Bob ♺
21.9K posts
Bob ♺
@Bob00731591
炸号后新开 | 性别男 爱好女 | #NSFW 🔞 | 币圈赌狗破产韭菜小白 | 史不失书，矇不失诵 ｜转发不代表赞同｜
这个小红书全自动运行Skills功能很强大，支持 OpenClaw、Codex、CC 等所有支持 Skill 的编辑器，感谢white0dew大佬开源🤗 核心原理还是通过 Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) 控制测试浏览器完成自动化。 目前已经支持的功能有： 图文笔记自动发布（含话题标签写入） 视频笔记发布（本地视频 / 视频 URL） 多账号管理（账号隔离、切换、默认账号） 浏览器的无头模式 / 有头模式 / 远程 CDP 搜索相关话题笔记、获取笔记详情 对指定笔记自动评论 抓取「评论和@通知」数据 抓取内容数据表并支持导出 CSV（曝光、观看、点赞等） 登录状态缓存、复用标签页、随机延迟等稳定性优化 项目地址： github.com/white0dew/Xiao…
DO NOT use Telegram in sensitive applications. Telegram does not need to have its message encryption broken for users to be tracked at the network layer. Telegram sends MTProto over unencrypted TCP, exposing auth_key_id - a long-lived identifier tied to the client’s authorisation key. An ISP, hotel WiFi operator, mobile carrier, transit provider, or surveillance system on the network path can see that identifier if they can observe the traffic. It can remain stable across app restarts, IP changes, VPN use, network switches, and location changes. Secret Chats protect message content, but this leak is below that layer. That makes the attack passive. The risk is in retroactive correlation. Think a journalist using Telegram from different networks for months, then joining hotel or corporate WiFi under a real name. That one identity anchor could make old logs searchable for the same auth_key_id. The fix is simple - mandatory transport encryption for all MTProto connections, with no unencrypted fallback. Telegram chose not to do this. Source: @kaepora symbolic.software/pdf/gnmx-01.pdf
