Alan Eyre

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Alan Eyre

Alan Eyre

@AlanEyre1

MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow; Former State Dept. Iran SME & senior policymaker for Iran/MENA; Thought Follower. RTs ≠ endorsements.

بیت الجُهَّال 가입일 Mayıs 2011
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Furkan Gözükara
Furkan Gözükara@FurkanGozukara·
Absolute psychopath. An American reporter asks Netanyahu about US soldiers dying for his war, and he literally brushes it off saying "freedom has its costs." He is sacrificing American lives without a single second of hesitation.
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Alan Eyre
Alan Eyre@AlanEyre1·
When asked about a possible USD 200 Billion Iran War Supplemental, Secretary Hegseth said: "It takes money to kill bad guys." That will be a historic budget line item: 'USD 200 Billion: Money to Kill Bad Guys.' #Testosterone_R_Us nytimes.com/2026/03/19/wor…
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Morgan Bazilian
Morgan Bazilian@MBazilian·
We wrote a detailed academic paper about the widening gap between copper supply and demand last month. Now it is highlighted in a format a few people might actually read! “Global copper demand outstrips supply, threatening electrification and industrial growth” theconversation.com/global-copper-…
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Alan Eyre
Alan Eyre@AlanEyre1·
spot-on, from @anneapplebaum Money quote: "Donald Trump does not think strategically. Nor does he think historically, geographically, or even rationally. He does not connect actions he takes on one day to events that occur weeks later. He does not think about how his behavior in one place will change the behavior of other people in other places." "He does not consider the wider implications of his decisions. He does not take responsibility when these decisions go wrong. Instead, he acts on whim and impulse, and when he changes his mind—when he feels new whims and new impulses—he simply lies about whatever he said or did before." theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/03/…
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عبدالعزيز المقبل
Morgan Stanley published this chart about massive disruptions in industries across the board
عبدالعزيز المقبل tweet media
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Kate from Kharkiv
Kate from Kharkiv@BohuslavskaKate·
Hegseth: "We're still dealing with the environment Joe Biden created—depleting our stockpiles and sending them to Ukraine instead of our own military. Every time we face a challenge, it traces back to 'Well, sent it to Ukraine.'" It looks like they’re just going to blame Ukraine whenever anything goes wrong now, doesn’t it? It’s depressing to watch because while this administration will eventually leave office, a segment of Americans will keep hating Ukraine without even remembering why.
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Javier Blas
Javier Blas@JavierBlas·
CHART OF THE DAY: The White House is fighting to keep the price of WTI crude oil under $100 a barrel. But for America's Main Street what truly matters isn't the price of crude, but the cost of refined products — and those are rising fast. Link to my @Opinion column on reply.
Javier Blas tweet media
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Victoria J. Taylor
Victoria J. Taylor@VictoriaT_·
As the last permanent DAS for Iraq/Iran (until May 2025), I agree with this 💯. My level of access and influence declined precipitously during this admin. I read the room and moved on. They have not named a permanent replacement for me.
Alan Eyre@AlanEyre1

Yes, this administration has gutted Middle East experience at the State Department, but ... ...it doesn't really matter how much/little expertise the current State Department has, because it is totally out of the policy loop. apnews.com/article/iran-s…

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Alan Eyre@AlanEyre1·
@tparsi underscores what is at stake.
Trita Parsi@tparsi

The developments of the past 24h may prove a turning point in this war: Israel and the US's escalation by striking the Qatari-Iranian Pars field, the strikes against Asaluyeh, Iran's massive retaliation against oil and gas installations in Saudi, Qatar and beyond, which shot up oil prices, the near downing of a F35 by Iran and Secretary Bessent's revelations that the US may unsanction Iranian oil on the waters to bring down oil prices. As I said already on the fourth day, the US has lost control of this war. It had a Plan A, but no Plan B. Plan A came crashing down after it became clear that the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei neither brought the implosion of the theocracy nor their surrender. As a result, the US is increasingly letting the Israelis drive the bus, by virtue of them having a plan, even though their plan does not serve US interests (the Israelis want to prolong the war to degrade Iran's entire industrial base, regardless of what happens to energy markets, Trump's presidency, and security in the region as a whole.) The Israeli strike against the Pars field, coordinated with the US, is particularly important because it violated a promise Trump made to Qatar back in September 2025 - Israel would no longer be allowed to strike Qatar. But that gas field is shared by both Iran and Qatar, hence it was an attack on Qatar as well as on Iran. With US coordination. This - and the impact on energy markets - may explain why Trump took to social media to blame Israel for the attack and publicly forbade them from striking further energy fields. But Bessent's comments about unsanctioning Iranian oil on the waters are the most important. Though it's primarily done to push down oil prices, it appears that we may have nevertheless entered sanctions relief territory out of necessity. I wrote several days ago that Tehran is very unlikely to end the war even if the US pulls out and declares victory. Iran has leverage for the first time in years and will seek to trade it in. It has publicly demanded a closing of US bases, reparations, and sanctions relief in order to stop shooting at Israel and open the Straits. The first may happen over time anyway, the second is highly unlikely, but the third - sanctions relief - may become more plausible as the cost of the war rises, and escalation strategies become increasingly suicidal for Trump. As I have explained, a return to the pre-war status quo is unacceptable to Tehran because it will not only be in a degraded state, but also in a continuously weakening state because its pathways to sanctions relief have been blown up. If Iran weakens further, it will only invite further American and Israeli aggression, Tehran believes, because it was the false perception of Iranian weakness that created the "window of opportunity" to attack Iran in the first place. Sanctions relief is, as a result, a necessity to ensure that the war doesn't restart. But here is where Iran may miscalculate. Trump may not yet have reached the point at which the cost of continuing the war is so high that he opts to offer sanctions exemptions to select countries to get Iran's agreement to open the straits and end the war. He will likely only reach that point once it's clear that his base is starting to turn against the war in a serious manner. At that point, Trump will face a time crunch. He will need a narrative in which he declares himself a victor - with his base believing it. Absent the ability to convince his base that he has won, the benefit of ending the war may not outweigh the cost of continuing it. And as soon as his base starts turning against the war, his ability to convince them of his victory starts to wane. Mindful of the fact that negotiating this end may take an estimated 7-10 days at best, which is different from the 24 hours or so it took to negotiate the unconditional ceasefire in June, Tehran may overplay its hand and only agree to enter these negotiations at a point at which the length of the negotiations may exceed the time Trump has left to convincingly declare victory and provide himself a face saving exit. Getting the timing of this right will be very difficult for both the US and Iran. Israel will do all it can to sabotage any such off-ramp, including by killing Iranian's negotiatiors. But it will become increasingly clear - if it hasn't already - to Trump that all his escalatory options only deepen the lose-lose situation he has put himself in. That's why Trump should never have listened to Netanyahu in the first place.

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Gregg Carlstrom
Gregg Carlstrom@glcarlstrom·
"The cost of replacing the first four days' worth of munitions would be $20bn-26bn. The problem, however, is more to do with scarcity than cost. America is thought to have used more than 300 Tomahawk cruise missiles in the opening days of the war, but the Pentagon had planned to buy just 57 new ones in the current fiscal year. There have been no deliveries of THAAD interceptors since 2023 and the Pentagon has not placed any new orders this year. A puny 39 interceptors are slated for delivery in 2027—six years after they were ordered." economist.com/briefing/2026/…
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Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim@academic_la·
I talked to two Israeli sources on why Iranian launches continue to increase, despite US-Israeli claims that they have destroyed almost all of the launchers. Here is what they said: 1) The 90–95% drop in volume claimed by CENTCOM earlier in the month was probably a temporary lull as Iran repositioned its remaining launchers into hardened sites. Independent satellite analysis suggests that a significant portion of the "80% destruction" claimed by the IDF actually hit high-fidelity decoys. 2) Despite fewer launchers, the lethality per strike has increased. Iran's shift to cluster warheads has allowed a single missile to impact multiple locations simultaneously, compensating for the lower volume of launches 3) Iran has successfully set up mobile, underground units able to fire at steady rates. Iran used that quiet period to move their remaining ~100-120 heavy launchers into "Super-Hardened" facilities 4) Iran is utilizing its Zolfaqar and Dezful road-mobile launchers. These units move from hardened tunnels to pre-surveyed launch spots, fire, and return underground in under 10 minutes, often before coalition drones can re-task for a strike. 5) Because these launching units are decentralized, it is very hard for US and Israeli intelligence to get info on them. Israel and the United States do not have an answer to this problem. That is why they are trying escalation on energy sources instead. But that is backfiring.
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