documented: once domestic competitors are gone, the cheap prices go with them. 1/2

Asia Society is pleased to announce the winner of the 2026 Osborn Elliott Prize  for Excellence in Journalism on Asia. Congratulations to Vivian Wang of @nytimes for a series of deeply reported stories exploring the paradox of life in contemporary China, and the challenges ordinary people in their daily lives face in a society powered by technology and driven by nationalist ambition. The $10,000 cash prize is awarded annually by an independent jury to the best example of journalism about Asia during the previous calendar year.

In a recent report, CSIS experts @mazzocco_ilaria and Ray Cai examine how China has been quietly building the institutional architecture needed to navigate the EU's carbon tariff regime. Read: csis.org/analysis/new-c…

We used similar data here. CF40 makes some good points. But two obvious rebuttals are: 1) if subsidies (broadly defined, not just cash subsidies in WIND) don't improve competitiveness, why use them? And 2) the "new economy" isn't all other countries worry about when they complain about overcapacity. x.com/i/status/20650…

“Based on the sum total of what President Trump has said to the media, it seems like he has absorbed a great deal of Xi Jinping’s thinking on Taiwan,” said Bonnie S. Glaser, the managing director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund. “People are anxious.” nytimes.com/2026/06/09/us/…

The irony is China is being cited as a key factor on both sides of the debate: These export controls are good because they keep advanced American AI models out of China’s hands. These export controls are bad because they slow down the US in the AI race with China.

Reminder, designations of Chinese firms as "military companies" are: a) minimal impact. No export controls or investment restrictions/sanctions b) near zero signal on security risk/mil links. If they have evidence on real military links for Alibaba, it isn't in here. The Pentagon has a poor record (at best) for rigor when listing Chinese firms. For example, the investment restriction list was moved to Treasury after a US judge found some of its listings "arbitrary and capricious", based on IMHO laughably weak evidence. Many of the most publicized listings in this batch are no different. Alibaba is listed b/c of "indirect" links with SASAC (which manages state assets yes including sensitive sectors but also salt, forestry, and tourism), and MIIT, China's main technology regulator. The latter is akin to saying a US firm is a military company because it's regulated by the FCC/Commerce Dep't or got Chips Act grants. Similar weak justifications for Baidu, China Mobile, China Telecom, and more. public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-11571.pdf

Just weeks after opening in late April, a humanoid factory in Beijing says it’s already produced 300 robots for clients — as it ramps up toward 10,000 this year. The question is: Who is buying them? This week in CNBC’s China newsletter: cnbc.com/2026/06/08/cnb…

@pstAsiatech hits nail on its head when he says the new 1260H list provides a "designation framework that appears less focused on identifying military companies in the conventional sense and more focused on identifying companies that operate within China’s broader techno-industrial system." open.substack.com/pub/pstaidecry…

Development zones has been an important element of China’s industrial policy tool kit. @CSISCBE @Ryanfeath has the details.

Chinese soft power, care of Unitree’s dancing robots.

A coalition of 23 EU industry groups release a letter calling for a more aggressive trade policy to deal with "unfair trade practices and structural overcapacity/oversupply in non-market economies" 4 demands: 1. More trade defence staff 2. Use existing instruments earlier

What's the balance of diplomatic power between China and the United States? We made a database of leader-level travel and found Xi Jinping now goes out less than US presidents But more world leaders visit Beijing than Washington New @AsiaPolicy piece w/Yuxuan Wei 1/Short📊🧵