Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz
We need to be honest with ourselves: so far, this campaign has been a major strategic failure.
There were certainly important operational achievements, and the level of coordination between U.S. Central Command and the Israel Defense Forces was highly impressive. But wars are not judged by tactical successes alone, they are judged against their original strategic objectives.
The Iranian regime did not fall, and at this stage there is no indication that it is close to collapsing. There was no regime change in Iran; instead, there was a change within the regime, and arguably for the worse. The crisis appears to have strengthened Mojtaba Khamenei and the more hardline elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, giving them greater influence over Iran’s decision-making process.
On the conventional front, Iran still retains most of its military capabilities. Even where damage was inflicted, it has not fundamentally altered Tehran’s ability or willingness to resume military confrontation.
On the nuclear front, Iran continues to possess a massive stockpile of enriched uranium, including the same roughly 440 kilograms enriched to near-weapons-grade levels. More importantly, the regime still possesses the scientific and technical expertise necessary to enrich to 90% if it chooses to do so.
And beyond that, Iran still maintains leverage over the Strait of Hormuz — which remained open and stable before the war began.
I do not know how this conflict will ultimately end. But if these are the conditions under which it concludes, then this will be remembered as a profound strategic failure — one that leaves behind a far worse regional reality than the one that existed before the campaign began.
Ignoring that reality will not improve the situation; it will only deepen the problem.
Iran built its national security doctrine around asymmetric capabilities. Damage to its navy or air force, however significant tactically, does not fundamentally undermine its ability to wage this kind of confrontation.
That is the reality, whether policymakers are comfortable acknowledging it or not. A serious strategy for weakening the Iranian regime in the future has to begin with an honest recognition of this reality.
It is possible that the United States is planning additional, more significant steps. But if we are assessing the campaign as it stands today, the outcome is deeply negative.
Without acknowledging that, Washington risks building its next phase on a false premise — and that is exactly how tactical achievements turn into strategic failure.
No wonder Iran is not surrendering at the negotiating table if this is indeed the reality.
It is time to go back to the drawing board rather than keep insisting on an approach that has already failed.
And it starts with one basic understanding: Iran is not Venezuela. Conventional cost-benefit calculations do not necessarily work against a regime that is willing to sacrifice its own population to preserve its rule.
There is no textbook solution here.
Not the Kurds, not arming the opposition, and not targeted killings. None of these, on their own, provides a strategic answer to the Iranian problem set.
It is time to think seriously about a different strategy, because the current approach is not containing the threat. It is producing a security reality that is, almost by definition, worse than the one that existed before.
If the objective is to weaken the Iranian regime over time, then repeating tools that have already failed is not strategy.
#IranWar
