EVVM

🕚 11:30 AM Fuzz & Unit Tests on Smart Contracts. Why both testing methods are essential to discover vulnerabilities before they become exploits. 🎙️ Kevin Padilla @jistro Co-founder, EVVM @RollAMate Registration: luma.com/kbkipite

Today we live tested the @ethereum EVVM EIP Lab beta with EIP-8250, which is very supprted thanks our native 'async_nonces' 🧉 EIP Lab Report: github.com/EVVM-org/eip-l… @EthMagicians EIP-8250 post: ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-8250-key… More improvements coming for EIPIP Call 👇

First of all, it's great to see @ChrJentzsch proposing a general solution and @nicksdjohnson responding positively, especially when he could easily disqualify it given the technical gaps clearly stated. I want to add my 2 cents regarding pricing, let's switch to "Demand-based recurring pricing", @VitalikButerin also posted about it in the past (vitalik.eth.limo/general/2022/0…) Here is an implementation example, complete and ready to clone by @ensdomains made by the @rollamate team: github.com/EVVM-org/testn… and docs: evvm.info/docs/category/… Plain pricing, dynamic renewals, and staking to offer. All in the native $ENS token, potentially using an optional pricing oracle or on-chain API. What could go wrong? This is a permissionless, transparent, and decentralized way to do it, and it adds a great feature to the architecture. As a domainer (domain investor) since the late 90s, I believe this is the best approach to avoid squatting and ensure fairness in renewal pricing.

Now that ENS Labs (via the project's founder, Nick) is trying to install itself as simultaneously the primary controller of the operations, treasury, AND security council, it's time to update this take: - The DAO looks like it has been captured. Voting power is concentrated in Labs, and is being wielded to take nearly-unilateral actions. - Whether those actions are in the best interest of the ENS project is besides the point; if top level executive control over the project resides in effectively a single person, any claims of credible neutrality, non-custodial-ness, or low developer platform risk are now severely in doubt. This is because the DAO (now controlled by Labs) has the authority to update the ENSv2 Universal Resolver contract (h/t @theZeugh), which can change how names are resolved. And if Labs also controls the security council, the veto protection against such a change is moot. -- Regardless of what happens with the DAO, the treasury, and the security council, to protect ENS' status as public infrastructure, the following must happen: Upgrade authority over the ENSv2 Universal Router (and ideally any other core protocol permissions) should be either burned or subject to a significantly higher voting quorum threshold