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Trump forcing Ukraine into negotiations will be like a guy trying to sell his sister-in-law's car with a bad transmission. A metaphorical 🧵
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Michael Lokesson
3K posts
Michael Lokesson
@MichaelLokesson
🗞️ Hack turned hack 🎥 Navy vet. Former NatSec Reporter. Russianista. Climber of vertical things. Bylines @ NatGeo / NYT / Other disreputables.
Los Angeles Katılım Şubat 2013
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Michael Lokesson retweetledi
Export volumes of crude #oil barely decreased despite Ukrainian strikes. This caused a small dip at the end of March, which is barely visible once we zoom out over four years.
The reason is that the infrastructure network is resilient: even if some volumes burned, most production was successfully diverted to other export hubs, while #Baltic terminals only shut down for a few days at a time, which is insufficient to significantly impact seaborne lifting operations.
Un baron fou@EuropaMagnifica
La Russie accroît ses exportations de pétrole, dont la valeur atteint un niveau record depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine. La valeur des expéditions a atteint en moyenne 2,42 milliards de dollars par semaine, un niveau record depuis l'invasion.
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Michael Lokesson retweetledi
As mentioned in my piece a while back, mapping is not only about describing control and frontlines but also about storytelling. In the case of drone warfare, it reveals the operational plan unfolding.
Unfortunately, if we ignore all the 5-10 km deep Russian infiltrations even though many fail to establish presence, we cannot infer patterns and assess intended objectives and movements. This simply erases a whole part of what cartography is about.
Needless to say, every map can tell a different story, and I believe it should be made clearer for the audience what each map is about: the FLOT, firm control, movements and infiltration patterns, etc.
I would be very interested in a map that can draw all infiltration vectors and patterns vs supply lines, topography, bottlenecks like bridges, at operational level.
Analysis on mapping conventions in reply 👇
#UkraineRussiaWar #OSINT #Mapping #Strategy
Playfra@Playfra0
1/🧵 🗺️Some more of my personal thoughts about the situation, specifically about current problems in mapping work and the role of geolocations in mapping. (If you're already somewhat informed on the problems' causes, skipping to 4/🧵, the core of the thread, might be useful to you).
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Michael Lokesson retweetledi
Michael Lokesson retweetledi
Seems that Reuters report that Russia oil exports were down by 20% was badly wrong.
It got everyone excited after the persistent attacks on the Baltic seaports at primorsk & ust-luga
But I said it many times, Ukrainian drones can fly along way now but they’re simply not powerful enough to destroy a refinery. Both ports are back at work exporting 60% of Russia oil.
Russia Oil Exports Keep Flowing Despite Ukrainian Attacks
Drone strikes have wreaked havoc on ports and refineries, but Moscow is still shipping crude
By Alexander Osipovich
wsj.com/world/russia/r…
“But even as the attacks caused a drop in exports from the Baltic and Black seas, Russia shipped more crude from ports in the Pacific and Arctic, according to figures from data provider Kpler. Russia’s total seaborne crude exports held steady at about 3.5 million barrels a day in April, little changed from March and 2% higher than the same month last year.”
“Moscow hasn’t released official data on its energy tax revenues since the Iran war began. IEA analysts have calculated that Russia’s revenues from oil and refined products hit $19 billion in March, the first full month of the conflict, nearly double the $9.75 billion from February.”
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@AMK_Mapping_ When both sides accuse you of bias, you know you’re doing something right.
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I've been seeing a lot of Pro-Russians claim that my reporting is significantly skewed in favour of Ukraine recently, and that I'm "over-hyping" Ukrainian successes, so I decided to tally up my posts I made over the last week based on if they were covering Ukrainian successes or Russian successes.
Out of 79 counted posts, 44 were covering Russian successes and 35 were covering Ukrainian successes. This ratio largely reflects what each side is achieving. I have the same threshold for what events I consider "worthy" of posting for both Russia and Ukraine, and these numbers simply reflect what events reached that.
Pro-Russians complaining about my supposedly overreporting Ukrainian successes are doing the exact same thing Pro-Ukrainians and nafoids have been accusing me of for the last two years, except the other way around.
Just because you want something to be true, it doesn't make it so. Stop basing you opinions of reality on what you personally want to happen.
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@3_bm15 @UAControlMap Not to mention they could send a Kilo out of Novorossiysk. Or retask any number of those ALCMs they send after UA infrastructure. They have the assets. For whatever reason they choose not to.
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@UAControlMap The VKS is plowing fields and tree lines, surely they can retask aircraft to another effort.
Munition constraints are of course real, but I don't expect shopping would plow through like some tower defense game critters.
It could have an international reaction though.
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It's unclear to me what deters Russia from trying to shut down traffic to Odesa at this point.
There's the international reaction I guess: ships coming into Odesa aren't owned by Ukraine.
OSINTtechnical@Osinttechnical
Overnight, Ukrainian USVs successfully struck a pair of oil tankers awaiting loading at Russia’s port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea.
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@AnankeGroup Who needs real economic effects when you have memes. x.com/Archer83Able/s…
Status-6 (War & Military News)@Archer83Able
Perm, Russia. The Russians honoring Wagner Group fighters killed in action in Ukraine while a burning oil infrastructure object can be seen burning in the distance after Ukrainian strikes.
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Les exportations de pétrole de la Russie, qui ont fait plus que se maintenir au mois d'avril malgré les frappes ukrainiennes, pourraient encore augmenter au mois de mai.
Reuters suit Bloomberg, qui disait la même chose il y a 2 jours ...
reuters.com/business/energ…
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Michael Lokesson retweetledi
5/ The most significant shift is internal. Pressure is mounting across governance, energy, and internal security. Ukraine’s degraded energy system has emerged as key strategic vulnerability - and a timeline. The next winter is a critical horizon shaping the negotiation track.
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Michael Lokesson retweetledi
In this article, I outlined that the strategic importance of territorial conquest must be measured differently than simply by the percentage of land.
Latest studies estimate that 50% of Ukraine’s $15 trillion worth of mineral resources is located in the 20% of territories currently occupied by Russia.
That means the war is largely paid for many times over. However, it also means the conflict has reached a phase where incremental gains may no longer yield sufficiently attractive results for Russia. A strict assessment of ground operations may occur by the end of 2026.
#Strategy #Analysis #Minerals
Delwin | Military Theorist@DelwinStrategy
My latest article (in French) has just been published in La Vigie. Many thanks to General Kempf (@egea_blog) for his trust and kind invitation. Stratégie d'attrition, Svechin et la guerre d'Ukraine (Delwin) lettrevigie.com/strategie-datt… #Strategy #Doctrine #UkraineWar
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@RALee85 Does the same apply to Russia's ability for offensive maneuver?
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I disagree. The Ukrainian offensive operations in Kupyansk and Zaporizhzhia from last fall and this winter demonstrated that offensive maneuver is possible even with brigades and regiments that only had a company-size element of infantry. In both cases, breakthroughs were possible if Ukraine had sufficient forces to exploit success. Proper planning, task organization, rehearsals, intelligence, and employment of fires/CUAS can set the conditions for successful offensive operations. UAS can enable, not only hinder, maneuver.
Giorgi Revishvili@revishvilig
General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and current Ambassador to the UK: Due to scientific and technological progress, it has become impossible, regardless of what others may claim, to carry out operational-level tasks. 1/12
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Michael Lokesson retweetledi
90 milliards, c'était pour couvrir les 2/3 des besoins budgétaires et militaires de l'Ukraine pour cette année.
Ça ne suffira pas : Kiev, qui n'a pas encore vu les premiers billets, dit déjà qu'il faudra probablement une rallonge de 19 milliards ...
newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/eu-may-ne…
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@ConnerBean Anyone who says otherwise has never experienced the sort of serious financial setback or period of joblessness that, if encumbered with a mortgage you may not meet, puts you under some of the most brutal psychic stress any person experiences.
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Paying off mortgages early is one of those things where I respect and acknowledge the math, but the math doesn't take into account the psychological benefits of not owing money to anybody and owning your house outright
The Money Cruncher, CPA@money_cruncher
My coworker has a 1.99% mortgage. That is something you should NEVER pay off early. Inflation is at least 3%/yr. Why would anyone pay that off aggressively? It makes absolutely 0 sense.
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Michael Lokesson retweetledi
Michael Lokesson retweetledi
10/ Economically, pressures continue to build: trade deficit, damaged energy system, fiscal gaps. The system holds, but external shocks now matter more. Iran, oil prices, US politics increasingly shape Ukraine’s war environment as much as the battlefield itself.
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@Camp4 The issue is people age out of most outdoor sports. Not surprisingly, the ones you can keep participating in into your 70s/80s -- like tennis and climbing -- confer not only huge longevity benefits, but huge improvements in the quality of life of those later years as well.
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I’ve been saying this for 20 years.
Exercise through sport >> Gym exercise
🧠 We massively underestimate the role of mind-body connection in fitness and longevity.
☀️ Not to mention being outside.
The gym is the side dish, not the main course.
Aakash Gupta@aakashgupta
Tennis players live 9.7 years longer than sedentary people. Not 9.7 months. 9.7 years. Nearly a decade. The Copenhagen City Heart Study tracked 8,577 people for 25 years and ranked every sport by how much life it adds. Badminton: 6.2 years. Soccer: 4.7. Cycling: 3.7. Swimming: 3.4. Jogging: 3.2. Tennis almost triples jogging. A separate study of 80,000 adults found racket sports cut all-cause mortality by 47% and cardiovascular death by 56%. Swimming hit 41%. Aerobics hit 36%. The question is why racket sports destroy everything else. Three mechanisms stack on top of each other. First, the physical demands. A tennis rally requires explosive sprints, lateral cuts, and sustained aerobic output. You're training fast-twitch and slow-twitch muscle fibers simultaneously. Most cardio only trains one system. Second, the cognitive load. You're reading spin, predicting angles, adjusting position, and executing motor patterns in real-time. Your brain is solving spatial puzzles at 80+ mph. That hand-eye coordination and strategic processing builds neural connections that protect against cognitive decline. Third, and this is the one researchers keep coming back to: you literally cannot play alone. Every racket sport requires another person on the other side of the net. That forced social interaction triggers neurochemical benefits that solitary exercise cannot replicate. Strong social connection alone increases your chance of longevity by 50%. Jogging is you and your thoughts. Tennis is you, a strategic opponent, and a community. Dr. Daniel Amen is right. The data is overwhelming. If you want the single highest-ROI activity for a longer life, pick up a racket.
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@DelwinStrategy @franfran2424 Welcome! It’s a badge of honor.
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Such a comment coming from someone who, as far as I know, works in the telecom industry makes me smile…
And who “leveraged” my analysis conclusions on the Russian fleet size.
The work done at Oryx is excellent. The (basic) calculations done to reach the conclusions in my analysis rely on their data. This is simple maths. One may not like the result, or have a different interpretation, as for many other topics, but that should lead to a debate, not baseless comments. Disappointing.
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Michael Lokesson retweetledi
Zełenskiego poszukiwania Wunderwaffe, sezon 2026.
Tradycyjnie już jak co roku od 2024 r. gdy robi się ciepło, Prezydent Zełenski zaczyna fotografować się na tle pocisków balistycznych i opowiadać o "cudownych broniach", wykorzystując przy tym różne sztuczki zaczerpnięte ze starych podręczników dawnych sprzedawców odkurzaczy albo koców termicznych. Oczywiście jak co roku sporo osób w Polsce - jak widzę po swoim timeline, wydawało się poważnych ludzi - daje się na to nabierać. Część z nich to opłacani lobbyści i mają w tym interes ale reszta niczym nie różni od tych emerytów kupujących na pokazach "cudowne, lecznicze kołdry".
Oto więc krótkie przypomnienie dotychczasowych "cudownych broni" Zelenskiego z poprzednich sezonów.
Sezon 2024. Pocisk balistyczny "Palanica". Zelenski ujawnia w sierpniu 2024 r. istnienie broni, jej pierwsze użycie bojowe i zapowiada masową produkcję. Zakupem pocisków ma być rzekomo zainteresowana Litwa. Mychajło Fiodorow ówczesny minister nowych technologii obecny szef MON: „Myślę, że to będzie przełomowe wydarzenie, ponieważ będziemy mogli uderzyć tam, gdzie Rosja się tego dzisiaj nie spodziewa”.
Liczba zidentyfikowanych ataków "Palenicy" - O.
Sezon 2025. Pociski Balistyczne: "Neptun", "Grom" (Sapsan) i "Flamingo".
Marzec 2025 - Zelenski ujawnia pierwsze użycie bojowe "długiego Neptuna" - pocisku balistycznego na bazie pocisków przeciwokrętowych o zasięgu 1000 km. Zapowiada masową produkcję.
Liczba zidentyfikowanych ataków "długich Neptunów" do kwietnia 2026 - około 20.
Maj 2025 r. Jermak ujawnia w wywiadzie dla „The Times” info o pierwszym bojowym użyciu nowych pocisków balistycznych „Sapsan”. W czerwcu 2025 roku Zełenski ogłasza rozpoczęcie produkcji seryjnej.
Liczba zidentyfikowanych ataków "Sapsana" do kwietnia 2026 - 0.
Sierpień 2025 - Iryna Terek dyrektor ds. technologii w Fire Point (wcześniej wytwórczyni donic ogrodowych), ujawnia w rozmowie z dziennikarzami AP istnienie pocisku balistycznego FP-5 "Flaming". Twierdzi że jest lepszy od "Tomahawka" i informuje że Fire Point już produkują 1 pocisk dziennie, od pażdziernika 2025 r będą robić 3 dziennie, a do końca 2025 siedem dziennie. W temacie "Flamingów" wielokrotnie wypowiada się później także prezydent Zelenski.
Liczba zidentyfikowanych ataków FP-5 "Flaming" do kwietnia 2026 - około 30.
Przedstawiciele Fire Point pytani o małą liczbę użyć pocisku w stosunku do deklarowanej wielkości produkcji najpierw zasłaniają się rzekomym zbombardowaniem linii produkcyjnej przez rus, a następnie brakiem "cyfrowych map wysokości", które "mogłyby z wysoką dokładnością podpowiadać rakiecie, jak zmieniać wysokość lotu na trasie, aby omijać rzeźbę terenu i przelatywać nad różnymi przeszkodami na niskich wysokościach". Jak FP-5 ma to robić skoro nie ma radaru pokładowego umożliwiającego śledzenie terenu jednak nie wyjaśniają. W ostatnich wywiadach przedstawiciele i właściciele Fire Point opowiadają już wyłącznie o tym że nastawiają się na produkcje nowych pocisków FP-7 i FP-9 pozbawionych rzekomo wad FP-5.
Polski
Michael Lokesson retweetledi
(1/10) One Year of Analysis on the Russo-Ukrainian War: What the Facts Confirmed.
It has been a year since I started publishing my analysis of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The timing is right to recap the conclusions I reached, and to revisit what I was among the first to point out over that period.
All the topics selected here have since been confirmed and are now broadly recognised.
A thread with links to the original content.
- Russian Armored Fleet Expansion
- The deep-strike campaign on Energy Infrastructure
- The collapse of Ukraine’s heavy armor Fleet
- The attrition reversal in armor and artillery
- Ukrainian economy's exhaustion as a strategic objective
- Russia’s shift toward a Svechin-inspired strategy
- 2022 fatalities: reassessing loss asymmetry
- The real plan of the February 2026 Dniepropetrovsk counterattacks
Thank you all for your interest!
#UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy #Analysis
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@UAControlMap @DelwinStrategy Ukraine certainly has an advantage, but you’re overstating the case. The biggest reason CASEVACS are harder for Russia is because they are pursuing an offensive infiltration strategy. It’s simply much more difficult to extract your wounded under such conditions.
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Not at all. Getting people back from the front is very difficult in both cases, but possible. The UGV thing has been semi useful for a couple of CASEVACs, but not in any great number. You don't see Ukrainians shooting themselves in the head because they know no help is coming, but you see it all the time from Russia.
Ukrainian medical training and care is far better though, and there are TONS of very highly training medics helping Ukraine, let alone the aftercare where Ukrainian soldiers are being treated in western countries - a vital bit of experience given to western medicine in treating combat wounds, and one that often gets ignored.
It's one area where Ukraine have a definitive advantage.
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Important to note that this ratio likely applies to Ukrainian units as well. However, this concerns only soldiers becoming casualties in the first lines where drones operate, and should not be interpreted as a general average including longer-range inflicted casualties. Even though drones are the main cause, significant casualties still happen from artillery, FAB, etc.
Julian Röpcke🇺🇦@JulianRoepcke
#Analysis ➡️For several years, there has been ongoing discussion about the ratio of Russian soldiers killed in action (KIA) to those wounded in action (WIA), with commonly cited estimates ranging from 1:2 to 1:5. ➡️During a recent visit to the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction, I spoke with an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who provided a current, field-based assessment of this ratio. 😳An astonishing one – even for me! 🚨According to his account, the present KIA-to-WIA ratio for Russian forces in that sector is approximately 1:0.5 – meaning that for every two soldiers killed, there is only one wounded. ➡️This assessment is not presented as a theoretical estimate but as an empirical observation derived from the analysis of thousands of Ukrainian strike and surveillance videos. ➡️The mechanism behind this dynamic appears to be as follows: immediately after Ukrainian strikes, the initial ratio resembles a more conventional 1:2 (one killed, two wounded). However, due to the apparent lack of effective medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and an organized casualty recovery chain on the Russian side, many wounded soldiers do not receive timely medical assistance. 🚨As a result, a significant proportion of those initially wounded succumb to their injuries within hours, effectively reversing the ratio. ➡️In practical terms, this suggests that Russian soldiers who are even just moderately wounded have only a limited chance of survival, evacuation, and eventual return to service. ➡️In numerical terms for the Pokrovsk direction, this translates into an estimated daily toll of approximately 50 KIA and 25 WIA among Russian forces – amounting to around 75 total casualties (“losses”) per day, as counted by official Ukrainian military reporting.
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