Matteo Gamba

@Harrisbro777 we need that energy to train AI models!

@Similarweb @Similarweb what about meta?

Following the announcement of Sora’s shutdown, here’s how standalone AI video generation traffic evolved over the past 12 months. Sora traffic includes only its official domains (Sora.com and Sora.ChatGPT.com). Grok Imagine reflects activity on grok.com/imagine.

@levelsio ✌🏻

Okay let's see who can reply to this

@RampLabs can do you successfully handle with 3DS authentication?

Today, we're launching Ramp Agent Cards. There's been no safe way for agents to spend money, until now. Ramp Agent Cards give agents the ability to spend, governed with real spend limits, merchant controls, and full visibility into every transaction.

@SebJohnsonUK for those looking for the link: agent.askethos.com/refer/sjidtotn…

A European company just launched its platform to combat job loss from AI Ethos matches people with economic opportunities, be it speaking gigs, fractional work or full time jobs. Last year it company raised $3.5m from some top tier investors including General Catalyst, 8VC, Conviction (@saranormous), Interface Capital (@jansenniklas), and Common Magic (@sarahdrinkwater). Since then the company has been FLYING: > 5k experts join a week on average (14k this week in the run up to the launch) > Experts are already earning $3k+/week via Ethos > 10x-ed ARR in 3 months It's already serving the world’s top foundational AI labs, strategy consultancies, PE funds, hedge funds and startups. Today the company has officially opened up its platform. AI is eating a lot of jobs. It's great to see be used to help find find work.

@0xSammy This framework is a good first step, but it does NOT meaningfully solve the problem: 1) it requires ADOPTION at the entire industry level (including thousands issuing banks… good luck with that!) 2) it does not grant fraud LIABILITY SHIFT (the merchant remains responsible)

Why is nobody talking about this?! Yesterday, Mastercard revealed that they are partnering with Google to create “Verifiable Intent” which advances agentic commerce (including the use of x402): • AI agents acting autonomously on purchases creates a new problem: no visible moment of human confirmation like tapping a card • Mastercard + Google have co-developed Verifiable Intent; a cryptographic, tamper-resistant record linking consumer identity, their instructions, and the resulting transaction • All parties (consumer, merchant, issuer) can verify what was authorized; disputes have a clear audit trail instead of guesswork • Uses Selective Disclosure; only minimum necessary data shared, only when needed; privacy-preserving by design • Built on open standards (FIDO, EMVCo, IETF, W3C); protocol-agnostic and designed to work across wallets, platforms, and payment networks • Spec is being open-sourced at verifiableintent-dev; integration into Mastercard Agent Pay APIs coming soon • Partners on board: Adyen, Fiserv, Worldpay, IBM, Checkout-com, Basis Theory This is my favourite part: • It complements x402; Mastercard is staking out the authorization/identity layer of agentic commerce; x402 handles payment execution; together they sketch out the emerging agentic payments stack X402 is fast becoming THE missing agentic payments ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​link to enable trillions of micropayments across billions of agents If you’re wanting more information on x402 (the internet payment standard that’s been missing for 30 years!) follow @KhalaResearch - we have an in depth article going live in the next week!

@aidaxbaradari @be_inaudible you should translate this video to German, instant product-market fit 🇩🇪 😅

Today, we're introducing Spectre I, the first smart device to stop unwanted audio recordings. We live in a world of always-on listening devices. Smart devices and AI dominate our world in business and private conversations. With Deveillance, you will @be_inaudible.

pure bliss 🤩

@keyserfaty How is authentication (3DS) handled when requested? That’s an important piece to solve as well (actually, MORE important than accessing the card details)

your openclaw needs to pay for things on its own but sharing your credit card details is risky. give your agent its own debit card for free 💳 I created AgentCard to allow agents to create virtual VISA cards: a human sets the amount and the agent can then use the card through MCP. try it for free here: 👉 agentcard.sh 👈

The level of productivity enabled by AI is insane 🤯

@summeryue0 did it also empty the trash after deleting the content of the inbox? 📨🗑️🧐

Nothing humbles you like telling your OpenClaw “confirm before acting” and watching it speedrun deleting your inbox. I couldn’t stop it from my phone. I had to RUN to my Mac mini like I was defusing a bomb.

@markeatsmeat @levelsio you will love this

A former SpaceX engineer made an $80 plastic-free coffee maker Made in USA 🇺🇸

This is how traditional e-commerce companies that have to maintain a whole storefront experience will start to be disrupted by AI-first ones that just rely on APIs to distribute and sell via agentic commerce

@davidmarcus Should @elonmusk buy @PayPal ($39B is a almost a rounding error for him) and fold it into @X / Musk Industries? 😃

A few thoughts about PayPal, nearly 12 years after I left. I woke up this morning to dozens of messages from former PayPal colleagues. It pushed me to finally speak up. I never spoke publicly about the company after I left. Part of that was loyalty to John Donahoe, who gave me an unlikely opportunity, handing the reins of PayPal to a startup guy who, on paper, had no business running a then 15,000-person organization. But part of it was something else: I had left. I chose not to stay and fight for the changes I believed in. Speaking from the sidelines felt like armchair commentary. Easy opinions without the burden of execution. So I stayed quiet. But twelve years of silence is long enough. And today's news makes it clear the pattern I've watched unfold isn't self-correcting. I left PayPal in 2014 because I was deeply frustrated. We had executed a silent turnaround of a company that had lost its soul. We brought back engineering talent, shipped good products quickly, and acquired Braintree and Venmo. The company was on a tear. So much so that Carl Icahn felt compelled to accumulate a position in eBay and push for a PayPal spinoff. At the time, eBay decided to fight Icahn. It was a difficult period for me, caught between what I felt was right for PayPal and my loyalty to the eBay team. This is when Mark Zuckerberg approached me to join Facebook. The combination of his conviction that messaging would become foundational, the appeal of going back to building products at scale, and my growing exhaustion with the internal politics at PayPal and eBay eventually convinced me to leave and join one of the best teams in the world, one I had admired for a long time. In the summer of 2014, I met John in a café in Portola Valley and told him I had decided to leave. During that conversation, he told me that Icahn had effectively won the fight, that PayPal was going to become an independent company, and he tried to convince me to stay on as CEO, but I had already said yes to Mark, and my word is my bond. There was no turning back. After my departure, the board scrambled to find a replacement, and it took a few months for them to land on Dan Schulman. The leadership style shifted from product-led to financially-led. Over time, product conviction gave way to financial optimization. Much of the momentum we had created still persisted and carried the company forward, mainly driven by Bill Ready, who came over in the Braintree acquisition and rose to COO. Under his leadership, Venmo grew exponentially, and total payment volume (TPV) accelerated quickly. But the shift under Schulman became more pronounced after Bill's departure at the end of 2019. With him went the product conviction that had defined the post-spinoff momentum. Then, for a period, COVID-fueled online shopping hid a lot of the company's new weaknesses. During that period, the company made a fundamental miscalculation: it optimized for payment volume instead of margin and differentiation. It leaned into unbranded checkout, where PayPal had the least leverage, instead of branded checkout, where the margin, data, and customer relationship actually lived. Visa masterfully structured a deal that effectively ended PayPal's ability to steer customers toward bank-funded transactions, which had been a core driver of PayPal's economics. Not long after, PayPal lost a significant portion of eBay's volume. Over time, it saw its share of checkout among its most profitable customers steadily erode as Apple Pay and others continued to execute well. The same pattern repeated itself across lending, buy-now-pay-later (BNPL), and new rails. On lending, PayPal missed the opportunity to turn it into a platform weapon. Products like Working Capital were conservative, short-duration, and optimized for loss minimization. Lending never became programmable, never became identity-driven, and never became a reason for merchants or consumers to choose PayPal over something else. The missed opportunity in BNPL was even more striking. Klarna, Affirm, and Afterpay didn't just offer installment payments, they built consumer finance brands, persistent credit identities, and new shopping behaviors. PayPal saw the BNPL turn, entered the market, and had every advantage: distribution, trust, and merchant relationships. But BNPL was treated as a defensive checkout feature rather than an offensive category. There was no attempt to turn it into a core consumer relationship, no super-app behavior, and no meaningful differentiation for merchants. Others built platforms, PayPal added a feature. The failure to lean into building and owning new rails followed the same logic. After the spinoff, PayPal had a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build a global, at scale payment network. Instead, the company focused on building on top of existing networks and third-party rails. More recently, that mindset carried over to PYUSD. Technically, the product was sound. Strategically, it launched without a compelling transactional reason to exist. PYUSD had distribution, but no organic demand. It was not embedded deeply enough into flows to become a true settlement layer, a cross-border merchant rail, or a programmable money primitive. It sat adjacent to the product instead of inside the core of it. Acquisitions during this period followed a similar pattern. Honey was not a strategic acquisition for PayPal. It added activity, but not leverage. It lived outside the transaction, monetized affiliate economics rather than payment economics, and never meaningfully strengthened PayPal's control of the customer or the checkout moment. Xoom solved a real problem in remittances, but it never compounded PayPal's advantage. It scaled volume without changing the underlying rails, identity graph, or settlement model, and as importantly, it didn’t cater to a high-value, high-margin customer archetype. None of these were bad companies. They were just a wrong fit for PayPal and became unnecessary distractions. The board eventually recognized the problem. In 2023, they brought in Alex Chriss, an Intuit veteran with a strong product background, explicitly to restore product conviction. It was the right instinct. But Alex came from software, not payments. He understood SMB product development. He didn't have the muscle memory for transaction economics, network effects, or settlement infrastructure. In hindsight, he also made an error: clearing out much of the leadership team that understood payments deeply. Executives with years of institutional knowledge departed within his first year. This morning, Alex was removed as CEO. Branded checkout grew 1% last quarter. The board tapped another operator, Enrique Lores, the former HP CEO who's been on the PayPal board for five years. I don’t know Enrique. And he might be a great leader, but on paper at least, he’s a hardware executive. For a payments company. The common thread through all of this is incentive design. Once PayPal became independent, short/medium-term predictability beat long-term vision and ambition. Stock performance mattered more than platform risk and network opportunity. Financial optimization replaced product conviction. I'm not claiming I would have made every call differently. Running a public company at scale involves tradeoffs I didn't have to make after I left. But the pattern, choosing predictability over platform risk, again and again, was a choice, not an inevitability. Over time, the company that had every advantage and could’ve become the most consequential and relevant payments company of our time, lost its mojo, its product edge, and its ability to compete in a market that’s being rewired and reinvented in front of our eyes. That's the part that's hardest to watch for a company I care so deeply about.

@levelsio an idea for interiorAI.com: API / widget to restyle with AI the photo of a real estate listing, allowing to try different styles based on predefined options + compare before/after. basically an experience similar to what you can find on immobilienscout24.de/expose/1624269…

@nikitabier @nikitabier some edge case worth reviewing: the new UX is conflicting with the content of the link when there's a 🍪 notice banner + CTA hidden beyond the link UX and not easily dismissable (example x.com/bataille_chris… )

We're testing a new link experience, starting on iOS -- to make it easier for your followers to engage with your post while browsing links. For creators, a common complaint is that posts with links tend to get lower reach. This is because the web browser covers the post and people forget to Like or Reply. So X doesn't get a clear signal whether the content is any good. To help get better signal, posts will now collapse to the bottom of the page so people can react while you're reading. As always, remember: the post should stand alone as great content so write a solid caption.

@Nostroah @RobinhoodApp a feature first launched by @monzo (in 2023) that is now becoming the standard for other neobanks monzo.com/blog/2023/09/0…

This is one of the best security features I've ever seen a bank or card offer its users. @RobinhoodApp recognizes when I'm on a phone call and proactively warns me that it isn't them (in case a scammer is calling). Just another reason why I'm bullish on $HOOD and the gold card.

@nikitabier I'm adding my job history to my @X profile, but some of the companies are not showing up, even they have an account on X (e.g. @Wise @wimdu @RocketBerlin) Shouldn't all X profiles (especially if they are verified) automatically appear in the list of companies?

@GergelyOrosz Most crypto assets aren’t legally “securities” → insider trading laws don’t technically apply. Trades occur on offshore KYC-free exchanges, making wallets visible but identities hidden. Regulators might see them, but can't prove who or how. Full transparency, zero accountability

When I worked at Microsoft, it was mandatory for all employees to watch this video about how a former employee made $400K trading company stock w indsider info. Got 2 years of jail. The message was to never inside trade company stock. Crypto is not company stock though, is it?

@theRealDTrain37 @NewConstructs how come do you consider Monzo and Revolut as "pure play BNPL" firms? these are banks, that _also_ offer some BNPL features, but that seems quite far from a "pure play" definition

Interested in the $KLAR IPO? @NewConstructs free report reveals the good, bad and the ugly . There are details that Wall Street does not want you to know, e.g a strong statement from the auditor about the ?? of financial reporting. All in the report. newconstructs.com/ipo-update-don…