xorhash

@ezekgabrielse @keygen_sh Has this non-RSA cryptography stuff gone anywhere? I don't seem to see anything in the documentation other than RSA with PKCS#1 v1.5. (I also noticed you've removed the notice that you're hiring. I hope you found a good employee!)

@keygen_sh Out of curiosity: Is there any particular reason why you use RSA for the offline validation? ECC would give shorter signatures, which given offline contexts would probably be more convenient for manual human input. (Also why is PKCS#1 v1.5 padding still not dead...)

@oconnor663 As far as I know, BLAKE3 has a trivial native MAC mode though and HopMAC for K12 specified in draft-irtf-cfrg-kangarootwelve-04 needs double invocation of K12. I'm not aware of there being an officially condoned, performant alternative to HopMAC.

@cryptodavidw @zooko The best comparison I know of is our graphs in the BLAKE3 paper. K12 and B3 have very similar peak throughput on x86. Currently the official implementation of B3 leads by a bit. B3's advantage is larger for short inputs, and on 32-bit systems.

The world of hash functions is annoying af: SHA-3 is standardized, but Argon2 uses BLAKE2, but there is BLAKE3, but Ed25519 uses SHA-2, but...

I am very sad to learn that Harold (Ed) Edwards has died last Tuesday. legacy.com/obituaries/nyt… Among other achievements in mathemaics, Ed discovered Edwards cuvers as a new normal form of elliptic curves. These are _the_ Edwards curves behind Ed2215 & EdDSA.

This is a fascinating read about breaking a tiny embedded device for the hell of it. dmitry.gr/?r=05.Projects…

@ShinyQuagsire See, you might be targeting PRIMOS (that died in the late 90s), which represents NULL as all-1. svn.haxx.se/dev/archive-20…

Hedging my bets on my lab's coding standard by adding a comment acknowledging the fact that memset(structPtr, 0, sizeof(*structPtr)) is technically against the standard, but refusing to define the 0 on principle

Anybody have good recommendations for a book on Win32 in the sense of a programmer's manual? May be as old as covering Windows XP SP2.

NIST actually released NIST SP 800-208 "Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes". Right after even the NSA told them that stateful hash-based signatures are a bad idea. csrc.nist.gov/publications/d…

People who trust optimizing compilers to work correctly seem to be surprised by a 2020 gcc bug report gcc.gnu.org/pipermail/gcc-… where the optimizer treats byte arrays as equal if they pass strcmp. For comparison, here's a gcc bug report I filed last century: gcc.gnu.org/pipermail/gcc-…

Fascinating: NSA made a public comment on QKD, quantum crypto (QC), and post quantum crypto. Short version: They aren’t fans of QKD or QC, they like lattice-based crypto, they don’t like hash-based signatures. nsa.gov/News-Features/…

You know, I was wondering if the post-quantum cryptography competition didn't drag on too long, but now I'm not sure if it isn't actually too short.

A curiosity I learned about today: X-Face. The X-Face e-mail header contained a 48x48 black-and-white picture with the idea of showing the author's face. Anybody aware of this still being used for, well, anything? en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X-Face

We've achieved next step - Intel Microcode RC4 key. We can now decrypt microcode updates!

.@veorq Is the norx.io website gone intentionally?

@ezekgabrielse How did you end up implementing it? Standard TOTP?

CVE-2020-16898 | Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security…

Occasional reminder to make backups.

I have to say, I’m really impressed with how Microsoft has recently embraced open-source technologies like Rust

@dakoraa @veorq So does the list of safe examples. When's the last time the masses have used Poly1305 on its own (outside of a pre-specified AEAD) safely?

@veorq The list of unsafe examples seems…provocative…

"A new specification language for crypto primitives in Rust" github.com/hacspec/hacspec

May your soul rest in peace, longcat.

New paper "A discretization attack": #categories" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">cr.yp.to/papers.html#ca… Identifies another NSA-exploitable weakness in standardization processes. Includes a detailed case study of how #NISTPQC could hypothetically have been attacked, and evidence suggesting that it was in fact attacked.