Joshua Krasna

"...disconnect betw what markets look like and what is actually happening..The markets seem to be pricing this as a temp shock even though people in the oil sector say it will be long term. It's not as simple as opening the faucet to get oil flowing again" washingtonpost.com/business/2026/…

Very good analysis by @omareconomics : thenationalnews.com/opinion/commen…

Bibi's not going to do it, but if he manages to get a peace treaty with Lebanon (chances are low but not non-existent), he should drop the mic, take a bow, and leave before the elections.

The phone call between @IsraeliPM and @LBpresidency -- hyped by @POTUS -- didn’t happen but today was still a good day for #Lebanon-#Israel peace, as each of the leaders got something important to them. - @netanyahu succeeded in normalizing the idea of direct communication with the president of Lebanon. It didn’t happen today, but it is no longer viewed as a crazy gambit. If not today, tomorrow; if not tomorrow, the next day. He benefits domestically from turning a theoretical contact with the neighboring #Arab leader into a practical idea advanced by the President of the United States. - #JosephAoun benefits domestically by giving a polite but firm no to #Trump and to Netanyahu, affirming the importance of Lebanon’s sovereign decision-making and building important political capital for when he will have no choice but to use it. And he knows a time will come when he will have no choice but to use it. Along the way, Aoun had a productive conversation with @SecRubio, whose ownership of this issue is a plus for all sides. Given that the Israeli cabinet did not approve even the narrow, limited ceasefire on the agenda yesterday, it would have been crazy for Aoun to talk with Netanyahu today, of all days. Despite that, when the history of Lebanon-Israel peace is written, April 16 will be viewed as a good day, even though it appears nothing happened. But it did.

Very interesting. The timeline seems very optimistic... But I think Syria is poised to to play a major role in the redundancy efforts for oil and gas exports, as well as land transportation, in the wake of the Iran war

The US struggles to end the wars in Iran, Ukraine and Gaza for two reasons, says @andreaskluth: First, its diplomats are amateurs or worse. Second, so is their boss. (via @opinion) bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…

interesting development, not surprising in view of need for redundancy to Gulf ports. Still dependent on Suez Canal and/or Bab el Mandeb. Wonder how this meshes with IMEC-ish ideas of linkage with Israel to reach Med?

Iran made an extra 9 billion dollars since the beginning of the war, with the American policy which is just ended of allowing it to export oil and to charge full price. thenationalnews.com/newsletters/en…

@amirtibon @guy_laron ארה"ב מרוויחה כיצרנית הגדולה בעולם כשמחירי הנפט עולים, אבל האמריקאים כצרכנים מפסידים, כי מחיר עולמי גבוה לנפט מביא למחירים גבוהים לבנזין.

@guy_laron נזכרתי בציוץ שלך בסופש שהוא בעצם רוצה מיצר סגור. אבל יש דבר אחד שלא מסתדר וזה המחיר הפוליטי בעקבות עליית מחירי הנפט והאינפלציה הכללית בארה"ב. אלא אם מניחים שהוא ויתר מראש על בחירות האמצע.

Trump's announcement from a few minutes ago re-closes the Strait of Hormuz. It seems Trump decided a closed Strait is better for U.S. interests. The graph below explains why. If you want a deep dive on this, see the article below.

On the positive side of the ledger: - highest-level diplomatic engagement between America and Iran since 1979 - talks were by all accounts serious and substantive - still time for another round On the other hand: - there are simply too many issues to get through in ~10 days - the psychological gap between the parties is enormous. Iran thinks it is winning the war, time is on its side, America is desperate for a deal; America thinks Iran is so badly battered that it will have no choice but to accept its terms, and that if it refuses, more military force will shift its calculus

The idea that Israel couldn't have done anything differently is a comfortable excuse for the government, but it doesn't align with reality. Yes, there are elements of the far-left and far-right in the U.S. that have always hated Israel and would continue to hate us regardless of our own actions. But the question Israelis, and supporters of Israel, still need to ask is the following: Did the Israeli government make things easier for our haters, or did it empower our allies? When on October 12, 2023, Israel's Minister of Energy (Yisrael Katz) put out a tweet saying no water, fuel or electricity will go into Gaza, at the same time that Israel's official line was "we are fighting Hamas terrorists, not innocent civilians," does that help Israel's friends in the US and Europe, or Israel's haters? And the worst part about it: the tweet exploded, was quoted endlessly in the media, but wasn't actually implemented as a policy, so we paid the price for nothing but one idiot Likud politician's hunt for likes. When another "genius" in our government, the "Minister of Heritage" (whatever that means) spoke early in the war about using nuclear bombs in Gaza, did that help people who are trying to explain Israel's position and the necessity of going to war against Hamas, or was it a gift to Hamas sympathizers? In the beginning of the war, Israel's strongest and most convincing argument was the urgency of saving the hostages. Our supporters and allies abroad constantly spoke about this as a humanitarian issue, and even some of our tough (but not hateful) critics had to concede. But over time, when Netanyahu's ministers began insulting, disparaging and shutting down the hostage families, the same issue was weaponized in the opposite direction, as proof that Israel didn't even care, supposedly, for the lives of its own citizens. This was a total lie with regards to the overwhelming majority of Israelis, who preferred a hostage deal to a continuation of the war, but was convincing to anyone following Smotrich and Ben Gvir's statements on this. There are many more examples, the most obvious of them being Netanyahu's decision from March 2025 to renew the war after the first Trump ceasefire, and to stop all humanitarian aid in order to constitute the failed GHF experiment. This by itself led to an explosion of anti-Israeli sentiment, after the ceasefire and hostage release images moved things in the other direction for a brief period. Another favorite anecdote of mine is how Israel actually had a talented foreign media spokesperson in the beginning of the war, Eylon Levy, who managed to have a few breakthrough moments on social media (remember the interaction with the crazy British host who asked him about the ratio between hostages and prisoners released?), and then Netanyahu threw him out because Sara Netanyahu allegedly found out he had taken part in a demonstration against the government a year earlier. So you can say nothing matters and no effort changes anything, but sorry: if you fire a talented spokesperson because of a petty grudge like this, you're not serious about fighting the problem. Bottom line: no Israeli government should be blamed for antisemitism, a sickness that has existed for millennia. But the responsibility of every Israeli Prime Minister is to make things harder for the antisemites and easier for Israel's supporters. This government has been doing the exact opposite for three-and-a-half years, and the results speak for themselves.

מאמר מרתק על עוד זווית גאוגרפית של המלחמה שמסביר למה גם המרחב הווירטואלי שאליו נהרו מדינות המפרץ עדיין תלוי במרחב הפיזי וכמה קל להשבית את שניהם ביחד. "ביטוח מלחמה למתקן מרכז נתונים בשווי 100 מיליון דולר במזרח התיכון התייקר ב-1,900% מאז חודש פברואר. מנכ"ל חברת Constellation Energy ניסח זאת בפשטות מוחלטת בפסגת תעשייה שנערכה במרץ: "מי הולך לבטח מתקן בשווי 20 מיליארד דולר במזרח התיכון, שאפשר להשמיד באמצעות כטב"ם שעולה 5,000 דולר?" המגבלה העיקרית כעת אינה הון, אלא שרידות." zman.co.il/679526/ via @zmanisrael

I felt the exact same way when I saw one today.

This is super interesting and important

TAKE: If the US really needs to clear mines from Hormuz, can they actually do it? And how? I dug into the US Navy's mine countermeasures capability as of April 2026. 🧵(1/13)

לפי המקור הישראלי, נתניהו הבין כי אם לא יסכים לשיחות ישירות עם לבנון, טראמפ עשוי להכריז בעצמו על הפסקת אש בלבנון. על פי הדיווחים של הערוץ אל-חדת' הסעודי, ייתכן שהפסקת האש תוכרז כבר מחר - על מנת לאפשר את המו"מ באיסלאמבאד. מי לא ידע שטראמפ שכבר נסוג מהאולטימטום של עצמו באיראן, יכפה את הפסקת האש בלבנון על מנת לאפשר לשיחות בפקיסטן להתנהל כשורה, חוץ מכולם? ומי המשיך לשקר "שייקח כמה שיידרש", "גבול בליטאני", "אסור לעצור"? נכון, כולם. עצוב שכל פעם חייבים לגרור את נתניהו למהלכים מדיניים חיוניים כשהוא רוקע בשתי רגליו במקום שישראל תהיה זאת שתיזום, תוביל ותעצב את השיח. כך קרה עם סוריה, כך קורה עכשיו עם לבנון ובסוף זה גם יקרה גם עם הפלסטינים. האפסים שמנהלים את העניינים כאן חושבים שאם רק יעשו אבו-עלי וימשיכו באיומים מפוצצים, אף אחד לא ישים לב לכך שישראל נגררת על ידי האח הגדול ואיבדה את עצמאותה גם בתחום הצבאי וגם בתחום המדיני. So sad

VG on who's been going in/out. Steps Trump announced closing big loophole: 🇮🇷only state freely exporting thru Hormuz. Really just corrects s.t. that should never have been, especially after 🇺🇲allowed buying at-sea 🇮🇷oil, in attempt to keep down oil prices bloomberg.com/news/articles/…

Tom Nichols wrote this on March 6. Read it now, after the Golden Age of the Middle East post at midnight Wednesday, and every word lands harder. Victory disease: victory in battle encourages leaders to seek more battles, then to believe that winning those battles means winning the larger war - right up until they realize they have overreached. Nichols lectured military officers about it at the Naval War College. The condition is especially dangerous when a leader has exceptionally capable forces at his disposal, because the temptation to keep using them is almost irresistible. When ABC's Jonathan Karl asked Trump what happens next, Trump said "Forget about next." When CNN's Dana Bash asked how the war was going, Trump rated it a 12 or 15 out of 10. When pressed on war aims, Trump pointed at the military's performance. "How do you like the performance?" he asked twice. Nichols is precise about what this means strategically. Military operations are taking place in a strategic vacuum. Pilots and planners can execute missions with courage and professionalism. They cannot make those missions make strategic sense. Operational excellence and political wisdom are not the same thing. Xerxes had excellent armies. Napoleon had excellent armies. The French in 1870 had a military they were proud of. The Axis had remarkable early victories. All of them fell prey to the same confusion: what you do well in the field is not automatically connected to what you are trying to accomplish as a nation. Now we have a two-week ceasefire and a midnight Golden Age post. The Strait is not yet confirmed open. The regime is intact. The enriched uranium status is unclear. Congress never voted. Thirteen Americans are dead. And the president is "hangin' around" to make sure everything goes well.

אמרתי עכשיו בראיון לאלמז מנגיסטו בחדשות 12 שכל מי שבירך על יציאה למלחמה ללא מטרות ברורות וישימות אינו יכול להלין כעת על הפסקת אש ללא הישגים להם ציפה. כל מי שקפץ מאושר והבטיח יציאה של רבבות איראנים לרחובות, התקוממות של הכורדים ובעיקר קריסה של המשטר כאשר לא הייתה היתכנות לכל הדברים הללו, שישתה כוס מים וייצא להתאוורר במקום להביע כעת אכזבה ממדיניות של דונלד טראמפ ולקשקש על כך שישראל ״צריכה לחשב את דרכה״. לממשלת ישראל אין מדיניות, נקודה. אין מדיניות בעזה ובגדה, אין מדיניות בסוריה ולבנון, אין מדיניות באיראן. זהו לא נצחון מוחלט אלא כשלון מוחלט.