InTheTrenches 🙏

$BCAB with cash overhang removed/deal out, the story now turns to the huge EpCAM data readout that is forthcoming in q1. $40M market cap, trading at cash value, going into large scale EpCAM readout, things can go crazy here vs. $CTMX $700M market cap.

December 1, 2025 Daily Update. Tough day in the market before $JANX, tougher after. I have provided today's portfolio update for both before $JANX and after $JANX, the latter updated for the price I closed the $JANX position at. Needless to say, I got $JANX entirely wrong. I certainly recognize investing (especially in early stage biotech) is about probability not certainty. I know I will miss on some biotech calls as the extent to which we lack data on the human body's function entirely precludes the ability to predict biological outcomes with certainty from a priori reasoning In light of that, I try to pick positions that have material upside, and size them such that if I am able to maintain a high overall hit rate the returns from the winners will materially outweigh the appropriately sized losers. In such a framework, there are bets which make sense to make pre-data from a probabilistic standpoint, which can simply prove to not work out. However my current feeling on $JANX is it doesn't fall into that category and I made some mistakes, particularly as it relates to position size. Here are my preliminary thoughts on some of my mistakes: 1) I have long been wary of investing in oncology. The reasons for that are two-fold. One, cancer cells are extremely heterogenous within and across patients in even the most granularly sub-typed cancers. Two, cancer cells undergo rapid and extreme evolution given the speed at which they divide and the pace at which they mutate. Thus, it is particularly hard to identify through a priori reasoning the biological effects a new cancer therapeutic will have, much less rPFS, ORS, CRR, etc. This stands in contrast to a disease like DM1 ($PEPG) where the underlying pathophysiology is far more consistent and stable within and across patients. However, $JANX's initial data was so compelling, I decided to make a small investment. Over time, I came up with all kinds of mechanistic rationales for why it made sense that $JANX 007 appeared so effective (data on PSMA prevalence in metastatic prostate cancer, T-Cell activation altering the "immune cold" state of prostate cancer in a way pluvicto does not, etc., etc.), which provided the initial thought about making a larger investment than I normally would in early-stage oncology. I think I should have stayed more skeptical of those rationales given my baseline views on the heterogeneity and evolutionary pressure on cancer cells. 2) I ignored the warning signs from management and the slow pace of updates from $JANX. The slow pace of updates was a limiting factor for a long-time wrt increasing my position from the small position it initially was. Indeed, it was only a few days ago that I thought about just taking the gains. However, as I went through the capital stack I saw some names I respect recently increased their position size or maintained (though there were names like EcoR1 that fully exited). I assumed the pace of updates must have been one of the key points of diligence, and especially given I don't spend much time on oncology, I assumed that this was not an undue red flag. I think I really discounted the slow pace of updates more than I should have. 3) I got impatient to find another investment I could put meaningful size towards. I recently exited some largish investments for very small or moderate gains on the basis of either my views changing or the risk-reward profile shifting. I was on the hunt for another name I could go big on, and I think I was a little too impatient to find that name. 4) This relates to impatience, but on names that are high risk and beaten down, I usually try to enter far enough out (and at a price) I think gives a reasonable chance that the price will run up leading into data, meaning that if the data goes the wrong way the losses are more likely to be mitigated. I did not do that here and chased the price right up into the data readout. There is a time and place to do that. However, given the fundamental nature of oncology, I probably should have not done that. 5) I was slower to exit than I should have been. I wasn't in front of my computer ready to go, and I probably waited too long into the conference call to make my move out. I am sure there are other mistakes I will think of However, for now, we're on to Cincinnati.