SuperSimple

@lufeieth 是cost-adjust后的

更正下：按照协议，Hyperliquid 拿走USDC储备利息收入的90%。

Hyperliquid协议先拿走50亿USDC产生的储备利息的"绝大部分"，假如按照80%计算，剩下的20%，Coinbase作为这部分USDC的国库部署商，如果将其视为"Coinbase平台上的USDC"，那么Circle 分到的比例趋近于零。 对Circle的利好就是防御性和间接的： -阻止竞争对手占位，确保了USDC而非其他稳定币成为Hyperliquid的基础货币； -CCTP网络扩展（但目前CCTP不收费）； Circle在用利润率换规模，先做大流动性和品牌的的网络效应。

@marcolovebb @MaxCryptoSpace 持有hype又不吃亏的

@MaxCryptoSpace Circle同時被Coinbase, Hyperliquid吸血?

如果這是一盤棋，那 Hyperliquid 下棋的人很猛 🔥 還記得去年 9 月各大穩定幣巨頭搶破頭要拿 $USDH 發行權嗎？ 當時 Paxos、Ethena、Frax、Sky、BitGo 全部都來搶（Paxos 最後打不過，還拉了 PayPal 合作） 結果 Hyperliquid 最後選了 Native Markets，一個只做 USDH 的小團隊，那時很多人都看不懂（包括我） 然後搞笑的來了：USDH 八個月後只做 ~$100M 採用，鏈上還是躺著 ~$5B 的 $USDC （沒人想換） 所以今天 Native Markets 決定把 USDH 品牌資產的收購權讓給 Coinbase，以後 Hyperliquid 還是回歸 USDC 就這樣，Coinbase 成功拿下 Hyperliquid 的穩定幣層 不過回頭看，這結果竟然比當初任何一個 bid 都好（？） 🔶Coinbase x Hyperliquid 的合作方式長什麼樣？ 根據 AQAv2 規範，在 Hyperliquid 上的 90% 穩定幣儲備收益會返還給協議，進行回購（USDH 時代的 AQAv1 是 50%） 這代表之前躺在 Hyperliquid 裡面 $5B 的 USDC 利息現在 能產生 ~$180M/年的收入流進項目的 Assistance Fund 做 $HYPE buyback（之前全被 Circle 吃掉） = 每年 buyback 約 400 萬顆 $HYPE（流通量的 ~1.7%） = 比 USDH 時代（~$2M/年）多 90 倍！ 另外，Circle 同步 stake 50 萬顆 $HYPE 擔任 technical deployer，Coinbase 也增持 staking 部位 — 兩家美國最大的 crypto 公司同時質押你的代幣 🔶當初選 Paxos/PayPal 或 Ethena 會不會更好？ Paxos 當時開的條件其實更高 — 95% yield 給 Hyperliquid（Native Markets 只給 50%），還附帶 PayPal/Venmo 上架 $HYPE + $20M 生態基金 Ethena 也開 95% yield 加上 $75M 的 HIP-3 incentive，背後是用 BlackRock 的 BUIDL 基金背書 純數字看，Paxos 的 deal 短期贏很多（我當初最支持的也是 Paypal 方案） 當時選 Native Markets 看起來像是選了最弱的，但其實就是一個「可以被替換」的過渡方案 都是自己人，做不好換掉也同意 🤪 🔶 回頭看整件事有點像一盤大棋 第一步：宣布 USDH 競標 → Paxos/PayPal/Ethena 全來搶 → 免費出圈行銷，主流媒體全部都在報 第二步：Circle 感受到壓力 — 「你 $5B USDC 的利息我不讓你賺了」→ Circle 去年 9 月就開始買入 HYPE 示好 第三步：Native Markets 試水溫 — 用小團隊跑通 AQA yield sharing 機制，證明模式可行 第四步：USDH 品牌資產收購權讓給 Coinbase — 帶來合規身份 + 華爾街護身符 + USDC 直接 AQA 化，不用再推新幣 如果這是一盤棋，那 Hyperliquid 下棋的，真的很猛 🔥

HIP-4 quietly enables synthetic options on @HyperliquidX Want to bet BTC ends between $78k and $82k by Friday? Buy four cheap “yes/no” bets, one at each strike inside your range. → “BTC > $78k?” YES at $0.55 → “BTC > $79k?” YES at $0.48 → “BTC > $80k?” YES at $0.40 → “BTC > $81k?” YES at $0.32 Total cost: $1.75. Each pays $1 if true. If BTC ends at $80.5k → three bets win → +$1.25 profit If BTC ends below $78k → all lose → -$1.75 max loss If BTC ends above $81k → all win → +$2.25 max gain Same shape as a call spread. Built from four binaries. Polymarket can do this in theory. But each bet sits in a separate market with separate collateral, and you can’t cross-margin against a BTC perp. HIP-4 puts all of it on one engine, one collateral pool, alongside your perp delta. That’s how a binary book becomes an options surface.

@iamai_omni 你算港股是不是还不止90

要带单澜起科技了吗，不过这个已经90倍pe😂

@iamai_omni 这个地方的问题应该之前就提过了，帖子有点危言耸听

看起来NBIS的电力交付出了问题，物理世界的法则很残酷，感觉下次市场的恐慌可能出现在数据中心的电力交付上，并让当下过度火热的半导体板块承担下行压力。

@jacksonnb @Super4DeFi 但是bn不支持任何hypeliquid相关的东西

@Super4DeFi 最后发现币安最好的跨链桥

市场需要更好的跨链桥了，L0不堪重任。

For people who do not understand how bad the situation is, their most liquid pool is on ETH which has $2.8M. When this gets liquidated, selling this stake on that pool today gets you $2.8M (basically the whole pool). @Dolomite_io has no way to liquidate this and come out as whole from this situation. The stablecoins that were borrowed belonged to people who people who deposited on Dolomite for earning yield. When they go to withdraw it, they will not be able to do so. @CoreyCaplan3 is the founder of @Dolomite_io and the CTO of @worldlibertyfi. He has not commented so far but he seems to be in the right position to suggest this Dolomite rug. It is at the expense of depositors on Dolomite.

I am currently trying to: -move usdt (on arb) to usdt on (eth mainnet) -I don't have eth (arb) for gas -I can't swap my usdt (arb) for eth (arb) gas because I don't have eth to pay for my gas's gas. DO YOU THINK YOU'RE ONBOARDING ANYONE LIKE THIS? stupid system, broken system.

Along with the rest of the validator set, we voted to delist JELLY perps at the price where market manipulation happened. Read the official announcement from @HyperliquidX below

There's been a lot of discussion on Hyperliquid's margin design. I’ll address some flaws in the common arguments and explain Hyperliquid's first-principles based approach to improving the system. To my knowledge, this is the first such design in margining systems. Perhaps other teams will find it useful for their own logic. Like good theories in physics, the best margining design is simple, canonical, explainable, and works in a wide variety of pathological scenarios. 1. The conclusion of some people has been that there needs to be a centralized force that detects and limits malicious behavior. This completely violates the purpose of defi and everything Hyperliquid stands for. This forces users back to a web2 world where the platform has the final say. True decentralized finance is worth it, even if it is 10x harder to build. Just a few years ago, no one believed DEX/CEX volumes would reach its ratio today. Hyperliquid is leading the charge here and has no intention to stop. 2. Some assume that copying approaches from CEXs will work in defi. The most common suggestion I've seen is per-address margin requirement fraction scaling with position size, as CEXs only offer higher leverage for smaller positions. However, this doesn't work to prevent manipulation attempts on a DEX because a sophisticated attacker can easily open positions on many accounts. Nonetheless, this will help somewhat reduce the impact of "organic whale" positions and is on the list of features to implement. 3. Another suggestion is to implement some features that severely limit usability of the platform in exchange for safety. For example, if unrealized pnl is not withdrawable, many attacks are not possible. Indeed, Hyperliquid pioneered isolated-only perps for illiquid assets which feature this safety mechanism. However, this change would have a crippling effect on funding arbitrage strategies, where unrealized pnl from Hyperliquid needs to be withdrawn to offset the loss on other venues. Real user needs are a top priority in system design. 4. There were also suggestions to innovate on design by having margin settings based on global parameters. However, liquidation prices need to be deterministic functions of price and position size. If global parameters such as open interest were added as inputs to margin requirements, users would lose confidence in the ability to use leverage at all. So what's the answer? We all want defi, but a permissionless system must be robust to manipulation at all scales. The answer lies in understanding the true problem with large positions: they are difficult to mark. The first order approximation of mark price times size breaks down when market impact approaches maintenance margin. It's impossible to accurately simulate market impact because book liquidity is a path-dependent function of time and actions of other participants. Without simulating market impact, it can be possible for liquidation to be a low-slippage way to exit at a price that is unfavorable to the liquidator. Therefore, Hyperliquid's margining system update has the following desirable property: any liquidated position is either a loss relative to entry price, or at least a (20% - 2 * maintenance_margin_ratio / 3) = 18.3% loss relative to the last margin transfer out (using an example of 20x leverage). An organic 20x user who makes 100% return on equity after a 5% move will still be able to withdraw the majority of the pnl without closing the position. However, by introducing separate margin requirements between transfers and opening new positions, profitable manipulation attempts require moving the mark price almost 20%. This kind of attack is infeasible from a capital perspective. Finally, I'd like to point out that the mark price problem also solves itself as market makers continue scaling up on Hyperliquid. It's quite possible that the trader yesterday could have lost money in aggregate. $1.8M pnl longing on Hyperliquid could have been more than offset when pushing the price on other venues, or using other accounts on Hyperliquid. HLP took over an undesirable position, losing $4M. The only market participants who definitely made money in aggregate are the market makers. With millions of dollars of pnl to be made in the span of minutes, it's becoming clear to sophisticated participants that Hyperliquid is one of the venues with the best flow. As liquidity improves, it will become more and more expensive to dislodge prices. So while the margining system improvements will go a long way, the allure of easy pnl attracting market makers will provide an independent source of robustness over time. The future is decentralized. Hyperliquid.

@ZKSgu hype24h交易量是1.5亿

或许根本没有什么操盘的阴谋论。 有强庄控筹当然是好事，但这个庄到底是谁？ 目前 #Hyperliquid 援助基金累计买入5000万usdc，成本$5左右，占市值3%。 要知道 $hype 现货现在每天交易量就一两千万，而平台的合约交易量一直在涨，昨天日交易量突破100亿，这相当于援助基金每天将提供百万级的买盘。 hype一直都在涨的秘密，真相是如此简单，就在链上，只是因为hype的收入太高了而已，让人很难相信光靠平台收入能拉出这种貔貅走势。 简单复盘一下，大部分的交易换手是在开盘第一天完成的。 而在刚开盘的头两天，援助基金提供了4000万买盘，这是积攒了一年半的手续费收入，跟冲开盘的资金一起消化了本就不多的1.4亿空投抛压，有趣的是开盘前夕恰好流入1亿美元左右的资金，当时把bn、ok的arb usdc热钱包都抽空了。 这也是为什么第三、四天横盘，这段时间基金把存货交完了，进入了日常收入回购的阶段，而刚拿到空投的人还在继续卖出，供需关系变化了。 但毕竟hype社区团结，不像很多纯女巫社区，本身就没多大砸盘，总共20%的流出量只产生了2亿美元以内的抛压。 所以第5-9天又是被基金买成连续的上涨。 这一切也证明了hype到了正确的人手里。 hype是这一年半以来用户参与项目获取分红的凭证。 开盘立刻买入，其实截胡的是这一年半的平台累计收益，四五千万u的分红回购。 这就是利润来源，或许依然是pvp，但绝对不是等后来人接盘，而是当获得空投的人在基金还没把全部资金回购前，就以5u以内的价格卖出的时候，他们的损亏已经因为认知发生了，这也意味着买入的盈利是即时的，不需要外部接盘就存在。 虽然他们的成本可能更低，但他们没吃到平台的手续费分红，也没吃到上币费拍卖收入（预计每年2000万美元），这些都是本来他们应得的，但他们拱手让出了，感谢纸手。 如果这种买盘持续下去会发生什么。 我不知道，你猜呢？ 这几天虽然涨的蛮多，但一直坚定执行只加仓hype，不卖出不做波段的策略。 身边的老哥们最近难免因为蛮多阴谋论有所动摇，妄图去揣测狗庄到底准备什么时候收网，在想要不要找机会逃顶之类的。 其实也可以理解，每个人都有自己的投资逻辑。 但如果只是虚空索敌，压根没有所谓的镰刀在算计，准备收割你，那卖掉不是成了小丑？ 希望看完能让你做出更合理的决定。 我也会继续更新链上数据，每次基金会到底买入了多少hype，拍卖能为hype持有者带来多少额外收入，拭目以待。

@KennethHoxx @evilcos 你记错了吧，ada怎么会速度快，tps是0.5哦

@evilcos 因為他們是好早期的幣圈幣。市值不斷累積上來。他們價格一直沒起色。ADA當年力拼Sol地位 速度快 手續費便宜！但還是敵不過Sol 莊家主導的地位。

谁能告诉我，为什么 ADA XRP 这两这些年市值几乎总在 TOP10 里？让我感觉它们来自于平行世界…

用Solana大庄Kyle的话说 “类别推理往往导致错误的结论” 公链和公司两者确实没可比性，如果将错就错地继续类比，可能用国家做类比更合适： 以太坊和SOL建国时间、哲学完全不一样。一个自下而上做减法（美国），最小政府；一个自下而上中央计划（中国），极致效率。 以太坊基金会那三瓜两枣的财库资金，生态项目方还真没几个人看得上。所以大部分grant都是偏基建方向，也都是小额资助。 以太坊最活跃的DeFi生态压根就没靠过基金会资助（甚至EF整体对DeFi还抱负面评价），这恰恰是公链生态成熟的标志，众人拾材，把正外部性发挥到极致，同时把成本外化到极致。 靠自下而上猥琐发育，而不是自上而下的中央计划。 我感觉就中文币圈对以太坊基金会和Vitalik本身特别迷恋和过度神话，总幻想着一个温良君主能支持大局，恨不得基金会跟我党一样能领导大家“打土豪，分田地”。 EF的财库那三瓜两枣，可能都没有新L1基金会一个季度卖币和补贴量大。 大部分人对以太坊的失望，其实是对ETH的价格失望。 但价格也不是靠喊出来的。 SOL现在类似2017年以太坊ICO时代，市值相对较小，币价反身性极强，SOL OG创富反投，继续推动生态发展。 就我个人使用体验，SOL没有超越以太坊L2，现在费用（加priority fee 比arb/base还高），除非用聚合器，AMM直接交易10笔一半以上失败。 应用之战才刚刚开始，急什么。 如果把公链比做国家，自然也不是非美即中或非中即美，世界这么大，谁都有美好未来。

@sunlc_crypto 那就彻底悲剧了

大概率是朝鲜黑客，拿回来的希望不大

今年真的非常不顺利，这么老的项目也被盗了。。。。 我在BSC和ARB上加起来损失130W U。。。。。 目前BNB都在这个地址： debank.com/profile/0xcf47… 不知道币安能不能有点办法@heyibinance ETH转到了这个地址： debank.com/profile/0x8b75…

@chendabing123 @sunlc_crypto @heyibinance 黑客的这个手法，应该是没希望了

@sunlc_crypto @heyibinance Bbq了还是寄希望于和黑客沟通吧

During extreme volatility like today, @HyperliquidX is often the most liquid venue across DEXs and CEXs. Even on majors like ETH perps. Liquidity has a reputation for disappearing when users need it the most. The more efficient the market, the more pronounced this effect. It's a fair pricing of adverse selection by toxic takers. Conventional wisdom says it's an unavoidable side effect of the order book model. But this is lazy thinking. The market structure and underlying infrastructure should be optimized to best serve the end user. By redesigning the L1 from first principles, Hyperliquid proves that jointly optimizing the full stack leads to tangible benefits for all users.

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@thecryptoskanda @pikaso_me screenshot this

【开源镰刀 Open Rug 10 - 为什么资金去到Base了? 因为庄嫌SOL贵了】 资金近两周突然流向Base，一周Dex交易量增长83%,反观Solana一周流失53%。大家有没有想过为什么? 表面上的原因无非两个: 1. Base将会跟Coinbase剥离，并大概率发币。资金赌他Uni式空投，去交互有福报 2. Base生态社交做的好，有用户 实际上真是这样吗？ 首先又是我的老生常谈，Dex或者公链先服务谁? 当然是服务庄，LP。低流动性资产的庄的资金带动追低流动性资产的聪明钱带动主流机构资金(傻钱) —— 这个顺序基本上是真理 为什么庄或者说开盘子的要走? 因为两件事： 首先，是 Solana坐庄贵了 Solana开盘子多贵?我用经验告诉你: 先前我有说过我单独有一组团队做发币机器人，不断发币不断撤池子来杀开盘狙击机器人(抱歉了 @PepeBoost888 )做Bot farming。本质就是发币 - 加流动性 - 引诱机器人冲池子 - 砸盘+撤池子。 当前该Solana组合拳成本核算如下: 1. createtoken 0.2 Sol 2. create market id 1-2.8 Sol 3. create pool 0.4 Sol 4. 撤池子 0.4 Sol 合计 2-3.8 Sol ~ 380U-722U 比起ETH和BTC上开盘子，确实便宜很多，但比起Base，太贵了—— Base做同样的事，总成本不超过3U。 我的Bot farming策略要work的前提，是在不做运营的情况下，单纯靠加池子开盘吸引到狙击机器人，诱使其注入超过4Sol 资金并成功rug才能打平成本。这样的成本迫使我每次开盘需要放10万U等额以上Sol才能勉强完成 其次，是Base的流动性和注意力高了 说实话Base的gas成本优势横向对比其他L2和Solana并不突出。但是随着二级牛市来临，整体流动性变好。低流动性市场比如NFT和铭文退出市场中心，大战胜负手取决于注意力榨取。 Warpcast产生了关键的作用，它相当于把为数不少的高影响力KOL每天的时间圈在了Base上，从而确保了Base土狗的注意力。Warpcast作为social产品在经济上完全不make sense，但是作为”土狗发射器“它的效果要远好于任何launchpad。经过Warpcast传播的土狗很容易就诱拐刚学会机器人和链上博弈的IQ100们的注意。而注意力就是流动性 我在Base进行了一个礼拜左右的Bot farming策略实验，目前盈利13.7e，小池子平均每把收益2.5%左右。 我准备加大剂量给Base上的科学家们好好上一课，有花堪折直须折，莫待无花打骨折! Base上的mid curve们，洗干净准备好被割吧！

🎉Omnichain Carnival Wave 1 is now live with early access! TL;DR -Early access for Wave 1 starts on 3/26 at 14:00 UTC and lasts for 4 days -Register during early access to receive a 15% bonus in wave 1 -3% of the total supply will be allocated in Wave 1. Lead Wave 1 with extra rewards! Register at: carnival.stakestone.io Anticipate Wave 2, plus even more to come. Learn more about omnichain carnival: @official_42951/stakestone-omnichain-carnival-6a4fc10ebe4f" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">medium.com/@official_4295…

1/ Pac Finance is live on mainnet 🟢 A Big Bang winner, Pac Finance is the first hybrid lending protocol on @Blast_L2, featuring self-repaying loans, one-click leverage, and more. We are airdropping 100% of our developer points & more to our early adopters! More below 👇