Blake
1.5K posts




I am committing 500 ETH to the Defi united recovery fund. This represents a large part of my crypto holdings, but there are things that are more important than money - Like Stani, I have been working on Aave since the beginning and the only thing I care about is to see it succeed. There are no defeats in life, only lessons. We will be coming back stronger. Aave will win.


Golem Foundation and Golem Factory are contributing a combined 1000 ETH from our treasuries to @aave's coordinated DeFi relief effort following the rsETH incident. We've been working closely with the Aave team this week in a supporting capacity. Our contribution will go toward restoring rsETH backing and enabling an orderly resolution for affected stakeholders. Glad to stand with @aave and the rest of the ecosystem responding here. DeFi United.



Lot's of discussion re: should reETH mainnet holders be affected by kelpDAO LZ bridge hack or not. Some argue that every reETH (on L1 and L2s) is "equal", part of the same "social contract" that should be known to all reETH holders. Also, for all intents and purposes, they are fungible, so how can they not be the same ? Others point out that, from the technical PoV, we actually have two different tokens on mainnet - rsETH and rsETH-OFT wrapper. Is this really a technicality, an unimportant implementation detail, and they are part of the same, common "social contract" or they cannot be ? In my opinion implementation which anyone can (and should) verify should follow a social contract. KelpDAO implemented reETH w/out OFT functionality first. Later, they could have upgraded it to include OFT functionality. The ability to upgrade is part of a social contract (as it can be seen in the code and anyone that buys reETH agrees to the upgradability functionality). Ideally there should be a time delay, so if you are reETH holder and you see an upgrade that you don't like, you can rage-quit. Monitoring of upgrades and time delays should be the norm as is the case in any social contract in the real world - your supplier changes Terms - you should be able to quit the contract But KelpDAO did not do the upgrade. Instead they created a seperate reETH-OFT wrapper. This action cannot be detected by reETH holder just by observing reETH contract onchain. I fail to see how reETH holders could automatically enter the new "social contract" of an OFT version of reETH. The confusion clearly comes from the fact that every single UI, ranging from wallets to exchanges and DeFi apps fooled everybody that reETH and reETH-OFT are the same tokens. No, they are not. They carry very different operational risks. Hiding this fact is something I am strongly opposed to. You want the convenience (and risks) of an OFT token? Fine, issue your token as a pure burn-mint OFT or upgrade the existing token to it. But if you create an OFT wrapper, you create a new token with a new social contract. The main problem with this interpretation is that - ironically - it creates much bigger losses for Aave (see governance.aave.com/t/rseth-incide…), so it is perhaps not surprising that the "all rsETH is the same" theory is being promoted. But don't be fooled - if you are a mainnet rsETH holder, you should not be exposed to rsETH-OFT wrapper risks.


The Arbitrum Security Council has taken emergency action to freeze the 30,766 ETH being held in the address on Arbitrum One that is connected to the KelpDAO exploit. The Security Council acted with input from law enforcement as to the exploiter’s identity, and, at all times, weighed its commitment to the security and integrity of the Arbitrum community without impacting any Arbitrum users or applications. After significant technical diligence and deliberation, the Security Council identified and executed a technical approach to move funds to safety without affecting any other chain state or Arbitrum users. As of April 20 11:26pm ET the funds have been successfully transferred to an intermediary frozen wallet. They are no longer accessible to the address that originally held the funds, and can only be moved by further action by Arbitrum governance, which will be coordinated with relevant parties.

Update on rsETH incident: @LlamaRisk has published a report outlining the rsETH incident, the immediate actions taken, its impact on Aave, and potential paths forward. All service providers have been working to assess the two potential bad debt scenarios on the Aave protocol. Aave DAO service providers are also leading an effort with ecosystem participants to address any bad debt. This effort already has several indicative commitments from various parties and we are grateful for the strong support we have received so far. We will share further updates as we have them. In the meantime, the full report can be read here: governance.aave.com/t/rseth-incide…




