Malik Samuel

#CostOfLiving: The only item not affected price-wise in #Borno is... "Pure Water."

@MohammedJa33626 Lol. I asked former fighters a similar question, and their response was quite fascinating. They said the knowledge used to produce the different weapons or items we talked about, those made by people they called unbelievers, came from God (Allah).

@Sazedek The hypocritical animals, imagine taking drinks that came from those that attended "Boko" while they live in the bush like the animals they are. Very soon these vermins will be eliminated like their counterpart who attempted to attack our troops. The dogs of hell.

ISIS has finally released photos from ISWAP’s Eid celebration. Bottled water and fizzy drinks are easily identifiable in the pictures. Despite the remoteness of its location, obtaining supplies is no problem for ISWAP. Civilian collaborators are willing to risk everything for huge profits, as ISWAP sometimes pays more than double the market value for goods.

ISWAP’s Foreign Terrorist Fighters likely captured as part of its Eid celebration. I was told that about 10 foreign fighters have been killed in the last two years, including five in the last seven or eight months.

The ISCAP Eid celebration featured many women and children, especially children. These children will likely be socialised into violence and form part of the group’s recruitment pool for the future. ISIS affiliates, especially ISWAP, already have future fighters waiting in the wings, unless something is done to separate the groups from these children, which will not be easy.

Abu Umaimah in the video does not refer to the imam leading the prayer. Abu Umaimah is Bakura Doro’s teknonym, meaning he is the father of Umaimah. It is common for fighters and commanders to be referred to by their honorific teknonym, sometimes as a way of protecting their identities by avoiding real names.

JAS released a video of its Eid prayer from Lake Chad, but Imam Bakura Doro is not in it. It is possible that the video was filmed in a different part of the islands from where he is based.

It’s easy to criticise without realising that in an emergency like this, where three separate locations were hit, whatever form of transport is available will be used to move victims. This is not peculiar to Nigeria, as other conflict settings have also shown. Sometimes, instead of criticising, contextualising the situation helps.

It also seems that doing it now was strategic: better to catch security forces off guard than to wait until the end of Ramadan, when security would predictably be heightened.

@mustapha96497 Very obvious.

@Sazedek They have collaborators in the city.

Regarding tonight’s Maiduguri bomb blasts Ali Ngulde’s men are most likely responsible. How were THREE locations identified and targeted without intelligence picking up anything, especially as the Monday Market blast seemed to target a police post? Were the explosives assembled within Maiduguri (most likely) or brought in from outside? If brought in from outside, how did they circumvent the checkpoints and security presence in and around Maiduguri? If assembled within Maiduguri, how were the bomb making items secured? Where in Maiduguri were they assembled and how were they transported that no one saw anything? Following the 24 December 2025 blast, was no lesson learnt (what did the investigation reveal about how that suicide bomber managed to get there)? What do these latest blasts mean for residents of Maiduguri? Photo credit: @nk_daso

@AbubakarAbbaAl3 That would be assuming that ISWAP was responsible for the bomb blasts or that ISWAP and JAS were now working together, which currently is not the case.

@Sazedek I saw the last night attack as a possible cover to take the bombs into Maiduguri?

.@Lafarge_Africa, did you even bother checking which handle you have in your profile as your parent company? I’m sure you have nothing to do Osama Bin Laden, even if that’s the profile picture of your supposed ‘parent company’.

I totally agree with you, sir. In this instance, particularly in the short term, repelling is the best we can do. In the long term, however, those in charge will have to think better, and that includes not just our military leadership but the political leadership as well. To quote you, a country’s military is only as good as its political leadership. Unfortunately, our political leadership seems to have switched from governance to politicking and electioneering ahead of 2027, to the detriment of Nigerians, including frontline troops.

@Sazedek @yojora For a fighting force that is stretched, with active theaters virtually in every geopolitical zone of the Country, repelling an adversary force must be seen as a positive, regardless of how much we know about Military tactics & maneuver. What is better? Overran or repelled?

Baga: Repelled Buratai: Repelled Maiduguri: Repelled How much more repelling must we do before we realise this approach won’t work? As long as we keep repelling attacks, these groups will not stop. Our military needs to think like them to get ahead. How are they able to carry out multi-axis attacks? Why are they so emboldened? Last year, @GGA_org launched a report titled “Unseen Advances, Quiet Offensives: ISWAP’s Strategic Resurgence and the Limits of Nigeria’s Military Response”. This followed the ISIS launch of the “Burn the Camp” campaign, which made 2025 the most successful year for ISWAP since the 2016 Boko Haram split. Already, ISWAP has achieved more success now than at this time last year. How is a group with about 10,000 fighters able to dare and take on the army, police, air force, navy, CJTF, and others? The excerpt below from the GGA report provides insight into how and why ISWAP has been successful: The capture of Sambisa Forest marked a turning point for ISWAP, coinciding with a period of elevated morale within the group, largely due to the return of Abu Musab al-Barnawi as interim Wali (governor) with a mandate to reform and consolidate the organisation. Following this strategic victory, ISWAP undertook a major internal reorganisation, initially restructuring itself into two main Wilayah (provinces): Buhaira (also known as Kangar) and Farouk (also referred to as Timbuktu). Each Wilayah was further subdivided into administrative and operational zones known as Mantiqat (districts), with the Wilayah itself also retaining the status of a Mantiqa. Under this arrangement, Farouk, Sambisa, and Banki were designated as Mantiqat within Wilayah Farouk, while Buhaira and Krenowa were established as Mantiqat under Wilayah Buhaira. ISWAP then appointed a Wali to govern each Wilayah and Amir al-Mantiqa (district commanders) to oversee the respective zones. The Wali exercises a degree of semi-autonomous authority over both governance and military affairs, while the Mantiqat are overseen by an Amir al-Mantiqa. In some cases, the Amir al-Mantiqa may also serve concurrently as the Amir al-Fiya, the most senior military commander within the district, depending on the number of subordinate military commanders (Fiya) present. gga.org/unseen-advance…

This afternoon, bandits killed Jamilu Dogari, the royal guard of the Emir of Anka, who is also the chairman of the Zamfara State Traditional Ruling Council, on the road from Mayanchi to Anka. He was travelling from Gusau to Anka on an errand for the Emir.

@Generalsilas It’s always important to read to UNDERSTAND, not just read to respond.

@Sazedek But you have not provided any evidence to support your claims that the reporting is false. We can't simply ❌ a trust me I said so with another trust me I said so.

Bako Gorgore was killed by JAS fighters during one of the JAS-ISWAP inter-group clashes after Shekau’s death. While I’m not certain of the exact date, I’m confident it was more than a year ago. He was killed at Tunbum Allurah, one of Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s bases (I don’t know if he still stays there). Gorgore had led an ISWAP reinforcement to reclaim Allurah from Bakura Doro’s men when he was killed. He was buried in Tunbum Maikoko. I’m sometimes perplexed by how some media organisations, especially those claiming to do critical reporting, fail to verify what they publish. Reporting on Nigeria’s conflict is understandably difficult due to restricted access to certain areas, but the media owes it to themselves and to Nigerians to report facts accurately. One benefit of the recent wave of defections from both Boko Haram factions is that it has made reporting somewhat easier, as some information can now be cross-checked.