Getachew K Reda@reda_getachew
Congratulations, brother @Jawar_Mohammed Your persistent conflation of personal opposition to the Prime Minister with a coherent critique of Ethiopia’s long-term strategic interests is remarkable. Disliking the ruling party does not free you from having to distinguish between regime politics and state/national interests.
Over the past few days, you — once an ally of the Prime Minister but now a vocal critic — have repeatedly attacked Ethiopia for seeking to protect its strategic interests in the context of the Sudanese conflict. Some of the reports you circulate or the ideas you share may be factually accurate in isolation. Yet, you present them without reference to the broader strategic context shaping Ethiopia’s calculations. Facts, detached from structure and strategy, can easily be marshaled into a misleading narrative.
Do you genuinely believe Ethiopia should behave as a passive bystander in a region defined by intense geopolitical competition? The tragedy unfolding in Sudan is indeed exacerbated by foreign intervention. But Ethiopia is hardly unique in pursuing its interests. In fact, Ethiopia, more than any other country in the region and beyond, stands to lose more as a result of Sudan’s instability. It has a real skin in the game, as it were. Egypt and other regional actors are not neutral mediators; they are actively shaping the trajectory of the conflict to favor their preferred belligerents.
You position yourself as a politician–activist, but your posture suggests an aversion to the very language of national security and strategic interest. In a region marked by proxy competition, transboundary security threats, and zero-sum maneuvering among rival states, such discomfort is not a virtue. It is a liability. States do not have the luxury of moral abstraction when core national interests are at stake.
Moral posturing in such an environment may be emotionally satisfying, but it is not strategy. Critiquing policy is legitimate. However, presenting every move as evidence of strategic folly simply because it originates from Prime Minister Abiy’s government risks substituting partisan grievance for analysis.
More importantly, anyone with aspirations for higher office should be cautious about adopting a scorched-earth posture toward the state itself. While governments change, strategic geography is stubborn. Ethiopia’s long-term national interests are distinct from — and larger than — the party temporarily in power. A credible alternative must demonstrate an ability to separate those two. Thus far, however, you have shown a near-pathological inability to make that distinction.
