War Detective

Here is my second main article on the Gaza famine narrative, covering the whole food situation in the Gaza Strip. This articles focuses on IPC's August 2025 famine declaration and I present a lot of new information and clear evidence of the false classification of Gaza as in famine. IPC famine requires three pillars at the same time: extreme food deprivation, critical acute malnutrition, and famine-level mortality. All these three criteria needs to be reached at the same time for it to be a famine: - 2 deaths per 10,000 people/day from starvation related causes. - 30 percent of children suffer from acute malnutrition. - 20 percent of households face extreme food shortages The IPC famine declaration for Gaza Governorate did not meet IPC’s own famine standards. Mortality: - The mortality pillar failed first. IPC’s famine threshold implies hundreds of non-trauma deaths per day at Gaza’s population scale. But recorded malnutrition-related deaths remained far below that. - IPC projected more than 10,000 malnutrition-related deaths between 22 August and 9 October 2025. The reported outcome was only 192 deaths during that period. That is around 98% below IPC’s projection. - IPC also claimed the situation was worsening exponentially. But the daily and weekly MoH Telegram updates show a mostly stable/linear pattern, not exponential growth. - By 20 July 2025, after more than 21 months of war, Gaza had reported only 68 malnutrition-related deaths, 1/3 of the amount in US when accounted for population size. But Gaza was already claimed to be in Famine by many since the beginning of the war. Malnutrition: - The malnutrition pillar was also extremely weak. IPC did not use standard WHZ survey data. Instead, IPC relied on MUAC-only screening data for Gaza for the first time ever. - MUAC mesures the arm size of children between 6 and 59 months. It is much more sensitive to age structure, measurement quality, sampling method, and data errors, than WHZ that uses weight/height. - IPC’s own cited literature warns that MUAC-only data should not simply be converted into WHZ-equivalent famine thresholds. The 15% MUAC threshold is especially problematic and should have been around 23% instead and IPC’s own guidance says MUAC above 15% does not clearly distinguish Phase 4 from Phase 5. - The dataset that most helped IPC reach a famine conclusion was MDM-France and it also had the clearest data-quality problems. It had missing location metadata, it had children outside the target age range, it had a very high MUACZ standard deviation, it had the highest MUACZ flag rate, it had poor age-group accounting, and it was also the only Gaza Governorate dataset that crossed the 15% threshold for both younger and older children. - In a serious famine assessment, that kind of outlier dataset should be treated with extreme caution. Instead, it became central to the famine declaration. - The largest July dataset, Juzoor, screened 5,450 children. Juzoor’s weighted GAM by MUAC was only 8.29%. That was far below the IPC famine threshold of 15%, or around 23% as it should have been. - MedGlobal also had a large dataset, 2,811 children, and showed only 5.26%. But MedGlobal was missing from IPC’s main table. - When MDM-France is excluded because of its quality problems, the combined Gaza Governorate July MUAC result falls clearly below 15% and the broader Nutrition Cluster weighted data for July and August also remained below the famine threshold. - IPC’s later addendum created further problems. UNRWA’s split-period values appear inconsistent with the Nutrition Cluster’s weighted July value. AEI’s sample size changed from 1,807 to 5,085 in the split-period table. Juzoor was split in a way that moved much of its low-GAM data into the first half of July and left a higher value in the second half. This created the visual impression of rapid deterioration. But the broader weighted data did not show a clean famine-level threshold crossing. - When cleaning the data, by using IPC's own guidelines that they often broke themself, the combined Gaza Governorate GAM MUAC result for July becomes approximately 11.45%. This remains clearly below the flawed 15% IPC MUAC threshold. - In the August 2025 Nutrition Cluster numbers, they rounded all their data to hide the data quality but the trend was clearly going down from July. Food Deprivation: - The food-deprivation pillar was also weak. IPC relied on remote household survey data. One phone-based source suggested around 73% of households in severe or very severe hunger. Another source, linked to a face-to-face baseline and later follow-up interviews, suggested around 21%. That is a difference by more than a factor of three. IPC only gave weight to the more extreme source that was much more easily affected by bias. - Food inflow data also contradicted the famine claim. Gaza had already received very large amounts of food during the first seven months of 2025. The average was around 112 food trucks/day, mostly calorie-dense humanitarian food. That was far above the estimated wartime need of roughly 66 food trucks/day. - In August 2025, food inflow increased further. Gaza received 123,256 metric tons of food in August. That equals around 1.9 kg of food per person per day. - This does not prove equal distribution, but it strongly contradicts the claim of physical food absence at famine scale. - Market prices also moved against the famine narrative. WFP data showed prices peaked around June 2025 and then declined heavily through July and August. By the time IPC declared famine on 22 August, huge amounts of food had entered Gaza and prices were falling. That is not what a rapidly worsening famine normally looks like. IPC earlier reports: - The earlier IPC reports from 2023 and 2024 also shaped the narrative. IPC repeatedly warned that famine was imminent or likely. Those warnings were treated by media, NGOs, activists, and politicians as proof that famine was already happening. But the later mortality outcomes did not match those projections. - IPC itself acknowledged in June 2024 that famine was not currently occurring. That reversal received far less attention than the earlier famine warnings. By August 2025, many people already believed famine had existed for months. The IPC declaration therefore looked like confirmation of a narrative that had already been built. Conclusion: - When the three IPC pillars are examined separately, they collapse. Mortality was nowhere near famine level. Malnutrition relied on weak MUAC-only data and bad-quality outliers. Food deprivation relied on selective survey interpretation while food inflows and prices pointed in the opposite direction. - This was not a famine, it was a political and media narrative built from weak data, false baselines, selective reporting, and repeated exaggeration. - War conditions were real, but that is not the same as an IPC Phase 5 area-level famine. My conclusion: the August 2025 IPC famine declaration was not supported by the evidence required under IPC’s own standards.

كاميرا الجزيرة ترصد اقتحام عشرات المستوطنين بالأسلحة بلدة تل جنوب غرب نابلس #الأخبار

The Moroccan invasion of Ceuta today, a Spanish autonomous city south of Gibraltar, may be a joint operation with US-Isreal to take control of the Strait of Gibraltar from Spain. They might seek to punish Spain for being pro-Palestine while seizing control of Mediterranean navigation, a key naval choke point.

BREAKING: A new agreement between mediators & Hamas details full disarmament. Key terms: -All weapons (heavy/light/police), tunnels & stockpiles surrendered -Weapons handed over in weeks to depots guarded by multinational forces -Hamas ends all military activity & recruitment -Zero withdrawal from the original yellow line until disarmament is complete.

There's an alternative to arguing with people about genocide in Gaza. Mockery. Give the idiotic nonsense the scorn it deserves. Mockery is powerful. Try something like this: