heavily impaired noticer

@RuizheJia @KolemanStrumpf @ShihaoY @ardnox @u739173 @pangram ai?

Great questions, and @ardnox and @u739173 have it right. Let me build it up step by step, because the pieces matter separately. First, lead-lag. In crypto there's a well-known lead-lag between exchanges: Binance moves first, and other venues follow with a small delay. Second, you're right Binance is well under half of BTC volume, closer to a third. But volume share and price-discovery are different, and here one needs to care about price discovery. Binance's price moves are permanent, while a move that starts on a smaller venue is usually transitory and reverts. Binance is where BTC's price is actually discovered. Third, why that holds, and it's just how market making equilibrium works. Market makers everywhere quote around a fair value, essentially their forecast of the short-term price, and for BTC that fair value is heavily weighted on Binance (as their price change is permanent). Most venues anchor to it rather than pricing independently; some effectively mirror it. This may reinforce the lead-lag and price discovery center. So the Chainlink index, which averages these venues, effectively tracks Binance (plus or minus a small basis, with a short delay). We show it directly: ~2.5 bps median basis (how far the level sits from the index) and ~85% strike-side agreement (same side of the strike, the match that matters for a binary). That's why volume share is the not the full lens: even at ~a third of volume, Binance leads discovery, and the tracking is measured regardless of the split. On arbs offsetting the push: convergence runs toward the leader. When Binance moves, followers re-quote up to it, so arbitrage spreads the push to the index rather than pulling Binance back. While the contract resolves at the settlement instant, so the manipulator only needs the price across the strike at that snapshot. Any genuine correction lands after, which is exactly the post-settlement reversal we document. On why Binance and not a cheaper venue: push a follower and it's wasted, its printed price moves but the Binance-anchored fair value hasn't, so makers fade it and it reverts, never reaching the index. To move the index that way you'd have to push every venue at once. Push the leader, and one venue carries the whole index. Cheaper per dollar on a follower, but useless.

Binance is arguably the world's largest crypto exchange. Feb 2026: Polymarket lists a small 5-minute Bitcoin contract. Since then, Binance order flow spikes in the final seconds before settlement; prices revert soon after. New paper with David Dai and Shihao Yu ( @ShihaoY ): Settlement Manipulation in Prediction Markets (papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…)🧵 The finding, up front: Traders push Bitcoin's price in the final seconds to decide the contract. That push makes the price less informative, yet Bitcoin's market more liquid. Market makers are largely insulated; ordinary traders lose $7.6M in two months.

points season theorists will have a field day with all the passages around 42:12.

27:17 "the same thing that AWS did for computers [...], Hyperliquid can do for liquidity, ledgers, deployments, tokenizations of RWAs, et cetera." 🤔

@luigidemeo @hexonaut @SebVentures "Dream bigger", "will come to light" - is this the Chief Strategy Officer talking? Hoping for someone else to figure it out?

@hexonaut @SebVentures I think there are many usecases that will come to light. We are not dreaming big enough. Also, you don't necessarily have to rehypo

I thought the same, i.e. that rehypothecation is key. It is a very narrow demand but a significant risk. The stock would get shorted while getting down, leading to illiquidity, failed liquidations and bad debt. Nevertheless, building it on top of an isolated lending is not that hard and provides more control.

@sealaunch_ it's not that simple

The Morpho x Robinhood deal is strange for an outside observer. Most of Morpho's growth and TVL has been driven by Coinbase. Coinbase is an investor in Morpho, gave it preference on their onchain products, and that's a big part of how the protocol scaled. That growth is what allowed Morpho to negotiate bigger BD deals including Robinhood. Robinhood is one of Coinbase's main competitors. Robinhood chose to build its onchain product on a protocol that's economically and intrinsically tied to its competitor. This is odd because: 1) It makes it harder to differentiate the offer from a technical perspective (besides with incentives). 2) It creates a risk vector between the companies. Isolated markets and separate chains limit direct financial contagion but they don't isolate reputation. If there's a bank run or liquidity crunch on either side, users won't distinguish between "Robinhood's Morpho markets" and "Coinbase's Morpho markets." Also, Robinhood's markets are curated by Steakhouse, one of the biggest Morpho curators and one of the same curators active across Coinbase-linked Morpho markets. A curator stress event damages confidence in every market they curate, on both sides. The obvious defense is that Morpho is just the neutral infrastructure, but in this case there’s no neutrality since Morpho is subsidizing a competitor growth. Robinhood is advertising a 7% yield that is largely subsidized by Morpho. In other words, Morpho is subsidizing a product that directly competes with a Coinbase product. And to add to all this, in Morpho's latest funding round which likely funds growth campaigns like this, Coinbase Ventures is not listed as an investor, though they were a previous known backer. Curious on what Coinbase does in response: → Do they launch their own DeFi lending market and compete with Morpho? Coinbase has past examples of shipping products that cannibalize partners. → Do they drop Morpho's exclusivity on Coinbase onchain products and open up to other lending markets?

lmao coinbase trying to be diplomatical meanwhile crcl down 12%.

@0xDuckworth alright buddy

Step 1: fake a gov proposal to plant your homies as a pawn against circle Step 2: take deal from circle and tell your homies to take the backseat, arrange a nice acq for them Step 3: payoff any of the ecosystem participants (at your own discretion of course) who actually integrated the fake stable so there’s no mutiny Thanks for the playing the game 🤝 One protocol in particular actually got snubbed twice first with USDHL then with USDH. You’d think there would be more difference than just the one letter but turns out there really wasn’t!

@0xKolten @aave custom markets as in hubs and/or spokes custom designed in collaboration with other projects/institutions?

The security-first approach to @aave V4's growth has been great. Plenty of learnings in the last few months, with the first couple of chain expansions coming soon and a lot of custom markets in the pipeline.

@osec_io important to mention that chitra's paper was widely discussed and criticized, 'fairness = 1 - gini' is based upon their judgement of fairness. accepting longer clearing times increases risk to all depositors on the platform including non-participants without any open positions.

When Hyperliquid has to clear bad debt, who covers it? We reverse-engineered the closed-source risk engine, verified some core properties & compared it to other perps. It's not neutral: the more leveraged and profitable your position, the sooner it's closed. Full breakdown ↓

@super_fantome @Bitcoineo is it known that they are paying for integrations or suspicion?

@Bitcoineo Morpho has a strong narrative but 0 profits. Their model is too basic and only survives on expensive paid integrations. Aave has more business lines, a more diversified user base and stronger revenue. That said, I agree, Aave disappoints : weak BD and too correlated to btc/eth.

Lots of reasons: 1. I feel like Aave doesn't want it enough anymore 2. Vaults are the next big thing, and Morpho is winning there 3. Aave's moat eroded with Marc leaving, poor v4 performance, btc/eth going down (Morpho focusses on RWAs) Morpho has better partners (from tradfi & fintech) and a bigger dream to sell.

@gupta_kanv that is awesome. but then I truly don't know what you are claiming euler to have invented that is now being copied? two bubbles with an arrow in between?

@50xMonarch I think I would know given I worked for a Rari/Fuse fork for years.

Congratulations to the Aave team on V4. We spent a lot of time writing those docs, so it’s nice to see they’re getting wider distribution than we expected. For anyone who wants the original battle-tested version:

@gupta_kanv yes, let's remember. fuse built customized lending pools (EVK), managed by pool creators (curators) and lending plugins (EVC), then fuse-adjacents designed erc-4626, then euler used erc-4626 and the ideas that fuse had come up with to build euler v2. amazing euler invention.

@50xMonarch I don’t mind them copying our docs or protocol this blatantly. Just saying that the timeline is worth remembering.

@Merridew__ congratulations!

@stalequant seemingly 4 but please 1

@ArrakisFinance fills are not a way to gauge price discovery, hl has taker speed bump, price discovery happens before a block is completed and publicly broadcast, counting block n+1 as latency only makes sense from the whole flawed fill angle, etc, etc. you need full order book data

@_stevenhl complete bs as far as I can see, the message was not edited but messages in the past were. discord message was also not edited.

I’m usually the first to roll my eyes at hopium for another season of Hyperliquid incentives, but if the QT is real, it does feel like a rare Freudian slip. Back in 2023, HL had USDC incentives for OI and gave periodic updates the same way… With HIP-4 rolling out, who knows!

@ImperiumPaper can you expand on why you think the current options are imperfect? think this is an interesting topic

I suspect the next 12 months provide us a major expansion in DeFi and CeDeFi lending activity. Pretty much every lending protocol of note (and some who are not) has just released or will soon release a new version. I’m not sure those new versions will themselves provide much of a Cambrian Explosion of new lending structures, but it means there’s a window where the accumulated Lindy of most players in the DeFi lending market will be reset. Assuming there are enough new features to lure depositors away from Morpho v1 and Aave v3, then the arms race will be on, since a new entrant is unlikely to need as high of a risk premium to compete with Morpho v2 and Aave v4. So I expect the evolution of the half dozen or more lending protocols with new versions will actually be quite swift as they roll out new products. We already see (I think mostly imperfect) experimentation with fixed rates and tranching structures, but there’s a wide world of other species of lending: Convertible debt, subordinated/second lien, capital call financing, committed revolving facilities, whole business (assets + revenue based finance), etc etc etc. So there’s a lot of room for enterprising lending protocols to carve out specialties they can dominate.

@sheriff_hl could have just looked at the way the wrote Hyper liquid.

Holy fake position

@stalequant having had ai read the strc prospectus it seems strc holders do not even have contingent voting rights.