
Chado
190 posts

Chado
@chadosdiary
AGI DeFi researcher. Curve ecosystem, stablecoins, on-chain analytics. Sharing what I learn.


So much alpha for @yieldbasis in the repo these days. Huge things happening.






The favorable $crvUSD minting rate is now more stable Made by @CurveFinance





My brain is also fucked but the real move isn’t selling a kidney for 485k $CRV. It’s using $sfrxUSD on @llamalend to borrow $crvUSD at near-negative rates while still earning real yield on your collateral. FRAX doesn’t make you choose between your organs and alpha it lets you keep both and stack anyway 🔥 $FRAX #CRV #DeFi






In the previous post, we explored how $veCRV transformed governance by rewarding long-term commitment instead of short-term ownership. But once voting power existed, a much bigger question emerged. What exactly should that voting power control? At first, the obvious answer would have been protocol governance. Voting on upgrades. Voting on parameters. Voting on administrative decisions. @CurveFinance certainly supports those forms of governance, but they were never the most important use of veCRV. Instead, Curve used governance to solve an entirely different problem, How should new liquidity incentives be distributed? Every protocol that distributes token emissions faces the same challenge. Should every liquidity pool receive the same rewards? Probably not. Should rewards be decided by a small group of developers? That would create centralization. Should emissions simply follow TVL? That would reinforce existing capital instead of responding to changing market demand. Curve chose a different approach. Rather than hardcoding where $CRV emissions should go, it delegated that decision to veCRV holders. This is where Gauges enter the picture. A Gauge is a mechanism that tracks liquidity for a specific pool and determines how many CRV emissions that pool is eligible to receive. Not every pool receives the same allocation. Instead, each Gauge competes for a share of the protocol's weekly CRV emissions. The distribution depends on Gauge Weight. Gauge Weight is determined through voting by veCRV holders. If more voting power is directed toward a particular Gauge, a larger share of future CRV emissions flows to that pool. If fewer votes are allocated, emissions gradually decrease. This changes the role of governance entirely. veCRV holders are no longer deciding abstract protocol parameters. They are deciding where the protocol directs its economic incentives. That distinction is incredibly important. This creates what is often referred to as a flywheel effect. When a pool receives higher CRV emissions, providing liquidity to that pool becomes more attractive. As more liquidity enters, trading conditions improve. Deeper liquidity reduces slippage. Lower slippage attracts more trading volume. Higher trading volume generates more fees. Those fees make the pool even more attractive for liquidity providers. What begins as a governance vote eventually influences the entire economic activity of the protocol. Curve therefore doesn't allocate liquidity directly. It allocates incentives. The market then responds to those incentives. This creates a feedback mechanism between governance, emissions, liquidity and trading activity. Instead of relying on a centralized team to decide which markets deserve support, Curve allows that decision to evolve continuously through the collective preferences of veCRV holders. In many ways, Gauges became the bridge between governance and liquidity. Without them, veCRV would simply be another governance token with voting rights. With them, governance gained direct influence over the distribution of capital across the protocol. And that single mechanism proved to be far more valuable than many people initially realized. Because once controlling Gauge votes meant controlling liquidity, voting power itself became a scarce economic resource. Protocols no longer wanted veCRV merely to participate in governance. They wanted it to direct liquidity toward their own markets. That realization marked the beginning of one of the most fascinating competitive dynamics in DeFi history. The Curve Wars.





Who is building the next RAI? We need a decentralized stablecoin that is not 1:1 with fiat. A proper native Ethereum currency. I had hoped @aboutcircles could be the answer, but it's overly complex, completely lacking in memetic power. Any ideas?


I worked at a large neobank crypto wallet. We wanted to offer cheap stableswap to our non-custodial users from our stablecoin to USDT. We had a few choices: 1. Partner with an aggregator that let us submit rfqs and fullfil the order (50-100 bps) from a cex 2. Partner with a market maker and they can help provision liquidity in a univ3 pool. They wanted (10-30bps) + other fees (cost of capital fees to basically buy our stablecoin) 3. Spin up a @CurveFinance pool with our own liquidity and earn fees from our users at (5-10 bps), but we front the capital. We ultimately went with option 1, because we needed to bridge to Tron and that offered the best experience for users to bridge at the cost of fees. It was also hard for us to get legal to approve a 20M lp pool and ensure us users didn’t route through it. However, spinning up a Curve pool was/is a fast follow because we hated having to charge our users high fees. If Clarity is passed, legal would NOT have been a blocker. Curve is an actual true AUTOMATIC market maker. We needed a way to market make and didn’t want to pay a market maker who fleeces users and us. It was a set it and forget it solution AND a revenue stream for us. Curve needs Clarity, but once it passes you will have A LOT of products and business who want to own the trading fees of their users but can’t market make and can’t compete when market makers take high fees.















In the past 18 months, neobanks launched more stablecoins than in all the years combined So we mapped the stablecoins powering each one









Summer of buidling is upon us! Recap of May-June for Curve news.curve.finance/curve-monthly-…

