Portia Masawi

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Portia Masawi

Portia Masawi

@PopoMas12

We fall..... We simuka ..... We zunza zunza ourselves ..... We move .....

Somewhere near you Katılım Mart 2026
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Prof Jonathan Moyo
Prof Jonathan Moyo@ProfJNMoyo·
But, under Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No .7) Act 1987, when the directly elected Executive Presidency was enacted its term length or electoral cycle was six years for unlimited re-election with no presidential term limit. President Mugabe was in office for 37 years. So, 14 years should be contextualised; taking into account the structural mischief it seeks to remedy!
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Prof Jonathan Moyo
Prof Jonathan Moyo@ProfJNMoyo·
No, Mzukulu; I don't think we are in any way seeking or trying to fix a loophole. Rather, my critical analysis of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) Bill is that its core amendments - to section 92 under Clause 3; section 95(2) under Clause 4; section 143(1) under Clause 9 and section 158 under Clauses 10 - seek to remedy to overarching structurelal mischiefs: The first is related to the method or way of electing the President; given the country's troubled history with the direct election introduced under Constitution Amendment No. 7 Act 1987; as experienced in 1990, 1996, 2002, 2008, 2013, 2018 and 2023. There’s lot to say about this, but not today. The second is related to the shorter term lengths or electoral cycles of the elective public offices, under the separation of powers; adopted at independence in 1980. Again, there's a lot to be said about this; but not today. I look forward to substantively unpacking these two mischiefs. Meanwhile, to enable me to prepare myself accordingly; please kindly share with me the provision of the Constitution which enshrines what you refer to as the "people's direct control". I'm genuinely interested in knowing it Mzukulu. Kind regards!
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Prof Jonathan Moyo
Prof Jonathan Moyo@ProfJNMoyo·
With all due respect, it is primitive, juvenile and absurd to engage in public debate in the public domain while brandishing textbooks, certificates and degrees of a particular profession. Two points for your consideration. Firstly, cite just one respected lawyer who is not a politician, who has given a professional legal opinion that a referendum is required, just one. Surely, no one needs a rocket scientist to tell what the position of politician-lawyers is, and why they've taken that position. Secondly, constitution-making is neither for nor done by professional lawyers; it's for and done by lawmakers, commonly known as legislators or Members of Parliament - the overwhelming majority of whom are not lawyers by training or practice. Thirdly, it has become crystal clear to lawmakers, I mean legislators, that no clause of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) Bill, 2026 amends chapter 4 or chapter 16 or section 328 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), which would require a referendum; and that, as such, no referendum is required. Full stop. This is both a substantive and technical point. Thank you!
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Dhara Blessed Mhlanga
Dhara Blessed Mhlanga@bbmhlanga·
Education is overrated- this has nothing to do with CAB3 @ProfMadhuku was clear here on what he was talking about, your meaning making formula Prof is way off the mark.
Prof Jonathan Moyo@ProfJNMoyo

Professor Lovemore Madhuku in his Own Words Making the Case for Parliament to Indirectly Elect the President as an Electoral College: “We must not put in the Constitution of the country a provision that is dependant on what happens in a political party. That’s the point I’m making. We must never say in our Constitution of Zimbabwe that if a sitting President dies or resigns, we will wait to hear what the political party of that President is saying. No. That is not the best way of running a country. Political parties remain the preserve of those people who are in those political parties. But the country is run on the basis of either an election by the people—direct election—or you have Parliament as an institution sitting as an electoral college. Where parties have influence, they must do the influence within Parliament, but never to allow the political party to sit there to say I’m giving you this President, and so forth. That’s the point I’m making. And on that point, I’m making it right across the world; that’s what they do.” - Professor Madhuku, addressing a “Heal Zimbabwe Trust” public meeting in Harare on 22 February 2020. COMMENT: Professor Lovemore Madhuku’s 2020 remarks make a clear, powerful and enduring case for Clause 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) H.B.I. Bill, 2026. This clause replaces the direct election of the President with an indirect election by Parliament sitting jointly as an electoral college; both after every general election and, when necessary, to fill any vacancy in the office of President. The current direct election of the President was first introduced in anticipation of a legislated one-party-one-man rule through Constitution Amendment No. 7, Act 1987 in the old Lancaster Constitution repealed in 2013. Professor Madhuku put it plainly: The Constitution should not—as it currently does— depend on the internal decisions of a political party to select a successor to the President of the country. When a sitting President dies, resigns or is removed, the nation should not have to wait and hear what that President’s political party “is saying.” That is not a constitutionally proper way to run a country. Political parties exist for their own members. The country, however, belongs to all Zimbabweans. The proper solution is straightforward: Parliament—the institution chosen by the people—should act as the electoral college. Inside that open forum, parties may exercise their influence transparently and accountably. No party should ever stand outside the Constitution and simply “give” the nation its next leader. This principle is not abstract. Worldwide, presidential by-elections to fill mid-term vacancies are extremely rare. Most stable presidential systems instead use automatic succession by a deputy or, increasingly, allow the legislature to elect a successor who serves out the remainder of the term. These arrangements place national continuity and stability above partisan interests. Clause 3 of the Bill follows exactly this proven path. By giving Parliament the clear duty to elect the President—whether at the start of a new term or in an unforeseen vacancy—Zimbabwe will secure stronger democratic stability, and keep the highest office firmly within the people’s constitutional framework rather than the private control of any single party. In short, Clause 3 is a mature, practical and principled reform that directly honours Professor Madhuku’s wise 2020 counsel. As such, it deserves the full support of every well-meaning Zimbabwean who values good governance, democratic constitutionalism, institutional integrity and the long-term strength of the country’s democracy in the national interest!

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Portia Masawi retweetledi
Bete 𝕏 
Bete 𝕏 @Bete263·
@MkonoPride is a former student union president turned blogger. He describes himself as a social justice activist and former ZINASU president. That is his entire institutional credential. He has never held elected office, never practised law, and has no formal expertise in constitutional or electoral architecture. @citezw is presenting him as an authoritative voice on a complex constitutional question. His popular legitimacy point assumes Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) Bill, 2026 removes the people's voice entirely. It doesn't. Parliament is elected by the people. MPs are directly accountable to constituencies. The people's mandate flows through their elected representatives, that is representative democracy, the same system used by the majority of parliamentary democracies on earth including the UK, India and Germany. Mkono doesn't mention any of this because it destroys his argument. His presidential manifesto point is theatre. Presidents in parliamentary systems campaign through parties and policy platforms, not personal popularity contests. A manifesto is not contingent on direct election. His bribery argument, $1 million per MP, is speculation presented as inevitability. The entire broadcast segment is built around a guy who peaked in university.
CITE@citezw

Political analyst Pride Mkono says direct voting for the presidency gives a leader popular legitimacy. He argues that if Parliament elects the president, that legitimacy is weakened as citizens lose their direct right to choose. He adds that such a system could also undermine presidential manifestos and reshape political party financing.

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Portia Masawi retweetledi
Prof Jonathan Moyo
Prof Jonathan Moyo@ProfJNMoyo·
If you are referring to the referendum question, I'm sure you are aware that it is resolved by the Constitution which is crystal clear about the amendments that require a referendum and those that do not. For the avoidance of doubt, only amendments to chapter 4, chapter 16 and section 328 require a referendum; none of these is amended by the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) H.B.I. Bill, 2026. It is unconstitutional to seek or demand a referendum where the Constitution does not require it!
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Portia Masawi retweetledi
Prof Jonathan Moyo
Prof Jonathan Moyo@ProfJNMoyo·
Well @bbmhlanga, it is too risky and even dangerous for a media personality like you to approach technical or evidentiary issues with a shut mind. You have an amazing propensity to be obtuse in the gratuitous comments you routinely proffer in these streets; without arguing, making or proving any relevant point. Apparently, you seem to suffer from the folly that what you say is correct merely and only because it's you saying it. Hence, you hardly make any effort to argue or prove your claims, most of which are invariably outlandish and always personalised. What is crystal clear from your self-indulgent post is that you have either not read Clause 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) H.B.I. Bill, 2026; or you have definitely not understood it at all, despite your pretense to the contrary. Yet, here you are; arrogating to yourself a marker's role to judge content when you have not demonstrated even any iota of evidence that you actually understand what you think you are marking or commenting on; with a contrived, baseless authoritative aura. When your stress is down and you are hopefully able to think rationally and technically in place of being recklessly obtuse, read Clause 3 of the Bill slowly, then listen to Prof Madhuku's 2020 intervention carefully; and slowly read the verbatim text of the clip from that intervention attached to the post you purport to comment on knowledgeably; and, after that, please be kind enough to yourself and share here - not a vacuous, kneejerk and thumbsucked conclusion - but a well thought out technical argument on the line below from Prof Madhuku's 2020 submission: "But the country is run on the basis of either an election by the people—direct election—or you have Parliament as an institution sitting as an electoral college. Where parties have influence, they must do the influence within Parliament.." Why or how do you conclude that Prof Madhuku's view quoted above - and taken from the post you commented on - is logically and analytically not relevant to Clause 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) Bill? Surely, even a hopelessly incorrigible or malicious dunderhead ought to be able to see and appreciate that Prof Madhuku's argument in the alternative in 2020, is precisely what Clause 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) Bill offers in 2026!
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Portia Masawi retweetledi
Bete 𝕏 
Bete 𝕏 @Bete263·
@DavidColtart, I read your graphic. Let me go through it with you. 01. You say the President stays in office "until 2030, possibly 2033." 2030 is straightforward maths, seven years from 2023. It's 2033 that requires explanation. Where exactly does that come from, David? Because it appears nowhere in the bill. Your graphic designed to alarm people. 02. You say Zimbabweans lose the right to choose the President. When you vote for an MP you already know who that party's presidential candidate is, that's the entire logic of party politics. And independents would be expected to declare their preference. Speaking of which, by the way, what party are you in, David? And who is its president? Because the system you're describing as the theft of democracy is the same one your own MPs would operate under. 03. You're troubled that the Registrar-General will handle voter rolls. But you're silent on the fact that every single one of ZEC's nine commissioners is a Presidential appointee. The chairperson appointed by the President after JSC consultation. The other eight from a Parliamentary committee list, still appointed by the President. The institution you're holding up as the guardian of independence is built entirely on Presidential appointments. Your outrage is very selective, David. 04. Ten new Presidential appointees in the Senate, you say. The Senate you're defending to protect us from Presidential influence already contains 16 Chief Senators and the President and Deputy President of the National Council of Chiefs — none elected by popular vote. That's in the 2013 Constitution. 05. You want "uphold this Constitution" kept in the ZDF's mandate. Interesting position, David. Because that exact phrase has historically been the preferred costume for those who march on capitals with entirely different ambitions. CA3 closes that loophole. The question isn't why the drafters removed it, it's why its removal bothers you so much. 06. The NPRC. Section 251 of the 2013 Constitution, the one you're defending, established that commission "for a period of ten years after the effective date." It expired in 2023. By its own constitutional design. You're not defending a living institution, David. You're mourning a mandate that already ran out. As for the Gender Commission, gender equality is a human right. The Human Rights Commission exists to protect human rights. What exactly is the logic of keeping them separate?
David Coltart@DavidColtart

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brian mari
brian mari@brianmari3·
@PopoMas12 you make me laugh. Gada nemanhede. 1. Only Editors from School of Engutsheni will be fooled like this. 2. Saka vose vanhu ava matununu zvekuto dero nhai? 3. If the word "Uphold" still maintain its English text meaning which when I last check from Oxford Dictionary said "Uphold means to maintain, support, or defend a law, principle, or decision, typically against opposition or challenge. It often implies confirming a previous legal ruling is valid or holding up a standard. Synonyms include maintain, defend, sustain, vindicate, justify, and back"; then 4. By application of s345 to the English text of the prescribed oath of office of every member of cabinet or member of parliament sets a sacrosanct Fiduciary obligation to "uphold the constitution" and uphold is synonymous to maintain, defend, sustain, vindicate, justify, and backing the constitution. 5. How then can a minister who in terms of s104(6) or President or vice president who in terms of s94(1) or a Member of Parliament who in terms of s128(1), took Prescribed oath of office in Third Schedule to Uphold (maintain, defend, sustain, vindicate, justify, backing) the constitution before taking office as a condition, be allowed to then initiate an amendment of constitution and draft a bill to amend constitution without referendum, or bring a motion to amend constitution or vote for amendment Bill that seek to amend constitution without having originated from a petition by citizen or permanent resident of Zimbabwe and his or her oath remains valid? 6. We have Stupid people who have never run an institution packed in institutions of state who read s117(2)(a) which says Legislative authority confers power to amend this constitution to the legislature. 7. All of a sudden, an individual who is a Senator or National Assembly member or a minister who is a mere appointee want to assume the power of an institution of state called legislature, which is defined by s116 of constitution as consisting of Parliament and President acting in accordance with chapter 6 ; meaning to say (excluding ministers). 8. While it is true that parliament is part of legislature and In terms of s118 Parliament consist of Senate and National Assembly, the Role of Parliament is spelt in s119 and functions of Senate and Nation Assembly is in s130. 9. No where in s119 which describes the role of Parliament as the constituting element of Legislature does it give power or authority to initiate amendment of constitution and no where in Chapter 6 is the president as constituting element of legislature given power or authority to initiate amendment of constitution. The only reason we have s110(3)(c) function to initiate national legislation is because of s117(2)(b&c) which require the making of- laws of good governance and peace or statutory instruments. The word "make" from Oxford dictionary means "create". That is why we have executive having power to initiate National National Legislation. 10. Let's do this to do a better exercise, go to s130(1) which reads and I quote "Except as provided in the Fifth Schedule, in the exercise of their legislative authority both the Senate and the National Assembly have power to initiate, prepare. consider or reject any legislation". 11. The word "Except" is a preposition or a conjunction meaning to "exclude". In that regard all what is in Fifth Schedule is not part of legislative Authority of institutions Senate and National Assembly. 12. What is this s130(1) doing? It is separating the functions that are done by institute Senate or institute National Assembly from actions of Senator, Member of National Assembly, Vice President or minister. 13. While a senator is a member of Senate and National Assembly Member sit in National Assembly, a Senator is not Senate, and an MP is not National Assembly. In that regard legislative functions in s130(1) belong or relate to the institution Senate or National Assembly. So right of individuals in Fifth Schedule to introduce, bills, move a motion or present a petition to a house are by s130(1) not legislative function of Senate or National Assembly. It's not me saying it or creating it. 14. Now let us go back to s117 which require the Legislature to amend (not Parliament as some say) constitution in accordance with s328 of constitution. 15. By going to s328(3) we can all see the following- a. A constitutional Bill is not Presented to Senate or National Assembly for purpose of s131 before lapse of 90days. b. When the Bill goes to Senate or National Assembly it is Presented, and not "introduced" as in Fifth Schedule. 16. Now if Ziyambe, who is in parliament by being a minister and Fifth Schedule is not part of Legislative authority of Senate or National Assembly, and 17. He is not part of Committee on Standing Rules and orders which must not include a minister or Deputy minister or 18. Part of Parliamentary Legal Committee which must not include a minister or Deputy minister and does not vote in either house and the; 19. Constitutional Bill is presented to Senate or National Assembly in terms of s131 only for reading and passing the bill by the house and not by the members, then, 20 what part of legislative power does a minister or cabinet play as legislative power referred in s117(2)(a) in the amendment of constitution ? 17. s117(2)(a) which direct Legislature and not Executive to amend constitution in accordance with s328, and s328(3) give function to speaker, s328(4) gives function to Parliament and s328(5) give function to National Assembly and Senate and in s130(1) exclude Fifth Schedule as legislative function of Senate and National Assembly, s151 excluding ministers and deputy ministers from Committee on rules and standing orders, s152 exclude ministers from Parliamentary legal committee, what gives a minister legislative power to present a constitutional Bill which was Gazetted by Speaker of Parliament who is head of Committee on Standing Rules and order where no minister or Deputy minister is not involved and Parliament under guidance of Parliamentary legal committee, again a committee of parliament that does not include a minister or Deputy minister, if the constitutional Bill is PRESENTED to Senate or National Assembly, what basis do minister present the Bill? What legislative role does the minister play by presenting a bill that passed through Speaker, parliamentary legal committee? Ndaneta. Just know makabika mbodza
Portia Masawi@PopoMas12

@JumaMwakalobo @brianmari3 @matinyarare Jumwa, you are right. s110(3)(c) lets Cabinet initiate ALL legislation—including constitutional bills. s328 sets voting/referendum rules, not initiation. s149 petition optional, not exclusive. CA1/CA2 precedent confirms: valid process. No coup. #CA3

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Portia Masawi retweetledi
Prof Jonathan Moyo
Prof Jonathan Moyo@ProfJNMoyo·
Professor Lovemore Madhuku in his Own Words Making the Case for Parliament to Indirectly Elect the President as an Electoral College: “We must not put in the Constitution of the country a provision that is dependant on what happens in a political party. That’s the point I’m making. We must never say in our Constitution of Zimbabwe that if a sitting President dies or resigns, we will wait to hear what the political party of that President is saying. No. That is not the best way of running a country. Political parties remain the preserve of those people who are in those political parties. But the country is run on the basis of either an election by the people—direct election—or you have Parliament as an institution sitting as an electoral college. Where parties have influence, they must do the influence within Parliament, but never to allow the political party to sit there to say I’m giving you this President, and so forth. That’s the point I’m making. And on that point, I’m making it right across the world; that’s what they do.” - Professor Madhuku, addressing a “Heal Zimbabwe Trust” public meeting in Harare on 22 February 2020. COMMENT: Professor Lovemore Madhuku’s 2020 remarks make a clear, powerful and enduring case for Clause 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) H.B.I. Bill, 2026. This clause replaces the direct election of the President with an indirect election by Parliament sitting jointly as an electoral college; both after every general election and, when necessary, to fill any vacancy in the office of President. The current direct election of the President was first introduced in anticipation of a legislated one-party-one-man rule through Constitution Amendment No. 7, Act 1987 in the old Lancaster Constitution repealed in 2013. Professor Madhuku put it plainly: The Constitution should not—as it currently does— depend on the internal decisions of a political party to select a successor to the President of the country. When a sitting President dies, resigns or is removed, the nation should not have to wait and hear what that President’s political party “is saying.” That is not a constitutionally proper way to run a country. Political parties exist for their own members. The country, however, belongs to all Zimbabweans. The proper solution is straightforward: Parliament—the institution chosen by the people—should act as the electoral college. Inside that open forum, parties may exercise their influence transparently and accountably. No party should ever stand outside the Constitution and simply “give” the nation its next leader. This principle is not abstract. Worldwide, presidential by-elections to fill mid-term vacancies are extremely rare. Most stable presidential systems instead use automatic succession by a deputy or, increasingly, allow the legislature to elect a successor who serves out the remainder of the term. These arrangements place national continuity and stability above partisan interests. Clause 3 of the Bill follows exactly this proven path. By giving Parliament the clear duty to elect the President—whether at the start of a new term or in an unforeseen vacancy—Zimbabwe will secure stronger democratic stability, and keep the highest office firmly within the people’s constitutional framework rather than the private control of any single party. In short, Clause 3 is a mature, practical and principled reform that directly honours Professor Madhuku’s wise 2020 counsel. As such, it deserves the full support of every well-meaning Zimbabwean who values good governance, democratic constitutionalism, institutional integrity and the long-term strength of the country’s democracy in the national interest!
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Dereck Goto
Dereck Goto@dereckgoto·
Tendai Biti should realise that Zimbabwe doesn't have political amnesia. He once admitted - on record - that elections breed instability, violence, and national disruption. Not ZANU-PF's words. His words. That is precisely why CAB3 exists. But the moment it offers a real solution, suddenly he's in Mutare fighting it - getting arrested, calling it tyranny. The same man who diagnosed the disease is now blocking the cure, because the doctor isn't him. This is not patriotism. CAB3 is stability. CAB3 is continuity. CAB3 is Zimbabwe first. Biti, take note - your first instinct was honest. Everything since has been politics.
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Portia Masawi
Portia Masawi@PopoMas12·
@mawarirej You read to respond without understanding! You must carefully read this again. You will get more clarification if you read this slowly. x.com/ProfJNMoyo/sta…
Prof Jonathan Moyo@ProfJNMoyo

QUESTION: What is the relationship between section 91(2)—the term limit provision—and section 95(2)—the term length provision in the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013)? ANSWER: Section 91(2) is the term-limit provision. It regulates the President’s tenure by limiting the length of time that he or she may hold or occupy the Presidency as a public officer to a maximum of two terms—whether consecutive or not—where three or more years’ service is deemed a full term. By contrast, section 95(2) is the term-length provision. It regulates the electoral cycle of the Presidency as an office or institution by defining a single term as five years (now proposed to be seven years under Clause 4 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) H.B. 1 Bill, 2026). The relationship between sections 91(2) and 95(2) is therefore as clear and straightforward as that between a truck driver and a 500 km highway: section 91(2) limits the driver, while section 95(2) defines the length of the highway. Section 91(2) caps the time any individual may occupy the Presidency; section 95(2) sets the institutional length or duration of each presidential term or electoral cycle. This distinction matters because a persistent misconception claims that section 91(2) is not the presidential term-limit provision but merely a qualification rule for election as President, asserts that section 95(2) is the actual term-limit clause. Many who advance this incorrect view rely on one sentence in the obiter dictum by Patel JCC at paragraph 50 of the precedent-setting judgment in Marx Mupungu v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & 6 Ors (CCZ 7/21, 2021) [see: x.com/ProfJNMoyo/sta…], which includes section 95(2) among examples of term-limit provisions. That misconception overlooks a fundamental constitutional imperative: a presidential term-limit provision is, by definition, a disqualifier for election as President. Term limits on presidents are necessarily about elections. They limit qualification for election. Where there is no presidential term limit, re-election is unlimited. In a recent discussion with @DavidHofisi on 23 April 2026 [x.com/TSatNewslive/s…] on the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) Bill hosted by @TSatNewslive, I explained the relationship between the two sections. Below is the verbatim text of the attached clip extracted from the discussion addressing the import of section 91(2) and its relationship with section 95(2): ME: “It’s a clear term limit provision; is similar to term limit provisions in other jurisdictions that are comparable to Zimbabwe. And when you say it doesn’t have time, it doesn’t make reference to time, I’m at a loss as to what that means, and where that is coming from, with respect to Dr Hofisi, because it says a person is disqualified for election as President or appointment as Vice President if he or she has already held office as President under this constitution for two terms. This is the only section which tells us how many terms a President is limited to. Section 95 doesn’t even tell us that he’s limited to one term. There’s no limit. This one limits the President to two terms. And the two terms, the last time I checked, was a reference to time. And in this case, the section doesn’t leave us doubting or not knowing what a term is or what sort of time a term is. Because it continues to say these two terms are counted whether they follow each other or not. But most significantly, for the purpose of the limit on the President, the term limit on the President, which is provided in this section: three or more years. That’s time. You said there’s no time here. Three years is time. The length of time is three years minimum, and the maximum is more. It’s not defined here. It’s three or more years. It’s more because that is subject to what the relevant law about electoral cycles says is the electoral cycle of the institution that the President occupies”. [verbatim text of clip from x.com/i/status/20483…] The 500 km Highway Metaphor: Distinguishing Sections 91(2) and 95(2) of the Constitution To clearly understand the relationship between sections 91(2) and 95(2), imagine the Presidency as a magnificent 500-kilometre highway built and maintained by section 95(2) of the Constitution. This provision creates the presidential highway itself: it defines the office of the President as a permanent public institution and sets the exact length of each single term — currently five years, now proposed under the Bill to be seven years. It establishes a structured, recurring electoral cycle that belongs to the people of Zimbabwe, ensuring regular, orderly renewal of leadership. Without section 95(2), there would be no defined road — only an open plain of indefinite power. Section 91(2) governs the individual truck driver on that highway. It imposes an absolute lifetime limit: no person may complete more than two full trips along this 500 km highway, whether those trips are taken back-to-back or years apart. Any segment of 300 kilometres or more — that is, three or more years in office — counts as one complete trip. There are no partial credits or exceptions. After two full trips, the driver is permanently disqualified from driving on that highway, again. The distinction is sharp and deliberate: Section 95(2) builds the highway and determines the length of each journey. Section 91(2) limits how many times any single individual is permitted to travel it. One structures the office; the other limits the person who occupies it. Together, they form the Constitution’s twin safeguards — working in perfect harmony to keep power temporary, accountable, and subordinate to the will of the people. To conflate their distinct roles is to weaken these vital safeguards and to invite the very tyranny the Constitution was written to prevent. The Profound and Protective Meaning of “Three or More Years” in Section 91(2) of the Constitution At the heart of section 91(2) lies one of the Constitution’s most brilliant safeguards: “for the purpose of this subsection, three or more years’ service is deemed to be a full term.” The word “more” is no mere drafting flourish—it is deliberate constitutional genius. It declares that section 91(2), as the personal lifetime term-limit provision, imposes no rigid numerical ceiling. Subject to what is reasonable and justifiable in a constitutional democracy under section 95(2), service of four years, five years, six years, seven years, or even longer—once it exceeds the three-year threshold—is unequivocally deemed a complete term for the purpose of lifetime disqualification. This flexibility is not a loophole; it is a wise design that refuses to let the term-limit clause under section 91(2) become brittle or easily evaded. This open-ended “more” is anchored in section 91(2)’s harmonious relationship with section 95(2)(b), which defines the official electoral cycle of the Presidency as a permanent public institution whose five-year lifespan is inextricably intertwined with that of Parliament. Section 91(2) places an iron-clad personal disqualification on the individual; section 95(2) defines the dimensions of the highway itself. Crucially, section 95(2) is not a term-limit provision under subsections (1) and (7) of section 328. Unlike the referendum-protected personal term limit in section 91(2), it may be amended by Parliament under section 328(5) without a national referendum. This distinction is no accident; it is constitutional wisdom. It allows the institutional framework of the Presidency to evolve with the nation’s needs while the unbreakable personal lifetime bar on any single individual remains forever sacrosanct. All told, sections 91(2) and 95(2) differ in character and purpose—one limits the President, the other structures the public office or institution of the Presidency—yet they stand together as the Constitution’s twin guardians. This elegant complementarity keeps presidential power temporary, accountable, and forever subordinate to the sovereign will of the people through the institution or office of the Presidency. To respect and defend this relationship is to honour the very soul of the Constitution: ensuring that no individual can ever turn the highway into their driveway—turning the public office into a personal fiefdom—and that the highway of governance remains open, regularly renewed, and eternally in faithful service to the people of Zimbabwe. This is the promise the Constitution makes!

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mawarire mbizvo jealousy
Read it carefully, it reinforces what we always have been saying, that changing the presidential term from 5 to 7 years is an amendment to a term-limit provision which should be guided by section 328(7) and that the change can not benefit an incumbent. If #CAB3 follows Karabo's argument, the constitutional amendments should take effect after the 2028 election and should not benefit both ED & hungry parliamentarians who want to extend incumbency without facing the electorate. That is exactly what we are fighting for but malcontents like @ProfJNMoyo etal, have been coming up with silly arguments about not changing term limits but "electoral cycles", which is quite absurd at best and outright lunacy at worst. The malicious insertion of "notwithstanding section 328" to prefix the amendments shows the height of this mischief and that's why some of us would want the whole #CAB3 thrown away.
Shumbakadzi👑@shumbakadzi_zim

My brothers @mawarirej and @matinyarare what do you think of @karabongoepe1's article? This is a MUST READ. He responds much to what Matinyarare has been arguing about. sundayindependent.co.za/dispatch/2026-…

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Portia Masawi
Portia Masawi@PopoMas12·
@JumaMwakalobo @brianmari3 @matinyarare Jumwa, you are right. s110(3)(c) lets Cabinet initiate ALL legislation—including constitutional bills. s328 sets voting/referendum rules, not initiation. s149 petition optional, not exclusive. CA1/CA2 precedent confirms: valid process. No coup. #CA3
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Juma Mwakalobo
Juma Mwakalobo@JumaMwakalobo·
First of all, thank you for giving me the time of day. Ok, this argument is overcomplicating what the Constitution already makes clear. You’re mixing up initiation, consideration, and amendment authority. Section 328 governs how the Constitution is amended. It doesn’t need to restate who introduces bills because that’s already covered under the general law-making framework. Section 110(3)(c) is explicit. Cabinet prepares and initiates national legislation. A Constitutional Bill is still a bill before it becomes law. That’s established practice, including CA1 and CA2. Section 149 is a right to petition, not the only gateway. If it were exclusive, most legislation in Zimbabwe would be invalidwhich is clearly not the case. Bottom line: Cabinet introducing a Constitutional Bill is not a coup or breach it’s how the legislative system has always functioned.
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brian mari
brian mari@brianmari3·
@JumaMwakalobo how are you. I will share my two responses I gave @matinyarare . I think you will engage with better arguments after this. Response 1 You want to win the debate on CAB3 through “by numbers”? 1.Section 328(2) of constitution says and I quote , “An Act of Parliament that amends this Constitution must do so in express terms”. This is the rule any person evaluating whether a constitutional Bill before him/ her can legally be legislated or not. 2.You take the Constitutional Amendments Bill 3 and put it on the table. 3.All Bills no matter the type of Bill, Treasury Bills, Bills of lading, Invoices, Law bills, name them all. They gain their value or authority from the authority/power vested in the initiator/drawer of the bill to do so. The right to initiate a “Bill”. If you have no power to initiate a Bill then it’s not worth it’s paper. 4.Now, given a task in s328(4), to express your views on the Bill, you must know that you have been given a task which is normally done as delegated authority by Parliamentary legal committee under section 152(3) when they examine every bill which is not a constitutional Bill before it goes for reading in Senate or National Assembly. 5.In that regard, do not focus on political arguments over this Bill before you, because even Parliamentary legal committee would also leave political arguments to be decided by houses. In that regard focus on things within your power and control. You must win the debate on legal facts and not political arguments. 6.The words “whereas” are a formal way of introducing a Preamble, giving an agreed and indisputable fact, forming the basis upon which the rest in the bill will follow. Now by applying s328(2) of constitution, we now track the "explicit terms" of the bill and see if it fulfil the requirements of legal right to initiate a constitutional Bill. 7.The bill itself first cites s88(1) and it says “ Executive authority derives from the people of Zimbabwe and must be exercised in accordance with “this” Constitution”. 8.While we all assume people know the meaning of text or we all have common interpretation of text, often it is not correct. 9.I have to bring a definition of AUTHORITY in order for us to get the idea of things to follow in a clear and unambiguous way. 10.Definition of Authority from Collins Dictionary say “Authority is the legal or formal right, power, or permission to give orders, make decisions, and control or influence the behaviour of others. It also refers to recognized expertise in a field or, in plural form, the officials in charge” 11.In that regard I say, by s345 of constitution, ln the event of any inconsistency between different texts of the Constitution, the English text prevails and Collins Dictionary meaning of Authority shall be referred to when interpreting the text. 12.Executive is defined as “the part of the government that executes or enforces the law and policy of a government”. 13.The word “derives” has following English meaning from Oxford dictionary “Derives" means to obtain, receive, or take something from a specific source. It also refers to tracing the origin of something, developing from a root, or using reasoning to infer a conclusion. The word often implies a, "come from" or "originate from" relationship” 14.In that regard when reading s88(1) , we can say “the legal or formal right, power, or permission to give orders, make decisions, and control or influence the behaviour of others by the part of the government that executes or enforces the law and policy of government in Zimbabwe is obtained, received, or taken from people of Zimbabwe or originated from people of Zimbabwe. 15.Section 88(2) then states that, “the executive authority of Zimbabwe vests in the President who exercises it, subject lo this Constitution, through the Cabinet”. 16.We have established in s88(1) that there is a “thing” called “executive authority” and we have also established that it is derived from people of Zimbabwe. Now s88(2) is telling us that there is a “vesting” of this authority that is done to president who then exercise it through cabinet. 17.Again let’s define what “vest” means. From Collins Dictionary, “vest means to grant, endow, or transfer legal power, authority, or property rights to a person or entity”. 18.It looks like a long and winding exercise of definitions but this is where professors are getting lost and let’s do the exercise diligently. 19.Without going to what section 117 says, already we now know that there is a power “to do day to day things of government” that is obtained from people of Zimbabwe and endowed with President to exercise it in accordance with “this” constitution. The word “this” is in both section 88(1) and 88(2) and it looks irrelevant but a look at it’s definition will reveal other things which change the outlook of the whole process. 20.Collins Dictionary defines “"This" as a pronoun, adjective, or adverb used to identify a specific person, object, idea, or time that is near, present, or just mentioned. It contrasts with "that" (farther away) and signifies singular, immediate proximity in time or space. It is commonly used to introduce people or indicate a specific, current situation” 21.By applying section 345, the word “this” shall have a meaning that refer to constitution as it was written in 2013 and all actions or obligations imposed or required by 2013 constitution to be done by president or cabinet in terms or in accordance with “this” constitution, will always refer to the 2013 edition and it shall stand in contrast of any other constitution. In some jurisdiction where they allow incorporation of amended versions, they would say “in terms of this constitution or any amendments that comes after the first publication”. 22.We must now ask ourselves, what is it that was vested as EXECUTIVE authority of Zimbabwe in constitution of 2013? 23.That takes us to s110 whose heading reads “Executive functions of President and Cabinet”. 24.Section 110(1) explain powers and function of President as head of state, s110(2) list responsibilities of president as head of Executive, s110(3) list roles of cabinet, s110(4) state power of president make foreign agreements and treaties, s110(5) deals with having decisions of president to be in writing and s110(6) deals on decisions that president must act on advice of president and those he can do without advice of cabinet. 25.Now, we have a Bill before us called “constitutional amendment Bill number3” which was prepared by Cabinet and presented to parliament for legislation. 26.The first fact to be established by our exercise is found by asking this question, “does cabinet have the “Executive Authority” of Zimbabwe as derived from people of Zimbabwe and vested with president to then exercise it through cabinet in order to prepare and initiate a “constitutional Bill”. Yes or No. 27.May be let’s first get the definition of “Constitutional Bill” so that we can hunt the animal we can all describe. 28.Section 332 define “Constitutional Bill" as a Bill which if enacted, would have the effect of amending any of the provisions of this Constitution”. Section 328(1) also define it as “a bill that seek to amend this constitution”. In that regard, after the bill has passed and assented to, the contents of it become constitution and is read together with 2013 text as if they are both text by same author for the same purpose and intention as before. 29.From section 110(3)(c) we can all read and see that it says “Subject to this Constitution, the Cabinet is responsible for preparing, initiating and implementing national legislation”. 30.There are two sides of breaking the point, first by looking at the “action words”/ “ doing words”, in the provision as related to National Legislation or by analysing the definition of “National Legislation” and compare it with Constitutional Bill. 31.Constitution is not typical legislation, but rather the supreme law of a nation. While it is a written document that can look like an Act of Parliament, it differs because it is created by a special process. 32.Like in this instance, the 2013 constitution was made by People of Zimbabwe direct and is people who made it and not the legislature. 33.The actual law is made under the direct authority of people themselves and not delegated power in legislature. 34.Key distinctions include: a)Supremacy: The Constitution is superior to all other laws; any law that conflicts with it is invalid. b)Source of Power: The constitution creates the legislature (parliament) and defines its law-making powers and processes. In that regard it cannot be regarded as “product” of it’s own creation. Legislation is the maker of legislation and legislation comes from legislature. c)Amendments are difficulty: Changing the constitution requires special procedures, referendums and high-threshold voting procedures in houses , unlike ordinary legislation. d)Purpose: It outlines the structure of government, fundamental rights (Bill of Rights), and limitations on state power. e)In summary, a constitution is fundamentally different from regular legislation because it is the supreme law that regulates the government itself, whereas legislation is law passed by that government. 35.If say, someone wants us to believe that constitution is a National legislation, then we need to check the cordial agreement of doing words in section 110(3)(c) to see if they will give meaning intended by the section? 36.Of course the words “prepare” and “initiate” are doing words, but one cannot prepare constitution (Act 20 of 2013), because it is there already, you cannot initiate constitution (Act 20 of 2013) because we already have it. Of course implementation may be relevant act. 37.So by looking at the doing words in section 110(3)(c) and replacing National Legislation with constitution in order to give effect to s110(3)(c), it will not give textual meaning of Preparing and initiating. 38.If the said section had used the word “Bill” instead of Legislation then we could say yes, you can prepare or initiate a Constitutional Bill as National Bill. In this case the doing word on “initiate” refers to National Legislation and a Bill is not legislation. Therefore initiating a Bill must be for purpose of making a legislation. 39.A better comparison will be to use s130(1) which reads as follows “Except as provided in the Fifth Schedule, in the exercise of their legislative authority, both the Senate and the National Assembly have power to initiate, prepare. consider or reject any legislation”. 40.Section 130(1) add more “doing words” to those in s110(3)(c), Senate and National Assembly have power to consider or reject “any” legislation” and section 130(1) uses the word “legislation”. 41.However, s130(1) brings the word “any” legislation. This may mean there is more than national legislation but the action of preparing or initiating cannot apply to an existing thing. Unless they want to bring a new constitution as what we did in 2013 then Senate or National Assembly can prepare or initiate that new constitution as legislative function. 42. Yes, Senate and National Assembly can consider provisions of existing constitution but cannot reject existing constitution because it is supreme law that is existing. Rather they can amend or repeal the constitution which are also doing words but not listed here. 43.It therefore follows that both Parliament and Cabinet cannot exercise the following doing words to Constitution amendment Act 20 of 2013, that is to say, prepare, initiate or reject because it is there already and they are part of it. You cannot prepare, or initiate an existing constitution. 44.In that regard when s110(3)(c) is giving power to cabinet to prepare or initiate National Legislation it can only be in the exercise of laws under s117(2)(b&c) which have not been passed by legislature before. 45.However Senate or National Assembly can consider the existing constitution because it has function to consider and after consideration then decisions are made depending on what is being considered. If a decision is made to amend the constitution, then the amendment must clearly state that it is a result of a consideration by senate or National Assembly or parliament. It will also vary with provisions for consideration and authorities required to derive first. That is none of another day. 46.For avoidance of doubt, and clarity, only in s149(1) we find the introduction of an initiation procedure to amend a legislation. It reads “Every citizen and permanent resident of Zimbabwe has a right to petition Parliament to consider any matter within its authority, including the enactrnent, amendment or repeal of legislation. 47.While section 130(1) gives Senate and National Assembly power to consider legislation, non of the two have power to initiate an amendment Bill to amend a legislation or repeal a legislation. 48.Senate and National Assembly can practically initiate a new legislation, consider a new or existing legislation or reject a new or existing legislation but no power is provided to initiate a repeal or initiate an amendment of legislation. 49.Section 117(1) gives power to legislature to amend the constitution but no power is given to cabinet, or senate or National Assembly, or parliament to initiate an amendment or repeal of any legislation. 50.Only by way of petition by a citizen of Zimbabwe or Permanent resident of Zimbabwe can an amendment or repeal of law or constitution be put to parliament to consider and a decision of parliament coming as a consideration of a petition can initiate an amendment or repeal of constitution or any other law. 51.Otherwise from doing words that are in section 110(3)(c) non of them give cabinet power and Authority to initiate or prepare Constitutional Bill or initiate an amendment of constitution even for consideration of Parliament. 52.I now move to second way of looking at section 110(3)(c). By looking at definition of National Legislation. 53.Section 332 define national legislation" as “an Act of Parliament or a statutory instrument made under an Act of Parliament” . This definition is giving a definition of final product and not a mere bill that does not become Act of Parliament as it final state. 54.I have already cited s332 and s328(1) of definition of Constitutional Bill and further highlighted the distinction that separate legislation from constitution. A constitutional Bill becomes constitution and supreme law after its enactment and constitution has all the attributes mentioned above which National Legislation do not have. 55.We can safely say that, from the delegated executive authority of Zimbabwe, cabinet has no Executive authority to initiate a constitutional Bill or initiate any amendment of any legislation. 56.Section 110(3)(c) gives power to prepare, and initiate National legislation, if there is an existing law that was passed by parliament as a law in operation then only and only Parliament has power to consider the law and if it requires amendment then the initiation of process to amend an existing law can only start from Parliament after consideration of a Petition from a citizen or permanent resident of Zimbabwe 57.If Executive was to be given power to initiate an amendment of an existing law then the whole logic and purpose legislation would is lost. 58.One who passed, authored or decreed the law is the one who can initiate the amendment or the repeal. This is simple simple logic. If the initial law was send by Cabinet for legislation and it became law, the only authority that can amend its own law is Parliament. All other people outside can do is to as/ petition it to consider repealing or amendment and executive cannot not bring a Bill for amending when it’s duty is to implement the laws as they are. 59.If it is for the purpose of proving that Bill 3 is improperly before Parliament I have done enough. 60.Let me just conclude by saying delegated authority is exercised by “doing words”- “verbs” and the doing word is applied on something that can be identified or pointed. 61.From powers and functions of Cabinet in section 110(3)(c) and functions of Senate and National Assembly in s130(1) we can all identify the following doing words without repeating common functions, “prepare” , “initiate” , implement, consider and reject and all the action relate to legislation and these doing words do not prove how Parliament or Cabinet by exercising these doing words will come up with an amendment Bill in that- a.Prepare legislation- you cannot prepare an existing legislation. b.Initiate- you cannot initiate an existing legislation. c.Implement- of course you can implement existing legislation. d.Consider- yes you can consider an existing legislation but the drive or the initiation of legislation. However consideration has to be brought by some other power or action bringing the legislation or proposed legislation before you and not just waking up and decide to consider something from no were. By definition, “Consider" is a verb meaning to think carefully about something, often before making a decision, to take into account, or to deem/regard someone or something in a specific way. Therefore something must be put before Senate or National Assembly by some process that then require Senate or National Assembly to consider. e.The last doing word is reject means refusing to accept the. You can only reject something put before you and if it to happen then it’s after 90 days. 62.From these doing words do not explain how a Constitutional Bill was drafted, what prompted the initiation of the Bill and the power that is vested in Cabinet to prepare or initiate an amendment of an existing law. 63.The only process that ignite a constitutional amendment is in s 149(1). That is the only way Parliament and not Senate or National Assembly is Petitioned by a citizen to consider the amendment of constitution. 64.The from the petition parliament considers if there is requirement to amend or not. Where a decision to amend is made, then preparations are made based on the consideration. 65.The parliament does not put words to the proposal otherwise the word consider miss its meaning. The proposal must direct on how the matter should be handled. 66.We do not have a considered petition before us but some rogue people who have decided to coup the legitimate authority of people of Zimbabwe
Juma Mwakalobo@JumaMwakalobo

That argument misreads how law-making works in Zimbabwe 🇿🇼 Bills are routinely initiated by the Executive through Cabinet and then introduced in Parliament that’s standard legislative practice. Parliament debates and passes; the President assents. That is how the Legislature functions in practice. Section 117 defines the Legislature, but it doesn’t mean the President and Parliament must jointly initiate a Bill. Initiation and passage are different stages. Section 149 (petitions) is an additional avenue, not the only route. Citizens can petition but it does not replace the normal legislative process. On referendums: the Constitution is clear. They are only required in specific protected areas. You don’t create new referendum requirements outside what the Constitution states. So the claim that CAB3 is “null and void ab initio” because Cabinet initiated it doesn’t hold. The process being followed is the same constitutional pathway used for previous amendments.

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Chinese Embassy in Kenya
Chinese Embassy in Kenya@ChineseEmbKenya·
A visual timeline of China’s zero-tariff treatment for African countries:
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TheNewsHawks
TheNewsHawks@NewsHawksLive·
🔵Prominent local lawyer Thabani Mpofu has sued columnist Reason Wafawarova for US$1 million for defamation arising from "false" and "defamatory" statements, claiming that he was part of a Matabeleland South cabal which has pocket US$20 million for supporting President Emmerson Mnangagwa's constitutional amendments and 2030 agenda.
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Bete 𝕏 
Bete 𝕏 @Bete263·
SAPES Trust is hosting a “national dialogue” forum today. The panel: @Ibbosnr Mandaza, former Mujuru confidante, Mavambo dabbler, runs a think tank that functions as a salon for politically homeless anti-Mnangagwa intellectuals. @SiphoMalunga, Open Society Director of Programmes. His entire professional identity is transitional justice. His CA3 position was decided before the forum was advertised. @Chofamba Sithole, UK-based. Works for Nottingham City Council. Called CA3 a “constitutional coup.” A Chevening Scholar weighing in on Zimbabwe’s constitution from Coventry. Chiedza Mlingwa, famous for giving President Mnangagwa a 24hr ultimatum 😂😂😂. This is not a policy dialogue. It is a politically curated conversation. Every panelist is from the same funding network. There is no constitutional law voice arguing the other side. No government perspective. The conclusion was written before Ibbo made his daily updates to the NTA document. The real audience isn’t Zimbabweans. It’s donors, Western media, and the Southern African civil society bubble, who will cite today’s output as “expert consensus” against Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No.3) Bill, 2026.
TheNewsHawks@NewsHawksLive

Zimbabwe requires an inclusive, democratic, transparent, and comprehensive national dialogue to resolve its deep-seated political, economic, and social crises. The dialogue should focus on genuine, diverse and inclusive nation-building; creating a new social contract, while restoring democratic institutions, reforming the economy, and fostering national cohesion, rather than merely consolidating the current deeply flawed foundation and institutions, reinforcing political and ethnic hegemony, patronage, cronyism, corruption, intolerance or partisan interests.

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Bete 𝕏 
Bete 𝕏 @Bete263·
Rutendo’s Argument Falls Apart At Point 1 He builds everything on a false premise: that Cabinet cannot initiate constitutional amendment bills. The Constitution directly contradicts this. Section 328(2) states expressly: “An Act of Parliament that amends this Constitution may be made only in accordance with this section.” It then outlines the parliamentary process, it says nothing about who may introduce the bill. That gap is filled by s151, which governs bills generally, and by Standing Orders of Parliament, which have always permitted the Minister of Justice, a Cabinet member? to introduce bills, including constitutional ones. This is not novel. CA1 (2017) and CA2 (2021) were both introduced by the Minister of Justice on behalf of Cabinet. If Rutendo’s logic holds, those amendments are also void, including the one that removed the running-mate clause that opposition parties themselves benefited from. On s117 (Legislature = President + Parliament): Correct, but s117 defines the law-making authority, not the bill-initiation authority. The Legislature passes laws; individual members, ministers, and parliamentary committees introduce bills. These are constitutionally distinct functions. His s149 argument is the weakest point. Section 149 gives citizens the right to petition Parliament, it is a right, not the exclusive pathway for initiating legislation. Bottom line: Rutendo has confused bill initiation with constitutional amendment authority. Cabinet introducing CA3 follows 30 years of unbroken constitutional practice.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ @PinkyZulu72982
Rutendo Matinyarare@matinyarare

𝗪𝗛𝗢 𝗛𝗔𝗦 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗔𝗨𝗧𝗛𝗢𝗥𝗜𝗧𝗬 𝗧𝗢 𝗜𝗡𝗜𝗧𝗜𝗔𝗧𝗘 𝗔 𝗕𝗜𝗟𝗟 𝗜𝗡 𝗭𝗜𝗠𝗕𝗔𝗕𝗪𝗘? The other day, I read a very interesting write-up by Brian Mari explaining that we need to focus on CAB3’s inception, who initiated the Bill and interrogate whether the process followed the governance processes laid out in the constitution. In his analysis CAB3 is null and void ab initio (from the beginning) and here is why: 1. The only body in Zimbabwe that can change the Constitution is the Legislature and not Parliament. The two are different in Zimbabwe. 2. The Legislature in Zimbabwe is not Parliament, as is in most other countries. In Zim Legislature is the President and Parliament together (see s117). BUT here is where it gets tricky: 3. When you look at the functions of both Parliament (s118) and the Presidency (s110(1)), neither is given the power to change the Constitution individually, more so initiate a Bill, worse still change Presidential powers. CAB3, in its own inception and intent, changes the prescribed powers and functions of the President in constitution. 4. On this note, many of us have focused on conflict of interest in Cabinet introducing the Bill, instead of questioning whether the Cabinet or Presidency have the authority to initiate a Bill. 5. What this means is that our President or his Cabinet, in initiating Constitutional Amendment Bill 3, have assumed powers that the Constitution never gave them, to initiate a Bill. 6. And when a President or any branch of government exercises power it was not given to them by the Constitution, it is in breach of the constitution. I challenge you to look at the functions of the President and Parliament and show where they get power to initiate a Bill or change Constitution. Even the Legislature changes constitution but does not initiate a Bill to change constitution. 7. The President may sign a Bill, call for an election, refer a Bill to the Constitutional Court, call a referendum, etc., but nowhere is he or the Cabinet empowered to initiate a Bill according to their outlined functions. 8. So this means that CAB3 is null and void ab initio, because Cabinet initiated it without authority. 9. So how did the President and Cabinet initiate CAB3 and all other amendments previously — CABs 1 & 2? In the same way—making them invalid too. So this got me thinking: 10. How should these Bills have been initiated in the first place if we follow Brian’s constitutional governance and authority processes? 11. The only time that the Legislature (President and Parliament together) can change the Constitution is when “a Bill” is initiated by the AUTHORITY from which they derive power. 12. Who is that authority? The people of Zimbabwe, or “vene vayo” are the only ones who can initiate “a Bill” or petition parliament to change legislation or the constitution according to s149. 13. So how should CAB3 Bill have been initiated by vene? 14. Through a party—in this case, the majority party (ZANU PF)—deriving a mandate through resolutions properly made through its internal processes. So in this case, Congress, not Conference, must pass a resolution for ZANU PF MPs to:
(ii) raise a motion in Parliament and get majority vote,
(iii) then President as part of the Legislature with Parliament calls for a referendum see s110(f), since the Legislature may change the Constitution but can’t initiate A Bill,
(iv) the referendum then confirms the AUTHORITY from all Zimbabweans and not just ZANU PF who initiated the petition. This is why the Constitution gives the President and Cabinet the responsibility to call for a referendum on any matter in line with the law. 15. So referendums are not just held only when Constitution stipulates, but they must be held whenever the President needs to confirm that the people want a change to the Constitution. This is why Mugabe called for two referendums in 2000 and 2013 for our constitution, yet the constitutions didn’t mandate it.

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