Max Brin

I'm creating Claude Skill that does it all in 15 mins...

Microsoft did it again! Building with AI agents almost never works on the first try. A dev has to spend days tweaking prompts, adding examples, hoping it gets better. This is exactly what Microsoft's Agent Lightning solves. It's an open-source framework that trains ANY AI agent with reinforcement learning. Works with LangChain, AutoGen, CrewAI, OpenAI SDK, or plain Python. Here's how it works: > Your agent runs normally with whatever framework you're using. Just add a lightweight agl.emit() helper or let the tracer auto-collect everything. > Agent Lightning captures every prompt, tool call, and reward. Stores them as structured events. > You pick an algorithm (RL, prompt optimization, fine-tuning). It reads the events, learns patterns, and generates improved prompts or policy weights. > The Trainer pushes updates back to your agent. Your agent gets better without you rewriting anything. In fact, you can also optimize individual agents in a multi-agent system. I have shared the link to the GitHub repo in the replies!

Google Turbo Quant running Locally in Atomic Chat MacBook Air M4 16 GB Model: QWEN3.5-9B Context window: 50000 Summarising 20000 words in just seconds.. You can do 3x larger context window, processing 3x faster than before!

Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.

Early testers are saying that M2.7 has big improvements in emotional intelligence and character consistency 👀