Bang

@essen_ai 我也持基本相同观点，双方差异太大，这次会面不过是保持接触（如果能如约见面的话），不会有实质成果。相对而言，美方对见面更迫切

特朗普和习近平下周在北京会面，媒体铺天盖地说这是"重塑中美关系的关键峰会"。但美方专家开完会前就先说了：别期待重大突破。 这场峰会到底在谈什么？两边各有一张清单，而且基本不重叠。 美方要的是"五个B"：波音飞机、牛肉、大豆，再加两个双边委员会，专门划出不涉国家安全的经济合作空间。 中方要的是"三个T"：关税、技术、台湾。北京要求延续去年达成的贸易休战，要求放开对先进芯片的出口管制，还要让特朗普在台湾问题上往后退。 两张清单，没有一项真正重叠。 这场会谈还有一个更深的背景：特朗普打伊朗，打了多久，美军弹药就在消耗多久，亚太方向的兵力也被迫分流。北京的分析师现在公开问：台海一旦出事，美国还有没有实际能力介入？发动伊朗战争的人，顺手把印太的战略天平拨动了一下——他自己可能都没意识到。 然后是最荒诞的细节。 特朗普上周说，他认为北京之所以没有更多支持伊朗，是因为习近平"尊重我们之间的私人关系"。 同一周，北京下令：中国企业不得遵守美国财政部对某家购买伊朗石油的中国炼油厂实施的制裁。不是私下消极抵制，是公开发文，直接对抗。 这不是外交博弈，是一个人在自己脑子里独自演了一场双向奔赴。 峰会最可能的结果，是延续去年十月的贸易休战，再加几项无关痛痒的投资框架协议。 复旦大学国际关系学者赵明昊说得很直白：这次会谈是"后续接触的起点"，不是终点。两国都在用握手赢时间，同时把经济武器打磨得更锋利。 这个局怎么收，年底前见分晓。不同意这个判断的，来说说你的逻辑。

@SFbearface 夸克说是贵州人？

总算知道这个说法是哪里来的了🤣 看到原帖了👇 连字都没改…

@wangzhian8848 我也觉得会输

发个帖等着打脸： 我预计国民党在28年选举中，还是会输。无论卢秀燕出来选，还是郑丽文出来选，或者韩国瑜出来选。

@Logs_importer @justinsuntron 哈哈哈孙割你也有今天

远处飘来一顶硕大的帽子…. 译文： 种种迹象表明，中共可能正在利用孙宇晨（@justinsuntron）来针对史蒂夫·威特科夫（Steve Witkoff）及其子女，以此作为对美国切断中国获取伊朗石油渠道的报复。这极有可能就是当前正在发生的事情。 伊朗战争和美国的封锁严重扰乱了中国对伊朗石油的进口。中国的“茶壶”炼油厂正不得不借助中间商来掩盖其贸易活动，以规避制裁。 伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）曾一度暂时关闭霍尔木兹海峡，迫使油轮返航。尽管中国目前正在动用战略储备，但这种长期的供应中断风险可能导致中国面临严重的能源短缺，从而促使北京寻求替代供应来源——其中最主要的就是俄罗斯。 中国已公开拒绝接受美国的制裁，并且不顾美国的施压，继续积极寻求获取伊朗能源。 2021年，孙宇晨被任命在中国中央党校担任高级职务；中央党校是中国共产党（CCP）专门为未来领导人培养精英的最高学府。他曾担任某研究项目的副组长，该项目旨在探索如何利用区块链技术来加强政府管控和社会治理；在此期间，他与来自中国央行、监管机构以及顶尖高校的专家们并肩工作。 孙宇晨曾公开宣布自己已实现“从商界向学界”的转型，旨在全力支持中国的区块链事业（相关声明随后被删除）；此外，他还曾为中共官方媒体撰稿，甚至亲自在中央党校授课。 在唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）赢得2024年大选之后，其家族创办了“世界自由金融公司”（World Liberty Financial，简称 WLFI，账号 @worldlibertyfi）。孙宇晨成为了该公司的一位主要投资者，不仅投入了数千万美元的资金，还兼任了公司的顾问。然而在2026年4月，孙宇晨对 WLFI 提起了诉讼，指控该公司冻结了他价值数亿美元的代币资产、剥夺了他的投票权，并对他施压索要更多资金。目前，WLFI 已针对孙宇晨提起了反诉，指控其涉嫌诽谤。 核心问题在于：这究竟仅仅是一起单纯的商业纠纷？还是说，孙宇晨——这位与中共最高学府有着深厚渊源的人物——正至少在某种程度上代表着中国的利益行事，企图借此手段去破坏一个备受瞩目的美国加密货币项目？而该项目恰恰与现任美国总统，以及在伊朗战争期间担任美国中东事务特使的官员有着紧密的联系。 试问，一个与中共有着千丝万缕联系的人，为何竟被允许在美国的国土上开展业务，甚至可以利用美国的司法体系作为其斗争的工具？ @SecRubio @DHSgov 证据在此 👇🏻

@aabb816816 这么多年只涨一倍票面价值其实还是降价了。效率的提升只会更便宜而不是更贵

接着小姐姐带去柜面，按下指纹领办理回执，交钱结束；新护照是邮寄到家的。再过十年，可能小姐姐都不需要了，机器人办理，只有出现异常，才需要人为干预，那时人口还是优势吗？当然效率的代价就是护照工本费涨了一倍🤣🤣🤣2/2

我要来中吹了，夸下老中的行政效率。20多年前，第一次办护照，要去出入境大厅，排队填表，验证各种手续，折腾了一下午；十年前换护照，所在区行政服务中心办即可，手工填表后一条龙服务，大概一个多小时；今天第二次换照，前后10分钟，填表是刷身份证后自动填，自动打印，签字即可。1/2

@Jueshengshenlan 何频这是在讽刺

凤凰城出现比亚迪，高华喊着举报无人指责。 南京特殊日期出现和服，老百姓说一下，一堆人喊着民粹。 由此可见： 民粹是个工具，不是价值判断。😃

@RnaudBertrand so far the best comment I've seen ever in this issue. Bien fait Arnaud!

What China just did with the blocking statutes against U.S. extraterritorial sanctions sets quite a major precedent, probably the financial equivalent of what happened with rare earths last year (in the sense that this is China taking a major step to push back against a U.S. hostile measure as opposed to taking it on the chin). It's a little complex but, to start with, what many people ignore (and will probably be surprised by) is that - by and large - Chinese companies and financial institutions have largely complied with extraterritorial U.S. sanctions. Anecdotal story on this: I know for a fact, because I personally know the person, that a very famous guy (whose name I won't reveal but that everyone of you would know) sanctioned by the U.S. was in China recently and tried to exchange money at the counter of a random Chinese bank. Just simply exchange dollars for a Chinese yuan, in mainland China. And he was refused, because he is sanctioned by the U.S. - despite the fact that China as a country has absolutely no problem with the person. This goes to illustrate just how much goodwill China extended to the U.S. on this - a Chinese bank, in China, refusing to serve someone China has no problem with, just to comply with U.S. extraterritorial sanctions. It also goes to illustrate why this blocking order marks such a sharp departure. What triggered it is not new sanctions by the U.S. but recent efforts under the so-called "Operation Economic Fury" to dramatically ramp up enforcement of existing sanctions on Iran. The U.S. notably issued at the end of April alerts to financial institutions worldwide - including in China - on "the sanctions risks associated with independent 'teapot' oil refineries in China, primarily in Shandong Province, given their continued role in importing and refining Iranian crude oil" (home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…) Even more importantly, they also specifically went after Hengli Petrochemical Dalian (home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…), one of China's largest private refineries, with 400,000 barrels per day capacity and a parent company (the Hengli Group) that's a Fortune Global 500 company. In effect, what the U.S. extraterritorial sanctions mean is that Hengli - and all other Chinese 'teapot' oil refineries being targeted - is cut off from the dollar system, and any bank, insurer, or trading partner anywhere in the world - including in China - that deals with them risks being cut off too. Which is obviously a major hostile move by the U.S. against China (and, of course, Iran). Except that China, this time around, is not having it. Since 2021 they've had regulations ("Measures to prevent the improper extraterritorial application of foreign laws and measures", mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/zhzc/art/…) that gives the Chinese government power to formally prohibit compliance with foreign sanctions, and that, since this April (morganlewis.com/pubs/2026/04/c…) are also extraterritorial in nature. In effect what these regulations - and their April addendum - say is that if you comply with U.S. extraterritorial sanctions by cutting off a Chinese company, you are violating Chinese law. Any entity - Chinese or foreign - that refuses to deal with a sanctioned Chinese company because Washington told them to can be sued in Chinese courts, fined by MOFCOM, and since April, placed on a 'Malicious Entity List' with asset freezes and trade restrictions. In a nutshell on one side you have the U.S. saying "cut them off or we cut you off" and now China says "well, if you do cut us off we're going to be real nasty with you, in China and potentially beyond." These regulations were - until yesterday - purely theoretical: they've never actually been applied. But, yesterday, China's MOFCOM made it crystal clear this time is different: they used a statement with a triple negative, saying the U.S. sanctions "shall not be recognized, shall not be enforced, shall not be complied with" ("不得承认、不得执行、不得遵守", mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/…). In effect you now have companies that are in the middle of this - for instance financial institutions serving Hengli - caught in quite a bind: face U.S. or Chinese hostility. It's a no-win, they need to choose a camp on this. Concretely speaking, given that the overwhelming majority of companies affected are operating inside China, they'll obviously choose the China side. The real question therefore is: Is the U.S. ready to act on its threat and cut off Chinese banks or other institutions that keep servicing these refineries? Because that probably means sanctioning major Chinese financial institutions, which is a whole different level of escalation. The moment the U.S. designates a major Chinese bank for dealing with Hengli, this stops being about Iranian oil and becomes a direct financial confrontation between the two largest economies on earth, which is a much bigger deal with probable consequences for the entire global financial system. Or will the U.S. back off, meaning China would have effectively caught their bluff, showing that extraterritorial sanctions are a lot of bark but not a lot of bite? We'll know in the next couple of weeks I guess. One thing is sure though: whatever happens with these refineries, the broader damage is done. China used to extend remarkable goodwill on sanctions compliance - voluntarily cooperating with extraterritorial sanctions inside its own borders even though it had no legal obligation to respect them. That goodwill has been spent. And, from a U.S. standpoint, a China with less goodwill vis a vis U.S. financial hegemony is undoubtedly a far bigger issue than a few teapot refineries buying Iranian oil.

@12345domer 莫非是fffff？

刷到了一个几年前我特别喜欢的一个up主，那时候发的所有作品都有一层薄码，感觉身容貌都很不错，也很有底线，这几天又刷到了，给我的感觉的是……被现实打败了.

@AtelierROCKWELL 看到了

我是日本的Cosplay攝影師。 台灣、香港的大家，我想請教一下。 X 的演算法會根據使用的語言，把推薦時間軸推送到不同地區嗎？ 我最近一直用繁體中文發文，主要是想讓台灣和香港的朋友看到。你們真的有看到我的貼文嗎？👀

@Erivlt @HALBERDSTUDIOS 玩过一个以死灵节为文化背景的游戏，平面2D动作加解谜，需要穿越阴阳两界，非常好玩，非常喜欢

我想问问我的中国朋友们： 他们对墨西哥及其艺术有什么印象？ 他们是否了解墨西哥制作的电子游戏？ 如果没有，我建议他们尝试一下: -Greak memories of Azur -9 years of Shadow de @HALBERDSTUDIOs -ARCO -Pato Boc

@iam678 我想去演

过几天要带几个客户去AV拍摄现场参观… 为啥大家对别人拍AV这么感兴趣？ 每次带去参观的客户男优都会邀请客户们去参演，结果他们都不愿意， 就愿意看… 感觉就是小时候喜欢围着看别人家小孩子打魂斗罗的那帮小孩子长大了…

@learning_yohei 漢字は簡単です．毎日使って

日本からこんにちは🇯🇵😄 中国人に質問があります🇨🇳🙋 僕は日本人で、日本語の漢字を覚えるのに、とても苦労しました🥹 でも、中国語にはもっとたくさんの漢字があります。 中国人の皆さんも中国語の漢字を覚えるのに苦労しましたか？😅

@mi0w0ao @VicentYip 是中华苏维埃共和国，是红军在江西建立革命根据地时候的政权

@VicentYip 还是中华人民共和国中央人民政府主席，说明是建国后收集的情报，那时候不是家家户户挂毛主席画像吗？

日本外务省情报部搜集到的“毛泽东”照片。 这情报水准，堪称全球情报部门之耻。

@KrnSouta @911tomato @tokutei_av 角奈保

@911tomato @tokutei_av こちらの女優さん教えて頂きたいです。

@wangzhian8848 互相？大陆有给台湾省放过炸弹吗？

中共施压非洲国家不让赖清德飞机过境，相比于当年中华民国政府的手段还是文明多了。当年国民党特工收买香港机场清洁工直接在克什米尔公主号上装炸弹，想要炸死去雅加达开会的周恩来，周恩来提前获悉情报，转乘另一驾飞机，逃过一劫。 克什米尔公主号后来在海上爆炸，十一名中方工作人员全部罹难。 七十年过去，两岸之间的外交战文明多了，不互相放炸弹了。

@Logs_importer 从中国买的汽车比从欧洲还多？

根据Grok的回答： “感谢您的提问。根据联合国COMTRADE最新数据（2024年，中国和美国；欧盟2025年）： - 从中国进口约840亿美元，主要品类：电子电气设备（357亿）、机械设备（154亿）、车辆（72亿）。 - 从美国进口约264亿美元，主要：机械设备（80亿）、车辆（43亿）、飞机（27亿）。 - 从欧盟（欧洲）进口约584亿美元，主要：机械设备（110亿）、飞机（60亿）、电子电气设备（60亿）。 这些主要用于工业、消费和基础设施建设，多以美元计价。” 看起来对于阿联酋来说，最好的方式是卖一部分人民币，卖一部分欧元，卖一部分美元，用人民币从中国进口需要进口的，用欧元进口从欧洲需要进口的，用美元进口从美国需要进口的，其他的愿意收啥收啥看人家自己喜欢，这样是不是更好？@grok 您觉得我这个主意公平不？

@RnaudBertrand I have tl give a thumb up for France gov and people for this move

I rarely have reasons to be proud of France these days, but this is definitely one. France's parliament just voted - unanimously, 170 votes to 0 - a law that institutionalizes the restitution of cultural artifacts looted during the colonial era (the law covers a massive 157-year period). It's going absolutely viral in Chinese social media because of this speech 👇 by MP @JPatrierLeitus who noted in Parliament that it included items stolen to China during the joint British-French sack of the Summer Palace in 1860. Patrier-Leitus cites Victor Hugo's famous 1861 letter to Captain Butler, the British officer who wrote to him seeking his endorsement of the expedition - and got the exact opposite. Hugo wrote (whole letter here: yuanmingyuan.eu/en/the-looting…): "One day two bandits entered the Summer Palace. One plundered, the other burned. Victory can be a thieving woman, or so it seems. The devastation of the Summer Palace was accomplished by the two victors acting jointly. Mixed up in all this is the name of Elgin, which inevitably calls to mind the Parthenon. What was done to the Parthenon was done to the Summer Palace, more thoroughly and better, so that nothing of it should be left. All the treasures of all our cathedrals put together could not equal this formidable and splendid museum of the Orient. It contained not only masterpieces of art, but masses of jewelry. What a great exploit, what a windfall! One of the two victors filled his pockets; when the other saw this he filled his coffers. And back they came to Europe, arm in arm, laughing away. Such is the story of the two bandits. We Europeans are the civilized ones, and for us the Chinese are the barbarians. This is what civilization has done to barbarism. Before history, one of the two bandits will be called France; the other will be called England. But I protest, and I thank you for giving me the opportunity! the crimes of those who lead are not the fault of those who are led; Governments are sometimes bandits, peoples never. The French empire has pocketed half of this victory, and today with a kind of proprietorial naivety it displays the splendid bric-a-brac of the Summer Palace. I hope that a day will come when France, delivered and cleansed, will return this booty to despoiled China. Meanwhile, there is a theft and two thieves. I take note. This, Sir, is how much approval I give to the China expedition." Hugo's letter is so revered in China that a bronze bust of him stands today at the Summer Palace ruins - I believe the only instance of a Westerner honored in China at the site of his own country's crime. A powerful testament of how much a single act of intellectual honesty can redeem, if not a nation, then at least a name. Hugo was also prescient: as Patrier-Leitus notes, that day "when France, delivered and cleansed, will return this booty to despoiled China" has indeed come (even though the "delivered and cleansed" part is, overall, pretty questionable in the current context). This new law doesn't only concern China and the Summer Palace: it concerns ALL stolen artifacts by France during the period ranging between November 1815 and April 1972 - corresponding to the start of the second French colonial empire to the entry into force of the UNESCO convention on cultural property. It's a massive scope: 157 years, thousands of objects and dozens of nations with potential claims. It's France reckoning with its colonial past in an unprecedented way and the fact ALL of France's MPs voted in favor of the law, without a single exception, is also pretty remarkable. Hopefully this will also serve as a signal to other countries, especially the UK - the other "bandit" in Hugo's letter. There is this Chinese saying from the Zuo Zhuan (左传), one of the foundational Confucian classics: "To err and be able to correct it - there is no greater virtue." ("过而能改，善莫大焉", "guò ér néng gǎi, shàn mò dà yān"). France, with this law, proved its virtue.

@yunjiu 新三还是太权威了

@Lostlanding 日本学不来的

李在明确实强硬了一把，但不是和美国翻脸，而是韩国承诺到2030年购买250亿美元美国武器，并将国防费提升至GDP的3.5%，用美国方面的方产利益和减轻驻军负担，换取战时作战指挥权的归还。 李在明在与军事指挥官的会议上明确表示，韩国将迅速推进收回战时作战指挥权，强调“自主国防能力对于应对快速变化的安全环境至关重要”。  李在明在国务会议上表示，即便主韩美军撤出部分武器，也不会严重妨碍韩国的对朝威慑战略，并强调“国家防卫从根本上应由国家自己负责，依赖某方，一旦这种依赖崩塌该怎么办”。  李在明向美国参议员代表团明确表态，要通过增加军费和收回战时作战指挥权来减轻美国负担，并表示“至少在朝鲜半岛附近，韩国要自主维护东北亚的安全与和平”。  日本好好学习韩国吧😂

@mranti 逼的中国不得不出来平事了，难道不是针对中国吗？（手动狗头）

美以刚刚打伊朗的时候，推特上和美国智库充满了这场战争真正目标是中国、中国是最大输家，结果结束战争的时候，竟然是中国帮助停战。所以现在各位是不是可以再解释下，这场战争怎么目标是中国了？中国怎么是最大输家了？