
Portia Masawi
330 posts

Portia Masawi
@PopoMas12
We fall..... We simuka ..... We zunza zunza ourselves ..... We move .....






Professor Lovemore Madhuku in his Own Words Making the Case for Parliament to Indirectly Elect the President as an Electoral College: “We must not put in the Constitution of the country a provision that is dependant on what happens in a political party. That’s the point I’m making. We must never say in our Constitution of Zimbabwe that if a sitting President dies or resigns, we will wait to hear what the political party of that President is saying. No. That is not the best way of running a country. Political parties remain the preserve of those people who are in those political parties. But the country is run on the basis of either an election by the people—direct election—or you have Parliament as an institution sitting as an electoral college. Where parties have influence, they must do the influence within Parliament, but never to allow the political party to sit there to say I’m giving you this President, and so forth. That’s the point I’m making. And on that point, I’m making it right across the world; that’s what they do.” - Professor Madhuku, addressing a “Heal Zimbabwe Trust” public meeting in Harare on 22 February 2020. COMMENT: Professor Lovemore Madhuku’s 2020 remarks make a clear, powerful and enduring case for Clause 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) H.B.I. Bill, 2026. This clause replaces the direct election of the President with an indirect election by Parliament sitting jointly as an electoral college; both after every general election and, when necessary, to fill any vacancy in the office of President. The current direct election of the President was first introduced in anticipation of a legislated one-party-one-man rule through Constitution Amendment No. 7, Act 1987 in the old Lancaster Constitution repealed in 2013. Professor Madhuku put it plainly: The Constitution should not—as it currently does— depend on the internal decisions of a political party to select a successor to the President of the country. When a sitting President dies, resigns or is removed, the nation should not have to wait and hear what that President’s political party “is saying.” That is not a constitutionally proper way to run a country. Political parties exist for their own members. The country, however, belongs to all Zimbabweans. The proper solution is straightforward: Parliament—the institution chosen by the people—should act as the electoral college. Inside that open forum, parties may exercise their influence transparently and accountably. No party should ever stand outside the Constitution and simply “give” the nation its next leader. This principle is not abstract. Worldwide, presidential by-elections to fill mid-term vacancies are extremely rare. Most stable presidential systems instead use automatic succession by a deputy or, increasingly, allow the legislature to elect a successor who serves out the remainder of the term. These arrangements place national continuity and stability above partisan interests. Clause 3 of the Bill follows exactly this proven path. By giving Parliament the clear duty to elect the President—whether at the start of a new term or in an unforeseen vacancy—Zimbabwe will secure stronger democratic stability, and keep the highest office firmly within the people’s constitutional framework rather than the private control of any single party. In short, Clause 3 is a mature, practical and principled reform that directly honours Professor Madhuku’s wise 2020 counsel. As such, it deserves the full support of every well-meaning Zimbabwean who values good governance, democratic constitutionalism, institutional integrity and the long-term strength of the country’s democracy in the national interest!

Political analyst Pride Mkono says direct voting for the presidency gives a leader popular legitimacy. He argues that if Parliament elects the president, that legitimacy is weakened as citizens lose their direct right to choose. He adds that such a system could also undermine presidential manifestos and reshape political party financing.





@JumaMwakalobo @brianmari3 @matinyarare Jumwa, you are right. s110(3)(c) lets Cabinet initiate ALL legislation—including constitutional bills. s328 sets voting/referendum rules, not initiation. s149 petition optional, not exclusive. CA1/CA2 precedent confirms: valid process. No coup. #CA3


Tendai @BitiTendai unpacks the implications of #CAB3 in this week’s informative episode. Watch the full episode here YouTube.com//InConversatio… #icwt26


QUESTION: What is the relationship between section 91(2)—the term limit provision—and section 95(2)—the term length provision in the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013)? ANSWER: Section 91(2) is the term-limit provision. It regulates the President’s tenure by limiting the length of time that he or she may hold or occupy the Presidency as a public officer to a maximum of two terms—whether consecutive or not—where three or more years’ service is deemed a full term. By contrast, section 95(2) is the term-length provision. It regulates the electoral cycle of the Presidency as an office or institution by defining a single term as five years (now proposed to be seven years under Clause 4 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) H.B. 1 Bill, 2026). The relationship between sections 91(2) and 95(2) is therefore as clear and straightforward as that between a truck driver and a 500 km highway: section 91(2) limits the driver, while section 95(2) defines the length of the highway. Section 91(2) caps the time any individual may occupy the Presidency; section 95(2) sets the institutional length or duration of each presidential term or electoral cycle. This distinction matters because a persistent misconception claims that section 91(2) is not the presidential term-limit provision but merely a qualification rule for election as President, asserts that section 95(2) is the actual term-limit clause. Many who advance this incorrect view rely on one sentence in the obiter dictum by Patel JCC at paragraph 50 of the precedent-setting judgment in Marx Mupungu v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & 6 Ors (CCZ 7/21, 2021) [see: x.com/ProfJNMoyo/sta…], which includes section 95(2) among examples of term-limit provisions. That misconception overlooks a fundamental constitutional imperative: a presidential term-limit provision is, by definition, a disqualifier for election as President. Term limits on presidents are necessarily about elections. They limit qualification for election. Where there is no presidential term limit, re-election is unlimited. In a recent discussion with @DavidHofisi on 23 April 2026 [x.com/TSatNewslive/s…] on the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) Bill hosted by @TSatNewslive, I explained the relationship between the two sections. Below is the verbatim text of the attached clip extracted from the discussion addressing the import of section 91(2) and its relationship with section 95(2): ME: “It’s a clear term limit provision; is similar to term limit provisions in other jurisdictions that are comparable to Zimbabwe. And when you say it doesn’t have time, it doesn’t make reference to time, I’m at a loss as to what that means, and where that is coming from, with respect to Dr Hofisi, because it says a person is disqualified for election as President or appointment as Vice President if he or she has already held office as President under this constitution for two terms. This is the only section which tells us how many terms a President is limited to. Section 95 doesn’t even tell us that he’s limited to one term. There’s no limit. This one limits the President to two terms. And the two terms, the last time I checked, was a reference to time. And in this case, the section doesn’t leave us doubting or not knowing what a term is or what sort of time a term is. Because it continues to say these two terms are counted whether they follow each other or not. But most significantly, for the purpose of the limit on the President, the term limit on the President, which is provided in this section: three or more years. That’s time. You said there’s no time here. Three years is time. The length of time is three years minimum, and the maximum is more. It’s not defined here. It’s three or more years. It’s more because that is subject to what the relevant law about electoral cycles says is the electoral cycle of the institution that the President occupies”. [verbatim text of clip from x.com/i/status/20483…] The 500 km Highway Metaphor: Distinguishing Sections 91(2) and 95(2) of the Constitution To clearly understand the relationship between sections 91(2) and 95(2), imagine the Presidency as a magnificent 500-kilometre highway built and maintained by section 95(2) of the Constitution. This provision creates the presidential highway itself: it defines the office of the President as a permanent public institution and sets the exact length of each single term — currently five years, now proposed under the Bill to be seven years. It establishes a structured, recurring electoral cycle that belongs to the people of Zimbabwe, ensuring regular, orderly renewal of leadership. Without section 95(2), there would be no defined road — only an open plain of indefinite power. Section 91(2) governs the individual truck driver on that highway. It imposes an absolute lifetime limit: no person may complete more than two full trips along this 500 km highway, whether those trips are taken back-to-back or years apart. Any segment of 300 kilometres or more — that is, three or more years in office — counts as one complete trip. There are no partial credits or exceptions. After two full trips, the driver is permanently disqualified from driving on that highway, again. The distinction is sharp and deliberate: Section 95(2) builds the highway and determines the length of each journey. Section 91(2) limits how many times any single individual is permitted to travel it. One structures the office; the other limits the person who occupies it. Together, they form the Constitution’s twin safeguards — working in perfect harmony to keep power temporary, accountable, and subordinate to the will of the people. To conflate their distinct roles is to weaken these vital safeguards and to invite the very tyranny the Constitution was written to prevent. The Profound and Protective Meaning of “Three or More Years” in Section 91(2) of the Constitution At the heart of section 91(2) lies one of the Constitution’s most brilliant safeguards: “for the purpose of this subsection, three or more years’ service is deemed to be a full term.” The word “more” is no mere drafting flourish—it is deliberate constitutional genius. It declares that section 91(2), as the personal lifetime term-limit provision, imposes no rigid numerical ceiling. Subject to what is reasonable and justifiable in a constitutional democracy under section 95(2), service of four years, five years, six years, seven years, or even longer—once it exceeds the three-year threshold—is unequivocally deemed a complete term for the purpose of lifetime disqualification. This flexibility is not a loophole; it is a wise design that refuses to let the term-limit clause under section 91(2) become brittle or easily evaded. This open-ended “more” is anchored in section 91(2)’s harmonious relationship with section 95(2)(b), which defines the official electoral cycle of the Presidency as a permanent public institution whose five-year lifespan is inextricably intertwined with that of Parliament. Section 91(2) places an iron-clad personal disqualification on the individual; section 95(2) defines the dimensions of the highway itself. Crucially, section 95(2) is not a term-limit provision under subsections (1) and (7) of section 328. Unlike the referendum-protected personal term limit in section 91(2), it may be amended by Parliament under section 328(5) without a national referendum. This distinction is no accident; it is constitutional wisdom. It allows the institutional framework of the Presidency to evolve with the nation’s needs while the unbreakable personal lifetime bar on any single individual remains forever sacrosanct. All told, sections 91(2) and 95(2) differ in character and purpose—one limits the President, the other structures the public office or institution of the Presidency—yet they stand together as the Constitution’s twin guardians. This elegant complementarity keeps presidential power temporary, accountable, and forever subordinate to the sovereign will of the people through the institution or office of the Presidency. To respect and defend this relationship is to honour the very soul of the Constitution: ensuring that no individual can ever turn the highway into their driveway—turning the public office into a personal fiefdom—and that the highway of governance remains open, regularly renewed, and eternally in faithful service to the people of Zimbabwe. This is the promise the Constitution makes!

My brothers @mawarirej and @matinyarare what do you think of @karabongoepe1's article? This is a MUST READ. He responds much to what Matinyarare has been arguing about. sundayindependent.co.za/dispatch/2026-…



That argument misreads how law-making works in Zimbabwe 🇿🇼 Bills are routinely initiated by the Executive through Cabinet and then introduced in Parliament that’s standard legislative practice. Parliament debates and passes; the President assents. That is how the Legislature functions in practice. Section 117 defines the Legislature, but it doesn’t mean the President and Parliament must jointly initiate a Bill. Initiation and passage are different stages. Section 149 (petitions) is an additional avenue, not the only route. Citizens can petition but it does not replace the normal legislative process. On referendums: the Constitution is clear. They are only required in specific protected areas. You don’t create new referendum requirements outside what the Constitution states. So the claim that CAB3 is “null and void ab initio” because Cabinet initiated it doesn’t hold. The process being followed is the same constitutional pathway used for previous amendments.



Zimbabwe requires an inclusive, democratic, transparent, and comprehensive national dialogue to resolve its deep-seated political, economic, and social crises. The dialogue should focus on genuine, diverse and inclusive nation-building; creating a new social contract, while restoring democratic institutions, reforming the economy, and fostering national cohesion, rather than merely consolidating the current deeply flawed foundation and institutions, reinforcing political and ethnic hegemony, patronage, cronyism, corruption, intolerance or partisan interests.

𝗪𝗛𝗢 𝗛𝗔𝗦 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗔𝗨𝗧𝗛𝗢𝗥𝗜𝗧𝗬 𝗧𝗢 𝗜𝗡𝗜𝗧𝗜𝗔𝗧𝗘 𝗔 𝗕𝗜𝗟𝗟 𝗜𝗡 𝗭𝗜𝗠𝗕𝗔𝗕𝗪𝗘? The other day, I read a very interesting write-up by Brian Mari explaining that we need to focus on CAB3’s inception, who initiated the Bill and interrogate whether the process followed the governance processes laid out in the constitution. In his analysis CAB3 is null and void ab initio (from the beginning) and here is why: 1. The only body in Zimbabwe that can change the Constitution is the Legislature and not Parliament. The two are different in Zimbabwe. 2. The Legislature in Zimbabwe is not Parliament, as is in most other countries. In Zim Legislature is the President and Parliament together (see s117). BUT here is where it gets tricky: 3. When you look at the functions of both Parliament (s118) and the Presidency (s110(1)), neither is given the power to change the Constitution individually, more so initiate a Bill, worse still change Presidential powers. CAB3, in its own inception and intent, changes the prescribed powers and functions of the President in constitution. 4. On this note, many of us have focused on conflict of interest in Cabinet introducing the Bill, instead of questioning whether the Cabinet or Presidency have the authority to initiate a Bill. 5. What this means is that our President or his Cabinet, in initiating Constitutional Amendment Bill 3, have assumed powers that the Constitution never gave them, to initiate a Bill. 6. And when a President or any branch of government exercises power it was not given to them by the Constitution, it is in breach of the constitution. I challenge you to look at the functions of the President and Parliament and show where they get power to initiate a Bill or change Constitution. Even the Legislature changes constitution but does not initiate a Bill to change constitution. 7. The President may sign a Bill, call for an election, refer a Bill to the Constitutional Court, call a referendum, etc., but nowhere is he or the Cabinet empowered to initiate a Bill according to their outlined functions. 8. So this means that CAB3 is null and void ab initio, because Cabinet initiated it without authority. 9. So how did the President and Cabinet initiate CAB3 and all other amendments previously — CABs 1 & 2? In the same way—making them invalid too. So this got me thinking: 10. How should these Bills have been initiated in the first place if we follow Brian’s constitutional governance and authority processes? 11. The only time that the Legislature (President and Parliament together) can change the Constitution is when “a Bill” is initiated by the AUTHORITY from which they derive power. 12. Who is that authority? The people of Zimbabwe, or “vene vayo” are the only ones who can initiate “a Bill” or petition parliament to change legislation or the constitution according to s149. 13. So how should CAB3 Bill have been initiated by vene? 14. Through a party—in this case, the majority party (ZANU PF)—deriving a mandate through resolutions properly made through its internal processes. So in this case, Congress, not Conference, must pass a resolution for ZANU PF MPs to: (ii) raise a motion in Parliament and get majority vote, (iii) then President as part of the Legislature with Parliament calls for a referendum see s110(f), since the Legislature may change the Constitution but can’t initiate A Bill, (iv) the referendum then confirms the AUTHORITY from all Zimbabweans and not just ZANU PF who initiated the petition. This is why the Constitution gives the President and Cabinet the responsibility to call for a referendum on any matter in line with the law. 15. So referendums are not just held only when Constitution stipulates, but they must be held whenever the President needs to confirm that the people want a change to the Constitution. This is why Mugabe called for two referendums in 2000 and 2013 for our constitution, yet the constitutions didn’t mandate it.


