Eggie B.

Schuldenquote nach GDP 2000 🇩🇪 Germany: 59% 🇺🇸 US: 54% 🇬🇧 UK: 37% 🇨🇳 China: 23% 2026 🇺🇸 US: 126% 🇬🇧 UK: 103% 🇨🇳 China: 107% 🇩🇪 Germany: 64%

You have absolutely no idea of what you’re talking about. The whole point of Pax Silica is to partner with countries who are good at doing different things because everyone wins from a secure supply chain. It’s also a fundamentally a capitalist project (this might be foreign to you) that’s a lot more about partnerships between private companies than it is about government programs. We never said our goal was to maintain diplomatic immunity. Our position has always been that markets and investors need certainty and predictability in order to deploy large pools of capital over a 5-10 year time horizon. Any half decent investor will happily validate this. That viewpoint was taken out of context and turned on its head by the press to suggest we were seeking diplomatic immunity which is patently untrue. Oh and by the way, the agreement is posted online for anyone to look up and read for themselves. The U.S. is home to the world’s largest technology companies—a fact I’m sure deeply irritates you. The idea that being part of their supply chain is “subservience” is an ignorant loser mentality. Is TSMC a subservient company?? Anyone who knows anything about tech understands they are one of the world’s most important (and valuable) companies—and also an integral part of America’s (and the world’s) supply chains.

🇯🇵 Tokyo Bet Everything on Taiwan Hardline: Trump Flipped the Table in Beijing and the Gamble Just Blew Up 🇨🇳🇺🇸 What happens when you ignore Beijing’s red lines is a lesson Tokyo’s foreign policy experts are learning firsthand, as they panic over the “Trump Shock.” The Beijing summit between Trump and Xi came to an end on May 14. The Great Hall of the People’s photos revealed the two leaders appearing at ease, with Trump appearing particularly respectful. Tokyo read the body language and lost the plot. They’re calling it Nixon Shock 2.0: Washington and Beijing quietly resetting the board in G-2 terms while Japan gets the same cold shoulder it got in 1971. Prime Minister Takaichi’s entire image was cultivated by taking the firmest stance on Taiwan, reminiscent of Abe. She told the Diet last November that a Chinese move on Taiwan would trigger Japan’s “survival-threatening situation” clause. Beijing responded to that as it should have, viewing it as a direct challenge to its fundamental interests. Airlines have reduced flights, Japanese seafood imports are on hold, and controls on rare earth materials have been strengthened. Takaichi’s gamble was simple: America will always have our back, but Trump just pulled the rug out from under her. Prior to his trip to Beijing, he voiced his doubts about Japan’s “too forward-leaning” stance on Taiwan. He downplayed any real risk of cross-strait conflict. He told reporters he’d discuss future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with Xi and later confirmed they covered it “in great detail.” This silently dismantles the previous Six Assurances framework, which had excluded Beijing for decades. A quick call to Takaichi to manage the situation on the flight back was ineffective. In blunt terms, Japanese analysts state the support has been removed. Believing in unwavering U.S. support, Japan adopted a tougher approach, but Washington ultimately sought a stable, deal-based relationship with China. From China’s perspective, this is purely the result of strategic maneuvering. Beijing has never concealed its stance on Taiwan; it is an internal matter and not subject to negotiation. Japan’s geographical location means it is not a co-owner of that issue. At the same time, Washington is managing issues with Iran, Russia, trade disputes, and energy costs. Beijing holds leverage on all of them. Why keep poking the dragon when you can deal directly with Xi? Here’s the pattern Tokyo misses: improved U.S.-China relations often correspond with a cooling of Sino-Japanese relations. “Japan passing” is not paranoia; it’s the intersection of geography, power, and reality. Japan’s economy still needs China and its security still needs America. Getting both relationships wrong at the same time is a self-inflicted trap. Takaichi now faces a choice with no good options: swallow the reversal and look weak at home, or double down and risk strategic isolation. Neither ends well. Instead of gloating, Beijing is monitoring the outcomes of crossing a line that was set in the past. When will Tokyo learn that provoking its biggest trading partner, as its security guarantor makes separate deals, is not a sound strategy?