Zafar Khan@zafarwafa1977
foreignaffairs.com/india/why-next…
"Risk Of Escalation in South Asia"
Although many security analysts may argue that including this piece titled "Why the Next India-Pakistan War Will Escalate" reflects that terrorism may lead the two South Asian nuclear rivals to the brink of a serious military crisis, quickly reaching up the escalation ladder to a nuclear level.
However, fighting and containing terrorism should not be made a pretext to wage a preventive strike, as India did in both the 2019 and May 2025 crises. This is potentially irrational and dangerous. It is fraught with weaknesses that may escalate to a dangerous level.
The Herman Kahn and Rodney Jones conceptual escalation ladders may not be directly applicable to the complex South Asian nuclear environment, where a persistent conventional force asymmetry could escalate to the nuclear level.
Using terrorism as a pretext to strike a nuclear Pakistan means that India is putting itself into a “commitment trap” and “escalation trap.” India must contain terrorism within its borders by addressing its intelligence failure, governance issues, and, more importantly, enacting a counterterrorism strategy to address such issues within India. It should be India’s internal issue. India may bring this issue, which Pakistan commonly faces, to the negotiating table as part of CBMs.
The article does not say anything about this imperative that is good for the South Asian strategic stability, potentially preventing a serious military crisis because of a false pretext of terrorism.
The article is also silent without mentioning that Pakistan suffers from the menace of terrorism much more than India does. Has Pakistan ever made terrorism a pretext to launch a preemptive strike against India and its handlers? Pakistan can, but Pakistan has not, and this shows a great deal of strategic restraint, but restraint should not be considered a weakness. It is part of the strategy to signal to the other side not to do things that may exceed the bounds of restraint.
Although the article mentions somewhere in conclusion about the possible risk of escalation to a nuclear level, it does not specifically mention how and why nuclear deterrence has been playing a direct and indirect role in preventing both large-scale and limited war in South Asia.
The article also skips to mention why India showed restraint not to take military action against Pakistan after the car bomb explosion in New Delhi in November 2025 that killed about 10 people. Was it because India realized that terrorism can not be made a pretext for waging a preventive strike (illegal) against Pakistan? Or was it because of nuclear deterrence playing in the background, deterring India to be more cautious that time around, having learned its lesson in May 2025?
The role of the third party is important and therefore cannot be ignored, as India does. Ironically, on the one hand, India does not recognize the third-party role, but on the other hand, it does not talk to Pakistan and share information on issues concerning India and Pakistan. The burden of responsibility is on the Indian shoulder, much more than on Pakistan.
The article does not critically analyze this imperative.
The article also does not elaborate on how and why Pakistan proposed the Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR), which India declined, and how this relates to broader strategic stability in South Asia, as well as to crisis management and crisis prevention mechanisms.
The efforts for crisis resolution (the ultimate way forward) are not mentioned in the article at all; one wonders why.
The article could have been more balanced and interesting if this could inculcate all these missing imperatives.
@ethrelkeld @ForeignAffairs
#India #Pakistan #SouthAsia #May2025Conflict #Escalation #deescalation #risk #nuclear #Kashmir #flashpoint
