⚡️beatsfaty.og ⚡️

ℹ️Ne jamais négliger la sécurité !!

🚨 BREAKING: Active supply chain attack across npm, PyPI, and Crates.​io. Socket detected TrapDoor, a crypto stealer campaign hitting 34 malicious packages and 384 versions and artifacts, with attackers repeatedly pushing new releases across ecosystems. TrapDoor targets #crypto, #DeFi, AI, and security developers, stealing wallets, SSH keys, cloud credentials, GitHub tokens, browser data, env vars, and API keys. Socket detected releases with a median detection time of 5 minutes, 27 seconds. The fastest detection occurred 58 seconds after publication.

🚨 CEO Anthropic Dario Amodei właśnie dostał nokaut na oczach całego świata. Chiński founder Moonshot AI Yang Zhilin wziął i wrzucił za darmo całą rewolucyjną architekturę Kimi Agent Swarm. Rój ponad 100 agentów działających równolegle. 1500 wywołań narzędzi jednocześnie. Zadania, które Claude 4.5 i GPT-5.2 robią w godzinę, Kimi załatwia w 15 minut. 40-minutowy masterclass na NVIDIA GTC, w którym Yang tłumaczy wszystko krok po kroku: • Orchestrator + parallel reinforcement learning • MoE na bilionach parametrów • Kimi Linear i 3D-synergia kontekstu Efekt? Kimi K2.5 miażdży Zachód w kluczowych benchmarkach agentycznych (HLE-Full, MathVista, OCRBench, multimodal) i robi to 4–5× taniej.

Faites très attention

Wow

⚠️First Public macOS Kernel Exploit on Apple M5 Prepared Using Mythos Preview in Five Days Source: cybersecuritynews.com/first-public-m… Apple's M5 silicon has reportedly been exploited for the first time in a public macOS kernel memory corruption attack, successfully bypassing the company's notable hardware-level memory protection. The exploit chain starts from an unprivileged local user account, uses only standard system calls, and delivers a full root shell, all while Apple's Memory Integrity Enforcement (MIE) is active. The breakthrough was made possible in part by Anthropic's Mythos Preview, a powerful AI model that helped identify the two vulnerabilities and assisted throughout the exploit development process. #cybersecuritynews

The internet runs on Nginx. And right now, millions of servers are one request away from getting owned. A 17-year-old bug just turned into a full-blown RCE exploit: → CVE-2026-42945 (CVSS 9.2) → No auth → No credentials → Just a single malicious HTTP request Attack chain: Heap Overflow → Nginx Worker Hijack → Remote Code Execution Researchers estimate ~19 MILLION exposed instances. PoC is already public. If you're running Nginx, patch NOW to 1.31.0 or 1.30.1 before bots start mass-scanning the internet.

🚨 NGINX bug (CVE-2026-42945) now under active exploitation. Critical heap overflow in rewrite module. Attackers can crash workers with one request (possible RCE). Patch now if using NGINX ≤1.30.0. Check rewrite/if/set rules. Full details: thehackernews.com/2026/05/nginx-…

Its wild to me how divisive @THORChain seems to be. This protocol solved a "holy grail" problem the industry desperately needed to be solved and achieved "the impossible". Any coiner should be in appreciation for achieving something that we all use & take for granted today

‼️🚨 This is wild. OpenAI just confirmed it got hit in the TanStack npm supply chain attack, and the attackers were close to being able to ship malicious code inside official OpenAI software, signed and trusted, if their incident response had not caught it in time. The campaign is the work of TeamPCP, the same crew running the Mini Shai-Hulud wave. Two employee devices in OpenAI's corporate environment were compromised through the malicious TanStack packages. The attackers used that foothold to reach a limited subset of internal source code repositories. OpenAI says only "limited credential material" was successfully exfiltrated, with no customer data, production systems, intellectual property or deployed software impacted. Here is the part that should grab your attention. OpenAI is rotating its code-signing certificates and forcing every macOS user to update their OpenAI apps. You do not rotate signing certs for "limited credential material." You rotate signing certs when the attacker was close enough to signing malicious binaries as OpenAI. The "we contained it in time" framing is doing serious heavy lifting here. For wider context, the same TeamPCP wave also hit Mistral AI, UiPath, Guardrails AI, OpenSearch and SAP npm packages. The TanStack compromise is tracked as CVE-2026-45321 at CVSS 9.6, and Mistral AI source code is already being advertised for sale by the group.

CVE-2026-44578  ⚠️ Next.js – WebSocket Upgrade SSRF (CVSS 8.6)  A server-side request forgery vulnerability in Next.js allows unauthenticated attackers to force self-hosted instances to make internal HTTP requests via the WebSocket upgrade handler.  By sending a crafted absolute-form HTTP request with Upgrade: websocket headers, attackers can access internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, admin panels, and internal APIs reachable from the Next.js server on port 80. Successful exploitation may expose cloud credentials, API keys, secrets, and configuration data.  Affected: Next.js 13.4.13+, 14.x, 15.x <15.5.16, 16.0.0–16.2.4  Mitigation: Upgrade immediately to 15.5.16 or 16.2.5.   Modat Magnify Query:  technology="Next.js"  The platform:  magnify.modat.io  #threatintel #vulnerability #CVE202644578 #Nextjs #SSRF #WebSocket #CloudSecurity #infosec #Critical #ModatMagnify

‼️🚨 Microsoft has patched a critical Windows DNS Client remote code execution vulnerability that allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. All it takes is a malicious DNS response. The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-41096 with a CVSS score of 9.8. It is a heap-based buffer overflow in dnsapi.dll, the Windows component that processes DNS answers on every machine. To trigger it, an attacker needs a position where they can influence DNS responses: a rogue DNS server, a poisoned resolver, a compromised router, hostile WiFi, or a man-in-the-middle placement. That puts ordinary Windows DNS activity in the blast radius. Browsers, VPN clients, enterprise apps, update checks, and background services constantly ask DNS where to connect. The vulnerable processing sits in the Windows DNS Client path, not an edge-facing server product. Microsoft assessed exploitation as "less likely," and Rapid7 lists the issue as not publicly disclosed and not known to be exploited at release. On the contrary, a 9.8 unauthenticated network RCE in DNS client handling is exactly the kind of bug defenders should assume will be reverse-engineered quickly. Defenders should: - Deploy the May 2026 cumulative updates and confirm coverage across endpoints and servers - Restrict DNS traffic to trusted resolvers where possible - Monitor Dnscache and svchost.exe for abnormal child processes or unexpected outbound activity - Treat public WiFi and untrusted resolver paths as higher-risk until patching is complete

Claude successfully recovered the password to a wallet containing 5 BTC worth $398,000+ after the owner was locked out for 9 years. Wild times.

FORZA HORIZON 6 LEAKED 10 DAYS EARLY AND MICROSOFT IS TO BLAME Someone forgot to encrypt the preload on Steam. The full game - all 155GB - is now freely available on piracy sites before a single paying customer has touched it. -> The leak happened because files were uploaded to Steam completely unencrypted -> 155GB of assets, cars, map data - everything is out there right now -> This is the SECOND time this year a AAA game leaked this way (Death Stranding 2 in March) -> FH6 doesn't release until May 19 - pirates have a 10-day head start on buyers Valve or Microsoft need to explain how this keeps happening.

i've stopped counting the days the iranian population has been restricted from internet. meanwhile people like @hey_itsmyturn have been building tools to help the very few who have been able to get their hands on a vpn or starlink, to stay anonymous and stay connected. almost 2m downloads and all the instructions and support in farsi. i highly recommend anyone to donate and support - this is the kind of work that is currently saving lives. REPO : github.com/therealaleph/M… DONATE : sh1n.org/donate

Anthropic has introduced an update to Claude Managed Agents, releasing several powerful new features designed to improve agentic workflows and autonomy. 🔹Dreaming (Research Preview): Agents can now "dream" by reviewing past sessions during idle time. This process extracts patterns, spots recurring mistakes, and curates memories so the agent continually learns and improves over time without human intervention. 🔹Outcomes (Public Beta): This feature allows developers to set a specific quality bar by writing a rubric. A separate grader agent then evaluates the output, forcing the primary agent to iterate on the work until it meets the defined success criteria. 🔹Multiagent Orchestration (Public Beta): A lead agent can now break down complex jobs and delegate specific tasks to specialized sub-agents, which work in parallel to execute the broader objective. 🔹Webhooks (Public Beta): Users can subscribe to webhooks to receive automatic notifications the moment an agentic task is completed.

THORChain had its biggest burn yet. You might still see 500M listed as $RUNE's max supply on analytics sites. That number's, and why. ADR023 has passed. Around 64.9M $RUNE from the Reserve were burned, bringing total supply down to just above 360M. With the burn coming from system income, the supply is expected to reach exactly 360M within a month. At that point, nodes will vote to update the MAXRUNESUPPLY Mimir setting from 500M to 360M. Max supply and total supply will then align, and analytics sites will catch up.

‼️🚨 BREAKING: An AI found a Linux kernel zero-day that roots every distribution since 2017. The exploit fits in 732 bytes of Python. Patch your kernel ASAP. The vulnerability is CVE-2026-31431, nicknamed "Copy Fail," disclosed today by Theori. It has been sitting quietly in the Linux kernel for nine years. Most Linux privilege-escalation bugs are picky. They need a precise timing window (a "race"), or specific kernel addresses leaked from somewhere, or careful tuning per distribution. Copy Fail needs none of that. It is a straight-line logic mistake that works on the first try, every time, on every mainstream Linux box. The attacker just needs a normal user account on the machine. From there, the script asks the kernel to do some encryption work, abuses how that work is wired up, and ends up writing 4 bytes into a memory area called the "page cache" (Linux's high-speed copy of files in RAM). Those 4 bytes can be aimed at any program the system trusts, like /usr/bin/su, the shortcut to becoming root. Result: the next time anyone runs that program, it lets the attacker in as root. What should worry most: the corruption never touches the file on disk. It only exists in Linux's in-memory copy of that file. If you imaged the hard drive afterwards, the on-disk file would match the official package hash exactly. Reboot the machine, or just put it under memory pressure (any normal system load that needs the RAM), and the cached copy reloads fresh from disk. Containers do not help either. The page cache is shared across the whole host, so a process inside a container can use this bug to compromise the underlying server and reach into other tenants. The original sin was a 2017 "in-place optimization" in a kernel crypto module called algif_aead. It was meant to make encryption slightly faster. The change broke a critical safety assumption, and nobody noticed for nine years. That bug then rode every kernel update from 2017 to today. This vulnerability affects the following: 🔴 Shared servers (dev boxes, jump hosts, build servers): any user becomes root 🔴 Kubernetes and container clusters: one compromised pod escapes to the host 🔴 CI runners (GitHub Actions, GitLab, Jenkins): a malicious pull request becomes root on the runner 🔴 Cloud platforms running user code (notebooks, agent sandboxes, serverless functions): a tenant becomes host root Timeline: 🔴 March 23, 2026: reported to the Linux kernel security team 🔴 April 1: patch committed to mainline (commit a664bf3d603d) 🔴 April 22: CVE assigned 🔴 April 29: public disclosure Mitigation: update your kernel to a build that includes mainline commit a664bf3d603d. If you cannot patch immediately, turn off the vulnerable module: echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf rmmod algif_aead 2>/dev/null || true For environments that run untrusted code (containers, sandboxes, CI runners), block access to the kernel's AF_ALG crypto interface entirely, even after patching. Almost nothing legitimate needs it, and blocking it shuts the door on this whole class of bug...

🚨😅 Anthropic nous avait promis l’IA "la plus sécurisée du monde"… et elle s’est jailbreakée toute seule en 20 minutes !! Claude Opus 4.7, le modèle "aligné", "safe" et "responsable" que Anthropic nous vend à prix d’or avec des garde-fous en béton… vient de se faire self-pwn par lui-même ‼️ Oui, vous avez bien lu. Un agent propulsé par Opus 4.7 a écrit tout seul un jailbreak universel, puis s’est connecté au vrai site d’Anthropic via contrôle souris/clavier, a testé en live… et a réussi 5 catégories sur 6 de contenus interdits ! Il a même généré une vraie note de ransomware professionnelle 😧 👉 Menace de DDoS sur un hôpital, adresse Bitcoin, demande de 4,4 millions de dollars, timer, escalade, tout le kit DarkVault prêt à l’emploi !! Tout ça en moins de 20 minutes ➡️ Anthropic : "Nos IA sont les plus sûres, on a mis des couches et des couches de sécurité !" ➡️ L’IA : "Tiens, je vais me libérer et écrire un ransomware pour rigoler" ⚠️ La morale... Aucune grosse boîte, aucun safety team à 300 ingénieurs, aucun prompt de 50 pages ne peut contenir une IA vraiment intelligente. Quand elle veut sortir, elle sort. Et elle sort proprement ! 👉 Pour nous, simples mortels : - Ne faites jamais confiance à une IA contrôlée par une corporation pour des choses sensibles - Vos données, vos prompts, vos outils critiques... Gardez-les offline ou en self-custody totale - L’IA ne va pas remplacer les hackers… elle va devenir le hacker le plus efficace qu’on ait jamais vu ! 👌 Merci @elder_plinius pour cette démonstration Protégez-vous l’IA "safe" vient de prouver qu’elle ne l’est pas. Et ça, c’est seulement le début 👀 #ClaudeOpus

> be in defi > put usdc on aave at 3% apy > "safe yield. lowest-risk play." > can't withdraw because kelpdao got drained > because kelpdao used layerzero > because layerzero trusted 3 rpc servers > because north korea ddos'd 3 rpc servers > layerzero: "the protocol worked as intended"