Olena Rohoza@OlenaRohoza
I’ll explain it again… Trump has been a Kremlin asset for many years. He wasn’t compromised over “Miss Russia” contestants, but over something far more serious — something that in many U.S. states could lead straight to the electric chair.
Yesterday, the CIA released a report stating that Russia helped him win his first election. Remember when things got heated and the Kremlin urgently recalled its ambassador, fearing arrest? That’s why.
For the second election, far more resources were deployed. Musk, already prepared, was pushed to buy Twitter and indirectly acquire a number of media outlets using Russian money. The financial trails allegedly run through Kuwait, which has long-standing ties to money laundering connected to Gazprom. Russia is said to have provided Trump’s campaign with extensive tools and strategies for campaigning and influencing the vote.
Back in 2018, Russia decided to make broader use of Trump’s presidential powers and move toward a global redistribution of influence.
At the Helsinki summit, Putin reportedly proposed that the U.S. allow the restoration of a “greater Russia” as a counterweight to China. The U.S., according to this version, agreed. It is even suggested that Trump was pressured into signing a document placing Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Armenia within Russia’s sphere of influence, while Sweden and Finland would join NATO, Russia would leave Syria, and the U.S. would withdraw from Afghanistan.
This, it is argued, explains why Trump looked pale after the meeting — as if he had just realized the scale of what had happened.
After returning to the U.S., discussions among top officials from both parties allegedly concluded that such an arrangement aligned with American interests and should be upheld — likened by some to a modern version of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.
Following the change of administration, at the Geneva meeting in June 2021, President Biden is said to have reaffirmed certain commitments, while insisting on a peaceful path to territorial changes.
From there, events accelerated: the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan in August, and preparations began to shape public opinion in northern Europe toward NATO membership.
Russia’s expectations that Zelensky’s rise to power would quickly resolve the “Ukrainian question” did not materialize. As he grew more assertive, it became clear to Moscow that a rapid outcome would only be possible through military means.
According to this narrative, Democrats did not anticipate the level of Ukrainian resistance and could not risk being seen as complicit in another genocide. They delayed, assessed risks, and sought to stabilize the situation. Their concern was not only nuclear escalation, but also the potential exposure of alleged agreements. Putin’s repeated claims of being “deceived” increased pressure, and in this interpretation, contributed to internal political shifts in Washington.
Trump, it is argued, understands the leverage the Kremlin holds over him and cannot escape it. He will do everything possible to shape a deal acceptable to Moscow. Hopes that he might reverse course are seen as unrealistic.
From this perspective, Europe is beginning to grasp the risks of Ukraine’s potential fall and may be forced to take on a leading role in defending the democratic world. This is portrayed not as optional, but necessary — otherwise Europe itself could be torn apart from multiple directions.
And as for Ukraine — the belief remains: it will endure and defend its independence.
