Samuel Charap

I spoke with RAND's top Russia expert @SCharap about Ukraine and avoiding NATO-Russia conflict turning into open war. Things I learned: 1. Russia has accepted Ukraine joining the EU (in 2022). 2. Finland joining NATO has made defending the Baltic states much easier. 3. Ukraine has options to build 'porcupine defences' during a ceasefire, making a Russian re-invasion very painful. 4. Ukraine would accept an unconditional ceasefire right now. Russia won't as they believe they're winning. 5. Research suggests China's calculus on Taiwan is shaped more by US behaviour in Asia than by what happens in Ukraine. 6. Russia sees itself as weaker than NATO, such that the biggest escalation risk comes not from a land grab, but from Belarus disintegrating. 7. Deploying UK/French troops to Ukraine probably does more to prevent a ceasefire than to deter Russian invasion. 8. The "snapback" mechanism in ceasefire negotiations would flip the burden of proof and reimpose sanctions and deep-strike weapons automatically and immediately should Russia violate it. 9. Parts of the Russian military probably knew the 2022 invasion plan was insane but couldn't stop it. And plenty more. On the 80,000 Hours Podcast, enjoy! Links below. • Could peace in Ukraine lead to Europe’s next war? (00:00:47) • Do Russia’s motives for war still matter? (00:11:58) • What does a good ceasefire deal look like? (00:18:16) • What’s still holding back a ceasefire? (00:40:15) • Why Russia might accept Ukraine’s EU membership (00:47:51) • How to prevent a spiralling conflict with NATO (00:49:58) • What’s next for nuclear arms control (00:51:56) • Finland and Sweden strengthened NATO — but also raised the stakes for conflict (00:55:36) • Putin isn’t Hitler: How to negotiate with autocrats (00:58:53) • Why Russia still takes NATO seriously (01:04:33) • Neither side wants to fight this war again (01:14:04)

.@scharap and @HiskiHaukkala consider how NATO and Russia could come to blows after the war in Ukraine: foreignaffairs.com/russia/europes…

“The resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, whatever its contours, will not put an end to the forces it has unleashed,” write @scharap and @HiskiHaukkala. “Indeed, a cease-fire could mark the start of an even more dangerous era.” foreignaffairs.com/russia/europes…

Read @scharap and @HiskiHaukkala on how the United States and Europe should prepare to handle an adversarial relationship with Russia after the war in Ukraine: foreignaffairs.com/russia/europes…

For now, it is safe to conclude that the unstable environment in Europe today will persist after the war in Ukraine ends, write @scharap and @HiskiHaukkala. foreignaffairs.com/russia/europes…

@stephenWalt @CooleyOnEurasia @MohanCRaja @ZackCooper @HillaryClinton @RebeccaLissner @LianaFix .@scharap and @HiskiHaukkala lay out what it will take to avoid a direct clash between Russia and NATO. foreignaffairs.com/russia/europes…

Even as policymakers in the US and Europe struggle to end Europe’s current war, they must begin working to prevent the next one, @scharap and @HiskiHaukkala write in @ForeignAffairs. Read the essay ⤵️ foreignaffairs.com/russia/europes…

New piece in @ForeignAffairs March/April issue coauthored with @HiskiHaukkala on the risks of Russia-NATO conflict after the Ukraine war, and what the alliance needs to do to avoid it. Paywall-free link here: foreignaffairs.com/guest-pass/red…

@thomaswright08 those calls hardly count as dialogue and you know that very well. but fine, technically true. and?

@scharap Contacts never stopped at chairman / SecDef level.

Interesting and potentially important development. eucom.mil/pressrelease/4…

periodic phone calls at that level is not the same as what is being suggested here. Particularly not those phone calls, which were essentially crisis communications.

An agreed plan not involving one of the belligerents isn’t an agreed plan. ft.com/content/0f26d5…

Following a year of close cooperation under Canada’s leadership, France assumes the @G7 Presidency 🇨🇦➡️🇫🇷. In 2026, our commitment remains unchanged: support for Ukraine, as it seeks a just and lasting peace, and continued progress on key reforms.

It really isn't all about the land. Why so many think otherwise is something of a mystery. ft.com/content/eb3294…

For heaven's sake: engagement is not a reward for good behaviour or simply something done with the like-minded. It is part of a complex of means (including sanctions, etc) of trying to influence foreign govts like Putin's so that it can be pushed towards peace

Two hard realities persist: The US won't risk war with Russia over Ukraine, and Europeans won't act without the US. This makes any security guarantee fundamentally less credible, regardless of Paris talk details.

I know Russia is on its last leg, totally crippled and on the verge of economic and societal collapse, but I suspect even in these, his final hours, Putin is unlikely to entertain a ceasefire deal that paves the way for British and French "military hubs across Ukraine."

The US is not a neutral party in this conflict, recent efforts at mediation notwithstanding. We cannot credibly serve as a third-party monitor of a ceasefire. for more see: rand.org/pubs/research_… 3/3

That last piece is potentially quite problematic. The US has exquisite intelligence capabilities, no doubt. But the point of ceasefire monitoring is not just for interested states to know what happened -- it's to have a neutral referee with its *own* sources of info. 2/3

meanwhile, the coalition of the willing is not only proposing binding security guarantees that explicitly oblige signatories to go to war if Russia invades again, but also is proposing that the US govt take responsibility for ceasefire monitoring. 1/3 barrons.com/news/us-would-…