

Cyber Strategy
24K posts

@CyberStrategy1
Forged at USCYBERCOM. We replace "Detect & Respond" with Engineered Certainty. Architects of: 🛡️ Warden 🔗 Digital Shield 🤖 AI SAFE² 👇 Get the Blueprint




Agentic capability is improving fast. We believe Proof of Human is becoming critical for the internet and many of the platforms we use (like X). This paper explains why FaceID, face biometrics & government IDs won’t solve the problem, and what properties are most important.








We are mapping the 5000 days series: the final frontier isn’t labor. It’s love, intimacy, and identity. When a robot can look you in the eye, remember every detail of your life, kiss you goodnight what happens to the messy, imperfect human relationships? readmultiplex.com/2026/03/25/you…









I NEED my feed full of builders. What are you working on right now? I don't care if it's a startup or a weekend side project. If you're building something, I want you on my timeline. Reply and let's connect. 👇

Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.

As @DavidSacks pointed out at @HillValleyForum, 50 directions and 1,200+ AI bills create a nightmare for innovators. We need a national framework built on shared principles, especially on child safety, with a clear North Star: empower parents while preparing kids for success.






