@tequilafunks I lost count of how many times I told Codex to inline such functions. Bonus when it also create a test for this.
English
Alexander von Studnitz
757 posts
Alexander von Studnitz
@jvstudnitz
Writing software at @clickbar_dev.
Darmstadt, Germany Katılım Eylül 2016
638 Takip Edilen129 Takipçiler
GPT-5.5 tends to create a lot of unnecessary indirection in code.
English
@vanilagy „Half-Life: Source“ has been finally achieved
English
Alexander von Studnitz retweetledi
Mediabunny 1.42.0 is now out, adding THE most requested feature: full read/write support for HLS! 🚀
It's truly a game changer for client-side media processing. Here, I'm creating 5 renditions from a 40-second video in ~10 seconds, fully client-side, without a transcode server:
English
some of us bumfuck hillbilly programmers (me) don’t need your fancy terminology for our ego. can y’all stop doing this shit?
English
@mitsuhiko I think it's just part of how slang evolves, hard to pin point to something specifically. But I also share your observation, it seems a lot more prominent in the Twitter tech bubble.
English
I swear I have never read the word "substrate" quite as much as in the last year. Funny enough I used it in my own slide deck a few months ago because I just read it on Twitter. Now I see it everywhere. Is this a Baader–Meinhof phenomenon or did the word become more common?
English
@nicbarkeragain There’s even a youtube premium feature that lets you skip often-skipped segments, which generally maps to the sponsor segments. :D
English
Just noticed a funny unintended consequence on Youtube - for videos that have baked in "promotion" (i.e. ads spoken by the creator) they are highlighted on the video timeline as "most replayed" because people engage with the timeline at those points attempting to skip the ads
English
@SawyerMerritt @DerektheCleric That’s the same as saying it’s a fraction of 100%
English
NEWS: The NHSTA says it has closed its investigation into Tesla’s “Actually Smart Summon” feature.
The agency found that almost all of the reported crashes involved minor property-damage claims with zero injuries and zero fatalities linked to the feature. It also found that out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. detroitnews.com/story/business…
English
@thekitze Wtf you don’t need mobx for vue. Just use state there or pinia
English
@danshipper In that case that would mean that it wouldn't be worth 100m anymore haha
English
Google should do the right thing and use their new quantum superpowers to help that guy who lost the private key to his bitcoin wallet with like $100m in it lol
Justin Drake@drakefjustin
Today is a monumentous day for quantum computing and cryptography. Two breakthrough papers just landed (links in next tweet). Both papers improve Shor's algorithm, infamous for cracking RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. The two results compound, optimising separate layers of the quantum stack. The results are shocking. I expect a narrative shift and a further R&D boost toward post-quantum cryptography. The first paper is by Google Quantum AI. They tackle the (logical) Shor algorithm, tailoring it to crack Bitcoin and Ethereum signatures. The algorithm runs on ~1K logical qubits for the 256-bit elliptic curve secp256k1. Due to the low circuit depth, a fast superconducting computer would recover private keys in minutes. I'm grateful to have joined as a late paper co-author, in large part for the chance to interact with experts and the alpha gleaned from internal discussions. The second paper is by a stealthy startup called Oratomic, with ex-Google and prominent Caltech faculty. Their starting point is Google's improvements to the logical quantum circuit. They then apply improvements at the physical layer, with tricks specific to neutral atom quantum computers. The result estimates that 26,000 atomic qubits are sufficient to break 256-bit elliptic curve signatures. This would be roughly a 40x improvement in physical qubit count over previous state-of-the-art. On the flip side, a single Shor run would take ~10 days due to the relatively slow speed of neutral atoms. Below are my key takeaways. As a disclaimer, I am not a quantum expert. Time is needed for the results to be properly vetted. Based on my interactions with the team, I have faith the Google Quantum AI results are conservative. The Oratomic paper is much harder for me to assess, especially because of the use of more exotic qLDPC codes. I will take it with a grain of salt until the dust settles. → q-day: My confidence in q-day by 2032 has shot up significantly. IMO there's at least a 10% chance that by 2032 a quantum computer recovers a secp256k1 ECDSA private key from an exposed public key. While a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC) before 2030 still feels unlikely, now is undoubtedly the time to start preparing. → censorship: The Google paper uses a zero-knowledge (ZK) proof to demonstrate the algorithm's existence without leaking actual optimisations. From now on, assume state-of-the-art algorithms will be censored. There may be self-censorship for moral or commercial reasons, or because of government pressure. A blackout in academic publications would be a tell-tale sign. → cracking time: A superconducting quantum computer, the type Google is building, could crack keys in minutes. This is because the optimised quantum circuit is just 100M Toffoli gates, which is surprisingly shallow. (Toffoli gates are hard because they require production of so-called "magic states".) Toffoli gates would consume ~10 microseconds on a superconducting platform, totalling ~1,000 sec of Shor runtime. → latency optimisations: Two latency optimisations bring key cracking time to single-digit minutes. The first parallelises computation across quantum devices. The second involves feeding the pubkey to the quantum computer mid-flight, after a generic setup phase. → fast- and slow-clock: At first approximation there are two families of quantum computers. The fast-clock flavour, which includes superconducting and photonic architectures, runs at roughly 100 kHz. The slow-clock flavour, which includes trapped ion and neutral atom architectures, runs roughly 1,000x slower (~100 Hz, or ~1 week to crack a single key). → qubit count: The size-optimised variant of the algorithm runs on 1,200 logical qubits. On a superconducting computer with surface code error correction that's roughly 500K physical qubits, a 400:1 physical-to-logical ratio. The surface code is conservative, assuming only four-way nearest-neighbour grid connectivity. It was demonstrated last year by Google on a real quantum computer. → future gains: Low-hanging fruit is still being picked, with at least one of the Google optimisations resulting from a surprisingly simple observation. Interestingly, AI was not (yet!) tasked to find optimisations. This was also the first time authors such as Craig Gidney attacked elliptic curves (as opposed to RSA). Shor logical qubit count could plausibly go under 1K soonish. → error correction: The physical-to-logical ratio for superconducting computers could go under 100:1. For superconducting computers that would be mean ~100K physical qubits for a CRQC, two orders of magnitude away from state of the art. Neutral atoms quantum computers are amenable to error correcting codes other than the surface code. While much slower to run, they can bring down the physical to logical qubit ratio closer to 10:1. → Bitcoin PoW: Commercially-viable Bitcoin PoW via Grover's algorithm is not happening any time soon. We're talking decades, possibly centuries away. This observation should help focus the discussion on ECDSA and Schnorr. (Side note: as unofficial Bitcoin security researcher, I still believe Bitcoin PoW is cooked due to the dwindling security budget.) → team quality: The folks at Google Quantum AI are the real deal. Craig Gidney (@CraigGidney) is arguably the world's top quantum circuit optimisooor. Just last year he squeezed 10x out of Shor for RSA, bringing the physical qubit count down from 10M to 1M. Special thanks to the Google team for patiently answering all my newb questions with detailed, fact-based answers. I was expecting some hype, but found none.
English
@SebAaltonen With 365*65 (assuming very young people dont have wallets) possibilities and checks whether the phone numer is valid I wonder how long brute forcing the number would take.
English
He used the most simple crypto. Just add the private password on top of the public crypted message to decrypt. Subtract to crypt.
Math Files@Math_files
A mathematician found a wallet, He left a note in a way so only the real owner could contact him
English
@hirbod I think asking an agent coukld do the trick. It's just some config files and extensions AFAIK.
English
