Harsha Kumara

1/ We are sharing additional details regarding our investigation into unauthorized access to GitHub's internal repositories. Yesterday we detected and contained a compromise of an employee device involving a poisoned VS Code extension. We removed the malicious extension version, isolated the endpoint, and began incident response immediately.

Anthropic leaked 512,000 lines of Claude Code source code yesterday. What happened in the next 12 hours is absolutely wild. 4 AM. Anthropic pushes an update to npm. Inside the package: their entire codebase. A 60 MB debugging file accidentally bundled in. 23 minutes later, researcher Chaofan Shou spots it. Downloads the zip. Posts it on X. Within 6 hours: 3 million views. By the time Anthropic’s team woke up, the code was forked 41,000+ times across GitHub. Anthropic started firing DMCA takedowns. Too late. A Korean developer named Sigrid Jin woke up to his phone exploding. He’s Claude Code’s biggest power user. WSJ reported he burned through 25 billion tokens last year. He read the leaked code. Rewrote the entire thing in Python in 8 hours. His repo hit 30,000 stars faster than any GitHub project in history. Then he rewrote it again in Rust. That version now has 49,000 stars. Someone mirrored it to a decentralized platform with one message: “will never be taken down.” The code is permanent. Anthropic cannot get it back. Here’s the part I can’t stop thinking about: Anthropic built something called “Undercover Mode.” Its only job: prevent Claude from accidentally leaking internal secrets. They shipped an entire anti-leak system in their own product. Then leaked their own source code in a .map file. Irony is beautiful

Max waved Gasly as he repassed him after his battery was depleted 😭😭

Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.

BREAKING: Amazon reportedly holds mandatory meeting after “vibe coded” changes trigger major outages.