
Nirbhai Singh
469.9K posts

Nirbhai Singh
@nirbhaisingh07
Indian Air Force Veteran🎖️


⚓️ Legacy Reborn. Power Redefined. Presenting the story of INS Taragiri - a journey of strength, stealth and indigenous excellence, reflecting India’s rise as a formidable maritime power. From legacy to the future fleet, Taragiri stands ready to safeguard the seas. #INSTaragiri #IndianNavy #MakeInIndia
















WHITE ELEPHANT MODI | As we exposed nearly two years ago, Modi’s vanity project, the Mumbai–Ahmedabad Bullet Train, has seen its cost escalate from the original ₹1.1 lakh crore to ₹1.98 lakh crore. This is when the project is half complete. The final cost could be more than 2.5 lakh Cr. The additional ₹90,000 crore burden will now be borne by Indian Railways, which is already struggling for funds. The Japanese agency JICA is not going to fund this escalation. The main attraction of JICA funding was the ultra-low 0.25% interest rate. But this extra ₹90,000 crore will now be raised as debt by the Government of India at 7–8% interest. It will take more than a century to recover the cost. The original projected ticket price between Mumbai and Ahmedabad was around ₹3,000. With costs nearly doubling while the project is only half complete, ticket prices could well touch ₹6,000–₹7,000. How many of you would actually pay that much for this ride? Bhakts, please answer and go.

* The commentary circulating on the Mumbai–Ahmedabad High Speed Rail Project relies largely on conjecture and selective interpretation rather than verified facts. Several of the claims made are factually wrong. * Updated project cost estimates are comparable to global benchmarks. The initial estimate was prepared at a preliminary stage nearly a decade ago. As is standard practice in major infrastructure projects worldwide, costs are refined once detailed design, engineering, land acquisition and construction contracts are finalised. * India has undertaken projects of similar scale in highways, metro rail and airports where revised estimates followed detailed project reports and tendering. * The agreement between India and Japan for funding the project is comprehensive and the speculations made have no base. * The project continues to be backed by one of the most concessional sovereign loans ever extended for infrastructure, with extremely low interest and long repayment periods. * Such financing terms are precisely why the project was structured as a bilateral partnership. Assertions to the contrary appear speculative rather than factual. * It is also incorrect to state that the burden is being placed on Indian Railways. The project is implemented through the dedicated entity National High Speed Rail Corporation Limited (NHSRCL), which has its own financing structure involving the Government of India and the participating state governments. * Treating it as an operating liability of Indian Railways reflects a misunderstanding of the institutional framework. * National transport infrastructure is evaluated world over by looking at economic benefits. High-speed rail corridors generate value through time savings and productivity gains, reduction in aviation and highway congestion, regional economic development along the corridor technology transfer and domestic manufacturing capability. These wider economic multipliers are the basis on which such projects are evaluated internationally. * Ticket pricing will be affordable. The speculative numbers have no basis and are meant to mislead people. * The Mumbai–Ahmedabad High Speed Rail Project is India’s first high-speed rail corridor. Its purpose extends beyond a single route: it establishes the technological, engineering and industrial base required for future high-speed rail development in the country. * Every country that now operates high-speed rail networks began with a similar foundational investment. The socio economic benefit of high speed outweighs financial returns and this project lays the foundation of construction of High speed in the country will revolutionise transportation required for Viksit Bharat.










