Tom Wright

23.2K posts

Tom Wright

Tom Wright

@thomaswright08

Senior Fellow @BrookingsFP. contributing writer @TheAtlantic, Formerly Biden NSC, Author of All Measures Short of War, co-author of Aftershocks. Views my own.

Washington DC Katılım Haziran 2008
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Tom Wright
Tom Wright@thomaswright08·
Some news. I have a short Penguin special (just 25,000 words) coming out as part of a @LowyInstitute paper series on April 28. It's called Inflection Point: Biden, Trump, and the Future World Order. It's partly a memoir with reflections on my time in the Biden administration and partly an analysis of Trump's second term. The key argument is that there are now two America's: 1) an internationalism that focuses on a post-neoliberal global economy, strategic competition and tech, and 2) an America First movement that builds on Trump's second term. These two Americas will compete for the foreseeable future but never destroy the other. The world will need to hedge against this volatile fluctuation. Pre-order here. Just $6.99 for the Kindle version and $10 for the paperback. penguin.com.au/books/inflecti…
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Tom Wright
Tom Wright@thomaswright08·
Maybe but what will Netanyahu say when Trump asks him for a nomination for the Nobel peace prize for this deal?
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz

It’s hard to overstate how deeply Netanyahu views this moment as a possible personal and political defeat. A U.S.–Iran agreement under Trump would be a major blow to him mainly diplomatically, but above all politically. For years, Netanyahu built his political identity around being “Mr. Iran,” the leader who insisted that only pressure, deterrence, and force could stop the Iranian regime. And now, after multiple rounds of operational successes but one resounding strategic failure, and after finally succeeding in drawing the United States into direct confrontation with Iran, he may be forced to accept an agreement that not only legitimizes the very regime he sought to weaken, but also exposes the collapse of his long-standing Iran doctrine. His approach was based on the belief that more pressure, more military power, and tighter coordination between Israel and the United States would eventually either force Iran into submission or destabilize the regime itself. Instead, the result has been a more radicalized, more resilient, and more dangerous Iran, one that even Washington now hesitates to confront militarily again. If this confrontation ends with an agreement, an even bigger strategic question emerges: what future American president would be willing to commit U.S. forces to another major Middle Eastern conflict after seeing the political and military costs of this one? Netanyahu had what may have been his greatest opportunity to prove his central strategic theory: that a close Israeli-American military partnership could fundamentally reshape Iran and perhaps even threaten the regime’s survival. By every indication, that assumption failed. Against this backdrop, reports of a tense conversation between Trump and Netanyahu become much easier to understand. They also help explain the extraordinary level of pressure now coming from Jerusalem, and the extent to which Netanyahu is trying to persuade, or pressure, the administration not to move toward a deal with Tehran. The bottom line is that a U.S.–Iran agreement would not only signal the failure of the military confrontation Netanyahu pushed for, but also the collapse of the broader strategic doctrine he has championed since entering Israeli politics, all on the eve of what could be the most critical election of his career. In that sense, the next Israel’s leadership need to learn the fundamental lessons of this war. More than ever, this conflict demonstrates the urgent need for Israel to develop a different long-term strategy for dealing with Iran and especially to understand the following: Israel’s confrontation with Iran will not bring normalization with the Arab world, nor will it resolve Israel’s most fundamental security challenges, first and foremost, the Palestinian issue. The belief that regime change in Iran would transform Israel’s position in the Middle East was always detached from reality. In fact, the consistent opposition of Gulf leaders and major Arab states to further escalation against Iran has demonstrated this repeatedly throughout the conflict. Israel will not be able to use the “Iran card” as a substitute for addressing the core political issues shaping the region. Anyone arguing that military confrontation with Iran alone can unlock normalization is mistaken and, more importantly, misleading others about the strategic reality of the Middle East. Because despite the undeniable tactical and operational achievements of the campaign, this failure may ultimately leave Israel facing a more dangerous strategic reality, one that has not fundamentally improved its position in the Middle East. #IranWar

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Helen Toner
Helen Toner@hlntnr·
A lot of AI/tech execs have been vocal about the importance of competing with China recently. Seeing who speaks out about this new green card policy will tell us a lot about who *actually* cares about US competitiveness, and who just uses China as a pretext to oppose regulation
Andrew Ng@AndrewYNg

The new White House policy requiring green card applicants to apply from outside the US is a capricious attack on legal immigration. It will hurt families, leave us with fewer doctors, teachers and scientists, and hurt American competitiveness in AI.

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Phil Gordon
Phil Gordon@PhilGordonDC·
Highly recommend this essay. Entire world has stake in which of these two competing visions for U.S. foreign policy will prevail.
Tom Wright@thomaswright08

My new Penguin e-book, Inflection Point: Biden, Trump, and the Future World Order, is now available to buy (for $6). This is a part of @LowyInstitute's wonderful Penguin paper series. Many thanks to @mfullilove and @SamRoggeveen. The overall argument of the book is that there are now two Americas—an internationalist America that will likely focus on strategic competition and deepening alliances and an America First movement that will be much more skeptical of allies, favorable to punitive tariffs and predatory. Unlike strategies of containment in the Cold War, these are largely antithetical. Each will compete with, but will never fully vanquish, the other—at least not for some time. If you look at all US presidential elections since 1944, Republicans are currently in their 42nd year and Dems have had 40. So it splits 50:50. The challenge for the world is to hedge against this dramatic fluctuation. Two of the chapters are on my time in the Biden administration. Two are on Trump’s second term. And one looks at where we go from here. The two Biden chapters offer my reflections on our Ukraine and Indo-Pacific policies in particular. Some specifics that you all might find interesting: My account of the risk of Russian nuclear use in October 2022. How we actually thought about escalation and military assistance to Ukraine. What we thought of the Global South’s peace efforts (some were legitimate and sincere, some were not). How we thought about the diplomatic endgame in Ukraine. My account of the balloon incident of 2023 and the trajectory of our China policy. How AUKUS came to be—why it might not have happened if the president knew how France would react but why it was still the right thing to do. The lessons Democrats are learning from Biden’s foreign policy and where it is likely to go from here. And what America First may look like after Trump. I hope you all get a chance to read Inflection Point. I will be in Australia next week for a series of events to launch it. amazon.com/Inflection-Poi…

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Bill Bishop
Bill Bishop@niubi·
On the "constructive relationship of strategic stability": Previous US administrations had resisted entering into these kinds of new frameworks defined by the PRC side, so even with the US conditions of “on the basis of fairness and reciprocity” this is a very significant move by the Trump team. I believe they understand that the Chinese will use this hard won period of tenuous stability to do everything they can to derisk and reduce reliance on the US, as the PRC effectively articulated in the new 15th Five Year Plan, but it is not clear the US side has the political will or capacity to do the same, especially as the PRC will be using every lever at their disposal to push back on further attempts in the US to derisk and reduce reliance on the PRC.
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The Atlantic
The Atlantic@TheAtlantic·
President Trump’s Beijing trip proves he believes "that a personal bond with Chinese leader Xi Jinping can ensure stability"—but this stance will make a future crisis likelier than ever, @thomaswright08 argues. theatlantic.com/international/…
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Tom Wright
Tom Wright@thomaswright08·
Some highlights from my @LowyInstitute speech “The World After the Unraveling”, the text of which is now published. The international order has been under strain for a long time but it endured throughout. It finally snapped because of the revolutionary policies of three leaders that broke the restraints underpinning the order— Xi on trade, Putin on territorial expansion and Trump 47 on alliances. The order has unraveled and it won’t be rebuilt or replaced for some time. We’re still in the unraveling. Those conditions are consistent with a pre war world— a shift in the balance of power, a break down in the old order, doubts about alliance commitments, a revolutionary technology, arms races, and volatile leaders who worry about a closing window of opportunity due to age. That’s not to say a general war is inevitable but if it did occur future historians would not feel that it came out of the blue. Our job is to manage this situation, ride out the storm, and put the building blocks in place for something better. There are critical choices ahead. lowyinstitute.org/publications/w…
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Tom Wright
Tom Wright@thomaswright08·
For almost a year there have been rumblings of a Democratic/ progressive alternative to the Biden administration’s concept managed competition. Now, after the Trump - Xi summit, its principal architects are laying it out. See this piece by @jessicacweiss. I disagree but it’s thoughtful & necessary for a real debate ft.com/content/63aa35…
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