
BrandyOldFashioned2
4.3K posts




We’re calling it: The war in Ukraine has entered a new phase. @KatStepanenko and I have authored a new special report studying how Ukraine is actively challenging the positional character of the war that has dominated the battlefield since 2023. Data on Russia’s battlefield performance indicates that the character of the war is shifting in favor of Ukrainian forces – at least for now. Russian forces rates of advances are stagnating while Ukrainian forces are employing novel tactics and operational concepts in efforts to break out of positional warfare. Neither Russia nor Ukraine can conduct operational maneuvers yet, however. The bottom line is that the war in Ukraine is competitive and far from stalemated. Ukrainian forces are out-innovating Russian forces in both military technologies and in applying these new technologies in effective operational concepts that can help Ukrainian forces break out of positional warfare. Ukraine is employing mechanized equipment in tactical maneuvers in ways that were impossible 12 months ago. Russia’s ability to conduct infiltration missions will likely continue to degrade as Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign pushes Russia’s logistics and forward operating bases further away from the frontlines, reducing resourcing to sustain infantry tasked with infiltration missions. Ukraine may be able to scale these effects if they resourced properly by international partners. Ukraine’s advantage in intermediate range strikes is notably not permanent, and Russia will very likely eventually develop countermeasures to mitigate Ukraine’s advantages. Ukraine’s international partners thus have a rare and temporary opportunity to help Ukraine exploit favorable battlefield dynamics while Ukraine has the upper hand. Key Points of the report: • Russia’s rate of advance is plummeting during the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. • Russia is losing more soldiers to make fewer gains, with monthly Russian casualty rates reportedly outpacing monthly recruitment since December 2025. • Ukraine is starting to regain more ground than it is losing for the first time since 2023. • Ukraine’ recent counterattacks feature unique characteristics and deviate from key trends that defined the positional character of the war since 2023. • Ukraine is conducting a pattern of more frequent mechanized counterattacks at the tactical level for the first time since 2023. • The Ukrainian command’s operational planning is maturing. • Ukraine’s early 2026 counterattacks in the south were successful likely due to better planning and preparation of the battlefield. • Ukraine has been conducting a coherent campaign to suppress and destroy Russian air defenses since late 2025, in order to shape the battlefield as part of more sophisticated campaign planning. • Ukraine significantly intensified its intermediate-range strike campaign against dynamic targets in Spring 2026 in order to degrade Russian logistics at operational depths ahead of planned Ukrainian maneuver. • Ukrainian forces started actively disrupting Russian railway logistics in occupied Ukraine and Russian western regions in Spring 2026. • Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes are already achieving notable operational effects, including degrading Russia's ability to use the key Russian highway connecting Russia to occupied Crimea and GLOCs around Donetsk City. • Ukrainian forces decisively seized the initiative in intermediate-range strikes by fielding new technologies such as the US-made Hornet strike UAV, among other systems. • Ukrainian forces are achieving temporary tactical drone overmatch in some frontline sectors, which is slowing Russian offensive operations by degrading the effectiveness of Russian shaping operations. • Ukrainian forces likely achieved tactical drone overmatch in certain frontline sectors after degrading Russia’s drone capabilities in late 2025 to early 2026 - primarily by suppressing drone launch positions and increasingly intercepting Russian tactical UAVs. • Ukraine’s degradation of Russian forces at operational depth combined with tactical-level drone overmatch likely is creating vulnerabilities in the Russian lines. • Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign is likely far from its zenith, assuming continued support from Ukraine’s partners, and will likely intensify over 2026 as Ukraine fields new weapons capable of striking Russian’s operational rear. Link to full report: understandingwar.org/research/russi…












𝗣𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝗰 𝗛𝗲𝗮𝗹𝘁𝗵 𝗔𝗹𝗲𝗿𝘁𝘀 𝗥𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁: On April 27, 2026, a man (later classified as Patient 3 in the outbreak) was medically evacuated to Ascension Island from the Dutch-flagged expedition cruise ship 𝘔𝘝 𝘏𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘶𝘴; he had severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) and reported shortness of breath and fever that had begun on April 21. He had signs of pneumonia, although findings on chest radiography were unremarkable. While he was on Ascension Island, his condition worsened, and he was transferred to Johannesburg, South Africa, for ventilator support and intensive care. He was in shock and had acute respiratory distress syndrome; findings on chest radiography were consistent with atypical pneumonia. The differential diagnosis in this clinical context is very broad and includes atypical pneumonias, bacterial or fungal sepsis, and vectorborne diseases such as malaria or dengue. The diagnostic evaluation, including respiratory pathogen panels, malaria smear and antigen, fungal biomarkers, blood cultures, and legionella urinary antigen, was unrevealing. On May 2, the cruise ship had a total of 147 persons on board, including 88 passengers and 59 crew members, from 23 countries. As of May 13, 2026, a total of 10 cases had been identified (an 11th was subsequently reclassified as not a case), including 3 resulting in death (seen in figure). However, because not everyone on board was tested, 3 deaths among 10 cases may represent an overestimation of the case fatality ratio. All cases to date have been among passengers or crew on board the ship. Beyond the first 3 cases, 7 additional confirmed or probable cases have been identified. A German national (Patient 4) died from a SARI on May 2, and later testing in the Netherlands confirmed Andes virus (ANDV). Two crew members — the doctor on the ship (Patient 5) and an expedition guide (Patient 6) — were medically evacuated to the Netherlands, tested positive by PCR and sequencing for ANDV on May 7 and 8, respectively, and were in stable condition at the time of this report. Read “Andes Hantavirus Outbreak on a Cruise Ship, 2026,” which includes clinical details, case timeline, genetic sequencing of the virus, and unresolved transmission questions, by the Andes Virus Outbreak Working Group: nej.md/4uQDeMQ








I slipped something in here that's so important and needs to be corrected going forward: --> "Every outbreak investigation involves careful clinical workups, painstaking epidemiology, re-created time-activity patterns, and genomic sequencing—but almost every time, without fail, the investigators ignore the actual space where the outbreak took place. Was the cruise ship’s ventilation system working? What filters did it have, and were they running?" It's not just the cruise ship. Anyone find any building info related to the birthday party outbreak? How about the subsequent funeral/wake where 10 people got infected? I read the Supplemental Info up and down - nuthin... Happened all through covid, too.








📍 (4/8) What is the risk to the public? Risk to the general public remains extremely low Andes hantavirus does not spread easily person to person Transmission requires close, prolonged contact with someone who is actively ill










