Ankit Kamboj

137 posts

Ankit Kamboj

Ankit Kamboj

@AnkitKambojTO

Private Equity investor at KCM Holdings focused on SMBs and LMM PE. Here to learn and meet other investors, operators and deal makers.

Toronto, Ontario Katılım Kasım 2023
158 Takip Edilen90 Takipçiler
Aizik Zimerman
Aizik Zimerman@AizikZimerman·
A few months ago, we had $0 of sales from Meta Ads. After hiring someone in Brazil to start and manage it, we did $100k this month and quickly growing
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junkbondinvestor
junkbondinvestor@junkbondinvest·
QXO buying TopBuild for $17B (55% stock) at 14.9x EBITDA (pre-synergies) Public consolidators paying premium multiples while PE-owned peers trade distressed Winners consolidate. Losers restructure.
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Charles | PE | Incentives
Charles | PE | Incentives@_PE_Charles·
Playing around with something that's been in my head for a while on value creation... Every client I talk to wants real, industry specific examples for how value is generated, typically tailored to their specific problem. I'm (very slowly) building a reference library for value creation case studies. Focused on public and private companies. Eventually, would be great to get real stories from real people, relevant to LMM PE. Thoughts and feedback welcome. Useful or dumb?
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Ankit Kamboj
Ankit Kamboj@AnkitKambojTO·
@Will_Schryver Do some research into the business, it’s more diversified than just a lumberyard.
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Will Schryver
Will Schryver@Will_Schryver·
What part of the cycle are we in when lumberyards trade for 10.7x $QXO is acquiring Kodiak Building Partners for $2.25B Kodiak generated ~$2.4B revenue / ~$211M EBITDA Few years ago I was on the sell side for a lumberyard and we were lucky to get 6x PE-backed consolidating platforms targeted 8x upon exit so Kodiak trading for 10x+ is extraordinary
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Ankit Kamboj
Ankit Kamboj@AnkitKambojTO·
@PEoperator One of the best capital allocators out there, amazing how small they started and what they’ve become.
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PEoperator⚡️
PEoperator⚡️@PEoperator·
This book is absolutely mind blowing. One of the greatest operators you've never heard of (I hadn't either). Must read and added to the list at: peoperator.co Alain Bouchard built Couche-Tard / Circle K into a compounding machine… in about the least glamorous industry on earth: convenience stores. From its IPO, he beat Warren Buffett. The numbers are staggering: $100 invested at Couche-Tard’s 1986 IPO became $60,000 by spring 2016 That’s ~600x. For context, over that period, the S&P500 did ~22x and Buffett did ~99x. Alain was not a passive investor. He was a hands on operator, involved in every facet of the business and obsessed with customers and execution. He founded Couche-Tard in Quebec after having been an employee in the industry for several years. He and his team (he convinced three partners to join him) acquired 11 stores and two buildings for just $20k down up front. He was relentless - driven by a chip on his shoulder having watched his dad go bankrupt in his own venture. While was an operator through and through, he had some serious financial savvy too. How did he do it? Here are my key takeaways from the book: 1) Humility “At Couche-Tard… we are egoless.” Even with immense wealth (talking about mgmt) “After all these years… you still feel that they are ordinary people… They listen.” 2) No bureaucracy Bouchard despised headquarters arrogance: “He wanted Couche-Tard to avoid that culture completely… it all started with having no head office… the base of operations would be a ‘service centre.’” And he was relentless about language: “There is no head office in this company, and there never will be… We are a service centre and a training centre - that’s it.” 3) Radical decentralization “The decision… still applies today… We took a decentralized approach.” Fortin (CT's CFO) called it the key: “To delegate power to the regions… It’s the model that would end up allowing us to buy convenience stores around the world.’” 4) Customer obsession “The clearest insights can sometimes come from the bottom rather than the top.” Bouchard didn’t tour stores for optics - he wanted to see the tip of the spear: “I don’t do these tours to inspect buildings. I do them to talk to people… to learn about their reality.” And when he visits stores: “He isn’t talking to us. He’s talking to the store managers, the store employees… He connects and gives them attention.” 5) Operational excellence Couche-Tard viewed itself as a compounding network: “They were part of a network in which the most profitable contribute to those still developing.” Story after story about how they pursued excellence in their stores and their ability there gave them conviction to lean in on larger and larger acquisitions... 6) Aggressive M&A + artful dealmaking They engineered operator-driven acquisitions early: “They acquired 11 depanneurs (convenience stores) and two buildings - with only $20,000 down… ‘we came back with cash.’” They bought a competitor twice their size: “The deal wouldn’t cost a cent… Metro-Richelieu would effectively hand over all its depanneurs for shares.” And they showed up as operators, not financiers: “The founders… with our noses in the books, while the other groups had sent lawyers and accountants.” 7) Tolerance for failure Bouchard encouraged entrepreneurial action everywhere: “He encourages risk-taking… prefers trust… even when it sometimes backfires.” Every store was a lab: “Each store should be considered a laboratory where the best ideas can germinate… harvest them and disseminate them.” “The indispensable corollary is tolerance for error.” -- Couche-Tard is proof that the greatest compounding machines are often built far from Wall Street… One store, one manager, one deal at a time. Again, check it out here: peoperator.co And thanks to @sidecarcap for the recommendation!
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Mindset for Money
Mindset for Money@Mindset4Money_X·
You can buy $V at its cheapest multiple of the year (close enough) 👀 How do we feel about a fwd P/E of 25x?
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Documenting Saylor
Documenting Saylor@saylordocs·
If you’ve got $2.8 million sitting around, a 9.25% savings rate pays you ~$259k a year. No stress. No risk. Just passive income. Why aren’t more people doing this?
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Will Schryver
Will Schryver@Will_Schryver·
Buddy of mine got an offer from private equity for his home services company “High single digits” EBITDA multiple 90% cash at close / 10% earnout Would you take this offer?
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Ankit Kamboj
Ankit Kamboj@AnkitKambojTO·
@ACapitalLP It’s definitely interesting at these levels, especially based on the guide of $330M to $360M FY EBITDA
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Jum
Jum@JesterJum·
This is our new kitchen. What would you put here?
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Gabriel Tamez
Gabriel Tamez@deusexdividend·
My local golf course (member's only) just ditched their course management software in favor of an in-house solution. Apparently it was entirely vibe coded by a 17 year-old caddie in exchange for 5 green fees, a 30 rack of beer and a Zyn pack. $CSU is in deep trouble guys
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Pvtcreditguy
Pvtcreditguy@pvtcreditguy·
In private credit I can put language in the side letter that for the avoidance of doubt no fee be charged if it was a placement agent that introduced me to the fund.
Chris Hoffmann@STLChrisH

Private Equity’s 2-and-20 era added a friend: +2–4% to the gatekeeper. I’ve been blown away at how many GPs I’ve met who hired third-party capital raisers to “open doors.” The result is a two-layer fee structure that investors ultimately pay. How the fees pile up: Model 1 - Investors pay directly: Placement fee of ~2–4% on commitments + the GP’s ~2% AUM management fee. Example: A $10M commitment with a 3% placement fee = $300k upfront, plus $200k/yr in management fees. Model 2 - “GP pays” (but from the 2% AUM): The placement fee is financed and serviced from the GP’s management fee. That shrinks the GP’s operating budget - less money for hiring, portfolio support, and infrastructure - which can boomerang back to investors via weaker execution. Why this exists: Third-party raisers are a byproduct of a market with too much capital chasing too few truly differentiated deals. “Access” becomes the product. The only guaranteed outcome? Fees. The hoped-for outcome - better returns - isn’t guaranteed (ask me how I know..) Questions investors should ask before committing your own capital: 1. Who pays the placement fee, exactly.. and how much? Is it netted from my commitment or financed from the GP’s 2%? 2. Are there caps/offsets? Does any portion offset management or transaction fees? 3. What’s the GP’s post-raise operating budget? Can they still fund the team and systems to support portfolio companies? Bottom line: Capital formation has become a lucrative business.. for fundraisers. For investors, the multi-layered fee stack is costly, and the “access premium” rarely comes with performance guarantees. Would be interested in any perspective from GPs who take the position thatt this model of capital formation is a good thing (and good for who)

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Ankit Kamboj retweetledi
The Sigma Mindset
The Sigma Mindset@thesigmamindset·
Stanford lecturer show how to trigger growth in your life...
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Dino
Dino@DinoSawaya·
Another McGuireWoods independent sponsor conference in the bag ! One observation I’ve had over the past few years (and strongly reinforced the past few days) is there are many supposed “truisms” espoused in the independent sponsor market that are just not quite right in the real world… If you’ve been an investor for more than 5 mins, you realize that EVERYTHING is actually a shade of gray and that there are very few absolutes in the world… To provide but one example, there are some capital providers that are obsessed with trying to find sponsors who specialize in one sector… Is this inherently bad? - absolutely not. Is the natural corollary that more generalist investors present less compelling opportunities accurate? Not at all. There are many extremely successful generalist sponsors who have completed many deals and who continue to be active in today’s market. How can those who espouse the supposed superiority of specialization explain away the prodigious performance of these “lesser” generalists…? I’m generally curious because the individuals I’m referring to have completed many deals - they did not simply get “lucky”… What’s worse is that calls for industry specialization often come from those capital providers who are themselves generalists…! It’s upside down… What can we learn from this? Well just because something is conventional wisdom doesn’t make it correct or accurate…In fact, the money is made in the nuance, not in conventional wisdom Stay curious. Question everything. Most importantly, think for yourself and do not accept on face value what you are told… See everyone next year !
Dino@DinoSawaya

If you’re at the McGuireWoods Independent Sponsor Conference, come say hi ! It’s easy to find me. Probably the only one with an Aussie accent !

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PEoperator⚡️
PEoperator⚡️@PEoperator·
Recommend reading… Akin to The Outsiders or Intelligent Fanatics. Great chapter on Constellation Software. My favorite was Lifco. Overall theme, summarized: These acquisition-driven compounders operate with a simple and profoundly effective philosophy: decentralization. Push daily decision-making as close to the customer as possible, give extraordinary customer service, empower people with responsibility, accountability, and shareholder-friendly incentives, and give them ample room to grow. Pair this with an obsession and passion for delivering exceptional customer value and rewarding great performance, and people go the extra mile.
PEoperator⚡️ tweet media
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