Connor King@connorking
re each point
1. On adverse selection, I think the strongest counterpoint is that the current pipeline already shows the opposite
The founders launching through MetaDAO are not just “crypto teams that couldn’t raise elsewhere.” Some are already doing 7 figures of revenue, growing quickly, and choosing this route because the structure is better aligned for internet-native capital formation.
The Laso Finance ICO ingested $25M of capital, which defies the common 'adverse selection' argument. This is becoming a lazy argument for funds imo, esp after speaking with many this year
The key distinction is not weak teams vs strong teams. It’s teams that want:
• better price discovery that commences at attractive entries
• broader distribution
• transparent terms
• a more aligned holder base
• investor protections baked into the launch
• less dependence on private round gatekeepers
High-caliber founders are rational. If MetaDAO gives them a cleaner way to raise, build an aligned community, and avoid the usual insider-heavy launch structure, then the adverse selection argument weakens over time
There may be adverse selection at the beginning of any new market. But if the mechanism attracts even a few real companies with revenue, growth, and credible founders, the market starts to re-rate the venue itself
That’s the unlock. MetaDAO does not need every single launch to be great. It needs enough high-quality teams to prove that decision market-native capital formation can compete with the private round plus CEX listing path
2. I agree futarchy should not be forced everywhere. The right use case is narrower: discrete, high-stakes decisions where the outcome can be measured and the market can price the tradeoff before capital moves. Launches, treasury allocation, acquisitions, mergers, buybacks, listings, strategic pivots. Not vague social preferences. The point is not “govern everything with futarchy.” It’s “price major decisions before committing capital”
3. On public goods, I think sequencing matters. Long term, ownership coins probably should become more open and standardized. But early on, the market needs a coordinated actor with economics to bootstrap issuer quality, liquidity, distribution, investor trust, and post-launch accountability. A purely public-good standard may not have enough incentive to do that underwriting and market-building work. Protocol economics can fund the coordination early, then the standard can open up once the primitive is proven
