Robdog 🍾

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Robdog 🍾

Robdog 🍾

@robdogeth

Building @corkprotocol - The Tokenized Risk Protocol Prev founded @toucanprotocol and Vultus (acquired)

Ethereum/Lisbon Katılım Nisan 2019
783 Takip Edilen4K Takipçiler
PaperImperium
PaperImperium@ImperiumPaper·
Just to break out separately what this means for the Kelp situation: 1) This improves recovery for some claimants. Obviously it’s better than the funds being in the hands of the criminals. 2) TBD who gets this recovery, though. These funds were, strictly speaking, stolen from Aave, not Kelp. Or were they? A non-recourse lender (like a pawnbroker) who inadvertently lends against bad collateral is out of luck. There is also a distinction to be had where the rsETH just became impaired after a legitimate txn vs the criminals borrowing with stolen assets. Should this just be given to Kelp? Except… this ETH wasn’t stolen from Kelp. Should it be used to plug holes on Arbitrum? Or spread around to avoid Arbitrum rsETH now becoming more senior to other L2 rsETH? 3) Arbitrum DAO now in an unenviable position. My guess is they sit on the funds until question 2 above is sorted out in court. Otherwise you risk giving it to the wrong people and being legally exposed for that decision, So I don’t see this speeding up resolution of the crisis, even if the eventual recovery is now much better. 4) Kelp still hasn’t communicated if rsETH and OFT rsETH are pari passu or separate products.
PaperImperium@ImperiumPaper

(For what’s relevant to Kelp specifically, see question 4; for general musings on intervention against illicit actors, see questions 1-3) I feel like the direct intervention of a major L2 to seize illicit funds marks a major shift in how L2s will be perceived and operate going forward. I think it’s probably wise for all L2s to develop a formal policy, even if it’s not publicly made available. My biggest hope is that this action makes L2s unappealing for major crime, and the deterrent is enough. Some thoughts (questions?) on the Arbitrum action, in no particular order: 1) Was there a court order? If not, why not, given the time delay? (This is really a question for Kelp) 2) If this was in response to a court order, does that open the flood gates to any legitimate court order? And what jurisdictions are legitimate to ignore vs act upon? This extends beyond criminal actions. Think divorce cases and bankruptcy cases where funds are frozen during litigation. 3) If this was not in response to a court order, what threshold warrants action? For example, there has been $16m in funds from the 2023 Multichain incident sitting on Arbitrum for years ($12m on Optimism, and single digit millions on other chains). Leaving aside views on Multichain draining specifically, is $16m enough to act like today? Why or why not? This is a really tough question, but if done at discretion, probably needs to be considered by teams. 4) Does this go to repay the exploiter’s loans on Aave? This would narrowly benefit Arbitrum’s Aave depositors the most, and there will still be some bad debt on Arbitrum, just at a glance. Or is this handed over to Kelp to make the underlying more whole? Priority of claims is going to be pretty important here because there’s a material difference between repaying debt on Aave, turning it over to Kelp, and potentially other combinations. I think we haven’t solved the issue that has markets stuck, which is seniority and recovery process. 5) Will we ever get some clear guidelines from major jurisdictions about the obligations in this kind of case? This extends beyond just L2s. Does a stablecoin have an obligation to perform a maneuver like this? If so, see questions 1, 2, and 3 above. Just swap out the Multichain executor on L2s for $20m stolen from users after the CB data breach that’s within reach of a major stablecoin. We suddenly are faced with the prospect that there’s a lot of recoverable funds within reach across all of DeFi if we have moved from “we don’t have a seize function” to “we can upgrade, add a seize function, revert the upgrade, but can do it again”. The similar precedent that comes to mind is Oasis (now SummerFi) responding to a UK court to recover funds on behalf of Wormhole, who used a zero day exploit on themselves to move the funds but then patched it. I am still developing my own opinions on all of these, and recommend everyone openly debate many of these, but keep an open mind on the final equilibrium. No one is going to have a final, smart answer today, these things have a lot of downstream effects, and also contain the unknown variable of how much deterrence is or is not available based on each choice.

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Duo Nine ⚡ YCC
Duo Nine ⚡ YCC@duonine·
🚨 AAVE just presented two potential ways on how to manage the bad debt. Both solutions throw users under the bus with no accountability from AAVE leadership on listing rsETH: 1️⃣ Socialize losses, L1 depositors take the biggest hit, including Umbrella depositors 2️⃣ L2 depositors take the loss, Mantle and Arbitrum are most affected I think the AAVE DAO and service providers have to take some accountability for listing rsETH and allowing it on their platform at the level of hundreds of millions. This has impacted users that never heard of rsETH or never touched it. Why should a user on Linea chain incur losses? Perhaps AAVE can find a solution with affected chains and corresponding parties to minimize the impact on users. I see Arbitrum already froze and took out the hacker funds in a historic decision that will redefine what DeFi actually is. This will reduce the total bad debt. The problem is that most of this fumble is also on AAVE that allowed this high-risk collateral type on their platform. Had they limited it, this would not be an AAVE and DeFi crisis, but just another bridge exploit impacting direct rsETH holders. This will likely drag on for a long time and likely end up in court as nobody wants to pay the bill, since each party has its own merits in the arguments they take. A settlement that favors users would be best. But may come at the expense of AAVE's treasury which still holds $181 million. Will Stani stay greedy or do what's best for his users? Time will tell. Like, share, and follow @duonine
Duo Nine ⚡ YCC tweet media
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Kolten
Kolten@0xKolten·
We are working around the clock to keep things moving. Full report on current situation below.
Aave@aave

Update on rsETH incident: @LlamaRisk has published a report outlining the rsETH incident, the immediate actions taken, its impact on Aave, and potential paths forward. All service providers have been working to assess the two potential bad debt scenarios on the Aave protocol. Aave DAO service providers are also leading an effort with ecosystem participants to address any bad debt. This effort already has several indicative commitments from various parties and we are grateful for the strong support we have received so far. We will share further updates as we have them. In the meantime, the full report can be read here: governance.aave.com/t/rseth-incide…

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Robdog 🍾
Robdog 🍾@robdogeth·
1/ 🧵 $292M of rsETH — was drained from @KelpDAO's @LayerZero_Core bridge in a single forged message. 48 hours later, $13B of DeFi TVL had walked out the door whilst it remains unclear where the losses actually will land. Let's unpack the ecosystem impact.
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Aave
Aave@aave·
Update on rsETH incident: WETH reserves on the Ethereum Core V3 market have been unfrozen and users can supply WETH to Ethereum Core V3 again. WETH LTV remains at 0. WETH reserves on Ethereum Prime, Arbitrum, Base, Mantle, and Linea remain frozen. Aave service providers will continue to work on next steps and provide updates accordingly.
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Zach Rynes | CLG
Zach Rynes | CLG@ChainLinkGod·
Look guys, it's actually really straightforward, a bunch of people staked their ETH on the Ethereum blockchain to earn yield, except they didn't want their capital to be locked up, so they actually staked with a liquid staking protocol called Lido who provided them a liquid staking receipt token called stETH, except they decided to juice their yield further by depositing their stETH receipt tokens into a restaking protocol called Eigenlayer, except they didn't want to lock up their capital, so they actually restaked with a liquid restaking protocol called KelpDAO who provided them with a liquid restaking receipt token called rsETH, except they decided to juice their yield further by depositing their rsETH tokens into a lending protocol called Aave so that they could open a leveraged looping position that borrows ETH against the rsETH collateral and restakes the ETH into rsETH which is then deposited as collateral, except it turns out rsETH used a cross-chain bridge called LayerZero that was hacked by north koreans causing rsETH to become undercollateralized and now these looping positions are stuck and unprofitable, and everyone is pointing fingers at each other, and also DeFi is a very serious industry
Zach Rynes | CLG tweet media
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Robdog 🍾
Robdog 🍾@robdogeth·
@phtevenstrong Now the big question is how they reconcile the situation, who takes the haircut, all rsETH holders or only the unbacked wrsETH on L2s? Unpacked here: x.com/robdogeth/stat…
Robdog 🍾@robdogeth

1/ 🧵 $292M of rsETH — was drained from @KelpDAO's @LayerZero_Core bridge in a single forged message. 48 hours later, $13B of DeFi TVL had walked out the door whilst it remains unclear where the losses actually will land. Let's unpack the ecosystem impact.

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Robdog 🍾
Robdog 🍾@robdogeth·
@arbitrum Real question is if those funds will go towards backing rsETH and if so will holders on L1 be fully whole and losses socialized on L2 or socialized against all L1 holders incl lenders? Unpacked in detail here: x.com/robdogeth/stat…
Robdog 🍾@robdogeth

1/ 🧵 $292M of rsETH — was drained from @KelpDAO's @LayerZero_Core bridge in a single forged message. 48 hours later, $13B of DeFi TVL had walked out the door whilst it remains unclear where the losses actually will land. Let's unpack the ecosystem impact.

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Arbitrum
Arbitrum@arbitrum·
The Arbitrum Security Council has taken emergency action to freeze the 30,766 ETH being held in the address on Arbitrum One that is connected to the KelpDAO exploit. The Security Council acted with input from law enforcement as to the exploiter’s identity, and, at all times, weighed its commitment to the security and integrity of the Arbitrum community without impacting any Arbitrum users or applications. After significant technical diligence and deliberation, the Security Council identified and executed a technical approach to move funds to safety without affecting any other chain state or Arbitrum users. As of April 20 11:26pm ET the funds have been successfully transferred to an intermediary frozen wallet. They are no longer accessible to the address that originally held the funds, and can only be moved by further action by Arbitrum governance, which will be coordinated with relevant parties.
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KPK
KPK@kpk_io·
KPK curated vaults and the rsETH incident. On Friday 18 April, Kelp DAO's rsETH was exploited, impacting markets across multiple networks. KPK's curation and execution infrastructure responded immediately. • KPK ETH Prime was the only vault with direct rsETH exposure, capped at approximately 2.3% of vault TVL at the time of the incident. Exit agents activated immediately and withdrew liquidity as it became available. As of yesterday, the rsETH position has been fully exited. No user funds were lost and no bad debt was incurred. Deposits are re-enabled. • KPK ETH Prime and ETH Yield currently have limited withdrawable liquidity due to a Morpho-wide ETH liquidity crunch. Some depositors may temporarily be unable to exit. As a result of the same imbalance, both vaults are currently overweight on certain markets (ETH+ and savETH respectively) relative to documented allocation targets. The underlying protocols behind these markets have exited or minimised their Aave exposure. We do not anticipate long-term impact from this temporary overweight and will rebalance to target allocations as liquidity returns. • USDC Prime, USDC Yield, USDT Prime and EURC Yield are fully operational with no direct or indirect exposure to the incident. We will share further updates as the situation evolves.
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Robdog 🍾
Robdog 🍾@robdogeth·
24/ I'll keep writing these as more updates comes out. Follow @robdogeth to stay posted
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Robdog 🍾
Robdog 🍾@robdogeth·
23/ A state-actor attack at this scale is part of the game. The question isn't whether these events happen again — it's whether the stack evolves to price them upfront, or keeps absorbing them with large cascading ecosystem consequences.
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