Seanavocado

Peter Schiff said "The real threat to Bitcoin now is Tokenized Gold, It is everything that Bitcoin was supposed to do. Tokenized Gold does better"

Midnight 🤝 Monument Bank Monument is set to become the first UK-regulated bank to tokenize retail customer deposits on a public blockchain — representing interest-bearing savings as digital tokens while remaining fully backed, redeemable in GBP, and protected under existing regulatory frameworks. Built on Midnight’s privacy-enhancing blockchain infrastructure, this approach ensures that transaction data remains shielded and accessible only to authorized participants — enabling the use of blockchain technology while maintaining the confidentiality and compliance required in regulated financial services. The initiative begins with a target of £250 million in tokenized deposits and represents the first phase in a broader rollout to expand access to tokenized financial products. Over time, this includes enabling exposure to asset classes such as private equity and structured products, and introducing more flexible lending models — capabilities historically reserved for institutional and private banking clients. Together, this partnership demonstrates how regulated financial institutions can bring traditional financial products on-chain — unlocking a more flexible, accessible, and programmable financial system without compromising privacy or regulatory standards.

Hot take: If Strategy stacks 2.1 million BTC and Bitcoin still isn’t anywhere near $10M-$50M a coin like Saylor predicted, I’m gonna be depressed. That’s 10% of the entire supply. Scarcity should be undeniable. Price should reflect it.

I have voted No on Dingo🗳️ Although I love the Node diversity, my current observation on treasury-spending and weakened network diversity cannot allow me to conclude this should be a necessary spending, just as Amaru.🙏 full-rationale------------------------- I am voting No on this proposal. I appreciate Dingo's technical capabilities and Catalyst contributions, but must reluctantly vote No, as with Amaru, due to treasury minimization principles. Reflecting on the problems observed over the past year: while technical improvements advanced, ADA experienced severe price inflation. Treasury withdrawals, despite their stated purpose of funding sound projects, impose economic costs that pressure SPOs and discourage new participants. This structural contradiction is weakening the staking foundation that secures Cardano. Cardano's security derives from staking, not treasury spending. Robust staking requires price stability and fair economic conditions. Minimizing treasury expenditure aligns with this fundamental proof-of-stake principle. Node diversity should be funded through voluntary investment, not treasury. If alternative implementations provide safety or economic benefits, SPOs will naturally invest in them. This market mechanism validates genuine value and eliminates implementations lacking real utility. Treasury funding bypasses this essential test. Treasury should fund only protocol development. The current treasury proposal system operates on a "first-come-first-served" basis without an annual budget framework, forcing decisions through incomplete deliberation while overall project importance and budget appropriateness remain opaque. Furthermore, node diversity implementations can proliferate indefinitely—funding them one by one will clearly strain the treasury. Approving implementations without clear boundaries invites indefinite category expansion. Voting No to protect staking economics and reserve treasury for protocol essentials.

As a DRep, I decided to vote NO on the proposal: Cardano x Draper Dragon: Orion Fund Cardano needs experts for efficient treasury spending, increased on-chain activity, and to become more attractive to VC investors. This proposal has the potential to achieve all that. It is not an absolute NO, but feedback for improving the proposal. My rationale: What to improve in the proposal: The Cardano Vision document makes a fundamental pivot. From “we build technology” to “we must deliver measurable results”. A proposal of this scale should explicitly commit to the KPIs defined in the Vision 2030. In its current form, the proposal defines its KPIs in a vague and qualitative manner, without clear numerical targets, baselines, or success thresholds, which makes objective evaluation and accountability difficult. Furthermore, if we expect smaller projects requesting significantly lower funding to adhere to clearly defined KPIs and measurable outcomes, it is essential that proposals of this scale set the standard by doing so themselves. Future tranches should be explicitly conditioned on clearly defined and measurable milestones, aligned with both financial performance and ecosystem impact. These milestones should include specific targets, transparent reporting requirements, and independently verifiable data, allowing the community to objectively assess progress. The conditions under which additional capital is released should be defined up front. The role of the Cardano Foundation (CF) within this structure should be more clearly defined, as its current description as an "administrator" lacks sufficient detail regarding its responsibilities, authority, and limitations. In particular, the relationship between the CF and Arouet Holdings should be explicitly clarified to avoid ambiguity around control, decision-making, and accountability. To strengthen governance and transparency, it would be beneficial to introduce a clearer separation of roles and to consider incorporating a DRep committee as an additional oversight layer. Such a committee could provide community-aligned review and accountability, potentially in a role analogous to CF. This would improve checks and balances while maintaining proper legal and governance boundaries. The proposal presents ambitious return targets, such as a 3x gross multiple and 25%+ IRR, which are meaningful on a strategic level. However, for an allocation of this magnitude, it would be appropriate to support these targets with clear evidence of past performance. In particular, the proposal would benefit from including historical fund results, track record data, and relevant benchmarks demonstrating the manager's ability to achieve comparable outcomes. Without such context, it remains difficult to assess the credibility of the stated targets. It would be reasonable to expect a clear and consolidated presentation of the fund's economic structure, including management fees, performance fees, and the overall distribution waterfall. While some elements may be mentioned, they are not presented in a sufficiently transparent and structured way to allow for proper evaluation. This makes it difficult to assess how much capital will be deployed into the ecosystem versus consumed by operational costs, and what portion of returns would ultimately accrue to the treasury. The proposal lacks clearly defined downside protection mechanisms for the treasury in the event of underperformance. In particular, it is not specified whether management fees are adjusted in case of poor performance, whether any form of clawback or capital preservation mechanism exists, or whether there are conditions under which the fund can be paused or discontinued. The proposal would benefit from independent oversight or audit mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability. In addition to third-party or professional oversight, it may be valuable to consider the inclusion of a DRep committee as part of the governance structure. This would help strengthen the connection between on-chain governance and the off-chain investment structure. While the use of a venture capital partner can bring potential benefits such as access to deal flow, investment expertise, and external networks, the proposal does not sufficiently demonstrate why this approach is superior to alternative capital allocation mechanisms. It remains unclear what unique value Draper Dragon provides that could not be developed within the Cardano ecosystem itself, whether through improved grant systems, internal investment structures, or community-led allocation processes. I recognize that a VC partner may be able to execute certain activities faster and more efficiently than DReps operating through on-chain governance. However, this raises a broader strategic question of whether the goal should be to outsource these functions, or rather to improve and mature our own governance capabilities over time. Before committing to this approach, it would be prudent to more clearly define how much capital should be allocated through external managers such as Draper Dragon versus how much should remain under direct on-chain governance. Without clearly explaining why this approach is better and what concrete value Draper Dragon brings, the proposal asks the community to trust external parties without providing sufficient evidence that this is the most effective way to allocate treasury funds. In conclusion, I view this proposal as directionally promising and aligned with Cardano’s long-term ambition to grow its ecosystem and improve capital efficiency. However, given the scale of the requested allocation, the current level of detail, clarity, and accountability is not yet sufficient to justify approval. My vote should be understood as a request for refinement rather than rejection. I would be open to supporting a revised version of this proposal that addresses the points outlined above, particularly in the areas of KPI definition, governance structure, transparency of fund economics, and evidence of track record and added value. With these improvements, this initiative could become a strong and valuable component of Cardano’s treasury strategy. If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance. MANDA Pool ID: pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8 My DRep ID: drep1km69g7ksf8t5g0h9d9tkrcd2tezxelx0wtr76rv2mrkl5nzd6v3