Ye in Web3

I’m ready to struggle for the peace of blockchain.

@zachxbt @lookonchain Gold reply, screening this. Good luck to “experts” identifying entities by these labels

@lookonchain Your tracing is incorrect the SOL from the Drift exploiter did not go to Hyperliquid or Binance here. It was a Solana to Ethereum bridging txn via Chainflip from 6W6Lfe Destination address: 0xd91a122b585bc588c9a48d0995ee0d7b4f8ab7dd Swap ID: 1436734

The Drift Protocol exploiter also deposited $SOL into #HyperLiquid and sold it to buy $ETH. The Drift Protocol exploiter even deposited $SOL into #Binance. intel.arkm.com/explorer/addre… x.com/lookonchain/st…

@tanuki42_ @60Mins @Dtex_ai @ASIOGovAu 🫡🫡🫡

My dear friend "Victor Perkins" and I made a cameo on @60Mins this morning, alongside @Dtex_ai and the Australian spy chief @ASIOGovAu. Yes, this North Korean really is using the name of the Despicable Me villain as his fake name and still getting jobs at crypto companies...

@Barabazs_ @tayvano_ And that’s considering you haven’t tagged Cobie yet

@tayvano_ lol this is hilarious

Whoa guys, calm down. Is fine, I promise. 🤗 Consensys didn’t fire me. They’re not that stupid. And, truly, I'll still be doing what I’ve always done. Before, my focus was on MetaMask. Now, I will expand to help more people + across the wider industry. In reality, the work I do will still include all those who use MetaMask. It is the longest-standing wallet with the most users. It’s critically important to this ecosystem. And rightfully so.

@tayvano_ 💖💖💖

@tanuki42_ @somaxbt @circle @jerallaire It would be nice if circle compliance department would have been working at least Monday-Friday 9-to-5

@somaxbt @circle @jerallaire Ah yes, apologies I forgot - it can't be a theft because crime doesn't happen on weekends. Silly me 🤦‍♂️

$3,000,000+ of stolen USDC has now been sat in this initial theft address for over 8 hours - will @circle save this man his retirement savings or will they instead ask for a US court order to "prove" something which is entirely publicly verifiable on-chain? @jerallaire?

Compliance enforcement process be that fast that victim proposing to exploiter “keep that 3M USDC in your wallet as bounty”

@tanuki42_ 🌸

I hope projects involved choose to do the right thing and reimburse the victim for the fees generated from these swaps. And before I hear "but it wasn't labelled in blockchain analytics tools", if you do zero due diligence on a user pumping >$100,000,000 through your service in less than a week, and instead proceed to post on X about "World Record" swap volumes, then you are complicit and should suffer the consequences. Blockchain analytics needs to do better, but this is not an excuse for you to launder money like this. If the controls aren't adequate, then you need better controls.

I mean I'm not sure I even need to comment on this at this point - but yes, it is exactly what you think it is... 💀

@pcaversaccio Aggressor, itself invading independent country, talking about “deep concerns” and “international law” 🤣. Beyond “disgrace”.

what an irony looool

@zachxbt @cozypront At least CZ hasn’t replied under this thread, we know how it goes

@cozypront That X account is a scammer larping as a girl and lying about being a victim of the hack to bait engagement. >44 username changes >countless meme coin scams >only 234 posts for a 2023 account >they preblocked me X User ID: 1725149174780268544

Whoever is taking people’s money on Christmas Day You are going to hell At last give us a break This is ridiculous image coming home from Christmas with your family and all your money is gone Shame on you

@SupremeKB420 @WazzCrypto Ah c’mon, most of the tokenomics have “ecosystem and community” big chunk of the pie, so let’s just call all crypto “a scam”?

@muststopye @WazzCrypto Educated guess looking back how all other projects with similar tokenomics have worked

In case you're wondering how this is gonna go: 10% Genesis - Team and insiders filled 100% of the initial cap before it was publicly announced 40% Ecosystem and Community - Team and Insiders will get the grants and farm most of the incentives 25% Team 25% Investors 95%+ supply controlled grift which will scam upwards for a few days/weeks leaving everyone seething to then bleed to 0 for the next 4 years

@tomwanhh @elindinga By “killer product” do you refer to dapps deployed on the chains? I think today’s dapps mostly multichain, probably the good example in past was GMX which brought quite a userbase to Arbitrum and C Chain back in days.

100% most general-purpose chains are the same from the perspective of a user. 0.5s faster block time or $0.01 cheaper in gas fee is great but not the selling point for people to come use the chain if you have a killer product, im going to your chain even a 12s block time and $1 gas fee

Unichain's TVL has dropped 86% from its ATH ($1.1B) after incentives have ended.

@lbkolev “Move at the speed of DeFi” having me PTSD lmfao

monad is killin it

@GANA_PayFi Guys it’s not “interaction contract” was targeted it was private key leakage (at least)

GANA Urgent Announcement GANA’s interaction contract has been targeted by an external attack, resulting in unauthorized asset theft. Our technical team, together with an independent third-party security firm, has initiated an emergency investigation to analyze the attack vector, identify vulnerabilities, and assess the full scope of impact. We will continue to provide updates on the investigation progress and subsequent actions through official channels. We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience caused by this unexpected incident and thank you for your understanding and support. GANA will activate a comprehensive project reboot plan, including a full mapping of all user asset addresses and their associated permissions. The detailed recovery plan and timeline will be announced shortly to ensure the protection and restoration of all user assets. GANA Official Team Date: November 20, 2025

Good effort @ethena blocklisting Balancer exploiter on sUSDe by granting “FULL_RESTRICTED_STAKER_ROLE” so they can’t perform transfer of sUSDe as there is a validation in beforeTokenTransfer hook. Transfer of 10k sUSDe failed 10 minutes ago at tx etherscan.io/tx/0x2f14ac0f7…

@Barabazs_ @thedamooo @inversebrah Body bag

@thedamooo @inversebrah MURDER ON THE TL

Reminder: transactions on aztec don’t exist

@DocMuscle_ @kingfisher_btc “Are ya winning son?”

@kingfisher_btc They’ve been doing this shit for damn near a week now.

Binance & bybit pump & dumping the whole market 🎣 Perp come in as price goes up Dump spot Liq and repeat 🎣

DPRK IT workers are now recruiting people on upwork/freelancer to hand over their accounts + install anydesk so they can work under someone else's identity We found folders of IDs, recruitment scripts, and 80/20 payment splits. This scales way better than individual infiltration & platforms need to detect the behavior (rmm tools, impossible travel) not just verify the identity. Full research from SEAL Intel: radar.securityalliance.org/from-north-kor…

@hklst4r @ImpermaxFinance Dude tf you write “pause is asap” here to ambulance chase, can’t you reach out the relevant team privately?

It appears @ImpermaxFinance is HACKED with ~110 ETH ($380K). My preliminary analysis 👇 Impermax is a lending protocol for isolated leveraged LP farming. Each isolate market has several imxToken is a vault where you deposit undelrying token and receive imxToken. The vulnerability lies in the "exchangeRate" function where if the totalBalance or totalSupply is zero, it returns a initialized value 1e18. Also, the mint/redeem function has a rounding problem. On top of this there is a curator-like contract that manages users' vaults and allocate them to different markets. Another vulnerability is that these curators have an unprotected allocation function allowing anyone to reallocate their funds to different markets. The attack used multiple transactions. (1) The attacker first repays all active loans on a market, this reduces totalBorrows to 0; And the attacker also allocate 0 to this market; (2) The attacker repaetedly mint and withdraw from the market until the totalBalance is rounded to 0. Currently, totalSupply is not 0 and only held by the attacker. (3) The attacker allocate all funds from curator to this market. This deposit will be at a exchange rate of 1e18 but the attacker already holds some shares. (4) The attacker withdraw his shares in (2) for profit. Please PAUSE affected markets ASAP @ImpermaxFinance. Note that only some vaults are affected, who only has curator deposits. If a vault has deposits made by users, it seems to be safe. --- This is not financial advice, and it's just my preliminary analysis and I may make mistakes. I have reached out to the team but the team has not replied.