Emmanuele Di Guida

I’m asked this a lot in my lectures: Why did the Soviets invest so many resources in propagating antizionism globally? Did they really hate Jews that much? The answer is that they invested in antizionism because it worked for them, both geopolitically and domestically. To be sure, there were many individuals in the Soviet antizionist apparatus who were driven by personal antisemitism. The Zionologists — individuals tasked with formulating the key tenets of the ideology — are the prime example. But at the state level, the demonization of Israel served much bigger, strategic purposes. It strengthened the Soviet-Arab alliance. It helped mobilize groups and states around the world against the US and the West, pulling them into the Soviet anti-Western orbit, including at the UN. At home, it functioned as a warning to other minorities: don’t organize around your own national interests, and definitely forget about any emigration demands. For the Soviets, antizionism was a tool — and a highly effective one at that. That’s why they kept using it, even when internal discussions acknowledged that their antizionist language was echoing the Protocols and Nazi propaganda. This is useful to understand because antizionism is still a political tool today. We talk a lot about antizionist hate, and there is no question that much of it is driven by that. But there are also political entrepreneurs who use antizionism to get ahead: to gain social media followers, raise money, advance socially and professionally, or pursue political goals. States do the same: witness South Africa filing its case against Israel at the ICJ or China deploying antizionist propaganda online. When incentives align, antizionism gets used. And right now, antizionism is rewarded. It’s a crucial aspect of its growing popularity, and it’s really important that we understand it as we develop strategies to combat it.