Zack Cooper

The White House just posted their fact sheet on Japan. Details here: whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/20…

🟥 LIVE NOW | The Impossible State | Mar. 18, 11 AM ET Moderated by @VictorDCha @CSIS @CSISGeopolitics, this episode features @ZackCooper @AEI and @KristiGovella @JapanChair on Washington’s failed pivot, PM Sanae Takaichi’s DC visit, and what it means for the Indo‑Pacific and the Korean Peninsula. 🔗 csis.org/events/impossi…

🚨 New Black Swan Strategy Paper out now! 🚨 The Strategic Rationale for SRF‑West, by Dr Zack Cooper, Dr Troy Lee‑Brown & Dr Emma Salisbury. defenceuwa.com.au/publications/b…

Delighted to have a new paper out today for @DefenceUwa with @DrTLeeBrown and @salisbot. We examine the strategic logic of Submarine Rotational Force - West, and discuss the value from Australian, British, and American perspectives. Read it here: defenceuwa.com.au/wp-content/upl…

@johnkonrad @WarOnTheRocks Great! Would look forward to getting your insights into the Trump team’s thinking. And appreciate your points about the industrial base, logistics, and chokepoint issues — will be good to get into more detail on those. I’ll DM so that we can figure out the arrangements.

Setting aside the disaster that was the 2017 transition appointments… I was a fan of the show until recently, when you all (but you especially) began routinely narrating the inner monologue of the President and key members of the administration. I tune in for the criticism. Criticism is useful. But the show has become something else: judgmental. And the distinction matters. Dr. Marshall Rosenberg’s work on conflict prevention identifies a precise mechanism here. Judging intent is the cornerstone of anger. Anger is the cornerstone of conflict. Phrases like “I don’t think that’s what the President is thinking, he’s thinking X” don’t inform. They foment. And it is anger, not disagreement, that breaks down civil society. Drop the presumptions of intent and I have no problem with your dissent. Simplifying intent is dangerous too because it’s also assumptive. We all know Trump has an ego. He admits it. Saying that was part of his decision making process is fine but suggesting it overrides all logic is false, This works both ways. I am angry with @EvansRyan202 because I assume his intention in publishing @CynicalPublius’ middle name was to make it easier for people to harass his coworkers. But I recognize my assumption could be wrong, so my anger towards Ryan is slight. Others who have convinced themselves of hostile intent are fuming. It would evaporate entirely if Ryan clarified his intent by admitting it was his motivation or proving otherwise. If true the residual emotion might be resentment, but resentment doesn’t start wars. It starts arguments. There’s a difference. Your assumption of intent on air is my primary grievance. My long-standing dispute with @EvansRyan202 isn’t political. It’s about WOTR’s persistently thin coverage of logistics, and the fact that when they do publish on the topic, the articles contain false assumptions easily corrected by input from sealift professionals. There’s that word again: assumptions. Except I hold no resentment toward Ryan. He asked for my help in correcting the problem, and I failed too. There simply aren’t enough US Merchant Mariners in our institutions for anyone to consult with…. And the very few who do are incredibly busy right now. What I hold is a deep desire to fix the underlying gap, which is what led to my involvement in the PME debate. As for battleships: yes, I’d welcome a public debate. DMs are open. Three points I’d make: My primary concern is the case you built for why Trump wants battleships. Ego is an obvious and provable motivation, but it is not the primary one. First, industrial base. Surface combatants are proving extraordinarily valuable, but we build exactly one type: DDGs. Every lever is already being pulled to increase DDG production. Building larger hulls concurrently, at yards not currently optimized for DDGs, expands manufacturing capacity rather than competing with it. This BTW is why the BB doesn’t have all the capabilities you and I desire. Second, logistics. We cannot sustain DDGs in a prolonged fight. A larger hull with greater storage capacity and reduced missile dependence extends on-station time and provides alternative methods for underway replenishment Third, chokepoint control. I did not have input into the current design, and we share many of the same concerns about it, but I was involved in the initial debate. The primary strategic motivation, at least at the outset, was the control of chokepoints. A topic that could not be more timely. Thank you for reaching out. For the anger I hold deep frustration but not with you but the entire system WOTR and Stimson exist in. No anger either because I don’t assume your background includes the explosive danger of presuming personal intent.

For those interested in more @WarOnTheRocks content… let me present a full hour of Zach and team podcast hating on battleships! And when zach says “debate” he means they all debate how much they hate Trump. Seriously it’s impressive. A full hour and not one nice thing to say about big booming guns. WARING: you’ll need several hard on the rocks beverages to consume this TDS infused bullshit.

Our latest episode is now available. Tune in to hear @ZackCooper, @AUJ_Ang and @kxachen discuss the state of US engagement with Asia (and yes, we talk about Iran, too). YouTube: youtu.be/rTPl8HSjD7A Apple Podcasts: podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/eng… Spotify: open.spotify.com/episode/1Gjjlz…

The timing of this piece is incredible.

This week on Net Assessment we debated the Trump administration proposal to build new "battleships" -- we were not impressed... Here's our broadside against the idea: netassessment.libsyn.com/a-broadside-ag…

Important article by @ZackCooper foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…

Unfortunately, I agree with @ZackCooper. To borrow an old line, I always knew the Pivot was incomplete. Now I know it's finished. To wit: I wrote this four years ago...

@stephenWalt @CooleyOnEurasia @MohanCRaja .@ZackCooper discusses Washington’s failed pivot to Asia—and considers what a more realistic regional strategy would look like. foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…

(10/10) Finally, how quickly will the US pull back? A fast withdrawal could lead to panic by allies. But a slow one suggest there’s no end in sight. These are tough choices. We should be debating them openly today. Our future, and Asia’s, demand it. Fin. foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…

(9/10) Third, as Washington pulls back, probing by Beijing is inevitable, and allies will look to the US for reassurance and clear commitment. Will US leaders decide to clarify their commitments to remaining allies, or attempt to hide behind a veil of ambiguity?

America’s Pivot to Asia has failed. That’s the argument I make in an essay out today in Foreign Affairs. I know this will be controversial, so let me explain why I think we need to take this seriously and reimagine what comes next. A thread… (1/10) foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…