Thibaut Freedisch 💤

482 posts

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Thibaut Freedisch 💤

Thibaut Freedisch 💤

@freedisch

prev @owasp, Google summer of code'24 @securecodebox | Linux Foundation Mentorship'23 @LitmusChaos 🔥

Github Katılım Temmuz 2018
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Thibaut Freedisch 💤
Thibaut Freedisch 💤@freedisch·
My open source contributions became more meaningful, When I started contributing without any expectations
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Thibaut Freedisch 💤
Shifted to Google Colab Pro and my 7-B mistral model got downloaded in less than a 1min
Thibaut Freedisch 💤 tweet media
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gabriel
gabriel@gabriel1·
when interviewing for jobs, don't talk as if they're doing you a favor by hiring you and giving you money focus on removing 100% of unknowns from the interviewer, even if they don't ask you; do you work hard, learn fast, have you done this before, show something live
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Jianyang Gao
Jianyang Gao@gaoj0017·
The TurboQuant paper (ICLR 2026) contains serious issues in how it describes RaBitQ, including incorrect technical claims and misleading theory/experiment comparisons. We flagged these issues to the authors before submission. They acknowledged them, but chose not to fix them. The paper was later accepted and widely promoted by Google, reaching tens of millions of views. We’re speaking up now because once a misleading narrative spreads, it becomes much harder to correct. We’ve written a public comment on openreview (openreview.net/forum?id=tO3AS…). We would greatly appreciate your attention and help in sharing it.
Google Research@GoogleResearch

Introducing TurboQuant: Our new compression algorithm that reduces LLM key-value cache memory by at least 6x and delivers up to 8x speedup, all with zero accuracy loss, redefining AI efficiency. Read the blog to learn how it achieves these results: goo.gle/4bsq2qI

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International Cyber Digest
International Cyber Digest@IntCyberDigest·
🚨‼️ BREAKING: PyPI package telnyx has been compromised by TeamPCP in yet another supply chain attack. The malware executes immediately upon importing telnyx. It drops a valid WAV audio file and runs an executable embedded within the frames.
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@levelsio
@levelsio@levelsio·
Who should I follow in African tech who follows everyone so Africa can reply again to my tweets? See what this system is doing? Like I am already actively seeking path ways to different social graphs It's super interesting I think!
K@begottensun

Looks like the entire African Tech / Dev community is frozen out from replying Levels … coz he don’t follow any and no-one he follows , follows any. But seems to have cured the Bot replies. Then with the incentive for more localised content being rewarded ; X is following the world trend of isolationism and nationalism. History will show if this is a good or bad thing I guess.

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International Cyber Digest
International Cyber Digest@IntCyberDigest·
🚨‼️ We're in contact with the actor behind the Trivy and LiteLLM hack. They told us they are currently extorting several multi-billion-dollar companies from which they've exfiltrated data. They've obtained 300 GB of compressed credentials and are working their way through them as we speak. The LiteLLM compromise alone led to half a million stolen credentials, according to the threat actor. Their message to the world: "TeamPCP is here to stay. Long live the supply chain." They've sent us their new logo (see image) and also teamed up with several threat actors, including Xploiters and Vect.
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ThePrimeagen
ThePrimeagen@ThePrimeagen·
> So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks do we have proof of this? I want this to be true so bad
Andrej Karpathy@karpathy

Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.

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Aakash Gupta
Aakash Gupta@aakashgupta·
Someone just poisoned the Python package that manages AI API keys for NASA, Netflix, Stripe, and NVIDIA.. 97 million downloads a month.. and a simple pip install was enough to steal everything on your machine. The attacker picked the one package whose entire job is holding every AI credential in the organization in one place. OpenAI keys, Anthropic keys, Google keys, Amazon keys… all routed through one proxy. All compromised at once. The poisoned version was published straight to PyPI.. no code on GitHub.. no release tag.. no review. Just a file that Python runs automatically on startup. You didn’t need to import it. You didn’t need to call it. The malware fired the second the package existed on your machine. The attacker vibe coded it… the malware was so sloppy it crashed computers.. used so much RAM a developer noticed their machine dying and investigated. They found LiteLLM had been pulled in through a Cursor MCP plugin they didn’t even know they had. That crash is the only reason thousands of companies aren’t fully exfiltrated right now. If the code had been cleaner nobody notices for weeks. Maybe months. The attack chain is the part that gets worse every sentence. TeamPCP compromised Trivy first. A security scanning tool. On March 19. LiteLLM used Trivy in its own CI pipeline… so the credentials stolen from the SECURITY product were used to hijack the AI product that holds all your other credentials. Then they hit GitHub Actions. Then Docker Hub. Then npm. Then Open VSX. Five package ecosystems in two weeks. Each breach giving them the credentials to unlock the next one. The payload was three stages.. harvest every SSH key, cloud token, Kubernetes secret, crypto wallet, and .env file on the machine.. deploy privileged containers across every node in the cluster.. install a persistent backdoor waiting for new instructions. TeamPCP posted on Telegram after: “Many of your favourite security tools and open-source projects will be targeted in the months to come.. stay tuned.” Every AI agent, copilot, and internal tool your company shipped this year runs on hundreds of packages exactly like this one… nobody chose to install LiteLLM on that developer’s machine. It came in as a dependency of a dependency of a plugin. One compromised maintainer account turned the entire trust chain into a credential harvesting operation across thousands of production environments in hours. The companies deploying AI the fastest right now have the least visibility into what’s underneath it.
Andrej Karpathy@karpathy

Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.

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kache
kache@yacineMTB·
Ten years ago, when I was still in university, I wrote a bot to scrape all indeed job postings and their expected salaries. I ran histograms on the total income I'd expect, and found correlations to skills. This is why I decided to focus on distributed systems instead of data / ML jobs. They simply made more money
Tips Excel@gudanglifehack

Claude Cowork can apply to 50 jobs in under 30 minutes. Here's how to set it up.

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kache
kache@yacineMTB·
Everyone is so full of shit. You can get so far ahead in your life by simply just not being full of shit. So many people saying Lets Build but have never built anything in their life, never wanted to build anything in their life. Complain of a lack of jobs but can't get shit done
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