Chris Delpinsky 💙💛 Слава Україні! ⭐⭐⭐

Today, March 25, 2026, marks the finish of a multi-day Ukrainian operation to turn off the whole of Russia's Baltic oil and gas hub: Ust-Luga, Primorsk and Vyborg. After Ukrainian strikes, the ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk stopped shipping oil. By preliminary data, 40% of the Russian oil exports capacity has been disrupted. ◾️Ust-Luga: information is coming in about the sinking of two shadow fleet tankers, and full destruction of the Novatek oil shipping terminal. ◾️In Primorsk, oil reservoirs keep burning for two days in a row now, and the tankers are drifting at sea. Russian exports through the Baltics has been de-facto paralyzed.

Looks like Russia lost an An-26 aircraft over Russian-occupied Crimea. Russian defense ministry reported it lost contact with the aircraft and has no idea what happened to passengers and crew. They say the aircraft was not shot down. 📷: illustrative

The war between the United States and Iran is accelerating the same systemic shifts already set in motion by Russia’s war against Ukraine. ▪️ The first major consequence is that there are no longer separate regional crises. The war in Ukraine, tensions around Iran, Black Sea security, the Strait of Hormuz, energy routes, maritime shipping, drones, air defense, inflation, and the political resilience of alliances are now all interconnected. A crisis in one place quickly reshapes the situation elsewhere. The war in the Middle East is already affecting European security, China’s policy toward Taiwan, South Asian markets, and Russia’s strategic calculations. ▪️ The second consequence is that the United States is losing the trust of its allies and partners and is no longer perceived as an unconditional source of stability. Its unilateral, transactional, and coercive actions undermine confidence, create uncertainty, and force partners to reassess their own security strategies and seek additional balancing options. Europe is talking about greater defense autonomy. Gulf countries are strengthening their multi-vector approach. U.S. partners in Asia are more carefully weighing the risks of over-dependence on Washington and are softening their approaches toward China. ▪️ For Russia, this creates a significant opportunity. Moscow benefits not only from higher oil prices, but also from the political effect: the more U.S. allies doubt Washington’s predictability, the easier it becomes for the Kremlin to promote its narratives. ▪️ But there are risks for Russia as well. Its close ties with Iran bring short-term gains but complicate relations with Arab states. The Gulf monarchies do not want to depend on Iran, on American impulsiveness, or on Russia as a partner too closely aligned with Tehran. They, too, will seek balance. This means Russia is unlikely to convert the gains from this war into long-term political leverage in the Middle East. ▪️ Another major consequence is the sharp rise in the importance of maritime security. Sea lanes, oil flows, LNG, shipping insurance, fuel prices, logistics, and the internal economic stability of entire regions are now under threat. This is changing the very concept of security. Security is no longer just about having a strong army. It is also about the ability to control routes, protect ports, ensure supply resilience, and keep key maritime corridors open. ▪️ For Europe, this means its security no longer ends at NATO’s eastern flank. The war in Ukraine and the conflict around Iran are merging into a single system of risks. More expensive energy, costlier logistics, weaker U.S. predictability, growing internal divisions within the West, and the risk of broader instability on the southern flank require new approaches to European security, new alliances, and a more active role in securing a wider space - from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean and further along energy corridors. ▪️ For China and Taiwan, this war also has direct implications. The postponement of President Trump’s visit to China due to the Iran war, alongside the planned visit of a Taiwanese opposition leader to China, shows that Beijing is using the moment not only for military pressure but also for political engagement with Taiwan. A window of opportunity is opening for China to pursue reunification with Taiwan through non-military means. ▪️ For Taiwan and other countries in South Asia, the conclusion is also clear. U.S. support is variable and does not guarantee security. In prolonged conflicts, victory does not go simply to the stronger side, but to the one that better sustains tempo, resources, political will, and international connections. ▪️ Another important consequence is the strengthening of states that were not previously seen as key players. Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and other middle powers are gaining weight as mediators, transit hubs, providers of connections, and situational guarantors. Influence increasingly goes not to those who are formally the strongest, but to those who can connect actors, secure routes, provide resources, or quickly occupy emerging niches. ▪️ The main conclusion is this. Russia’s war against Ukraine started the collapse of the old belief that large-scale wars belonged to the past. The U.S. war against Iran is now beginning to erode another belief - that the United States will automatically remain the unconditional and stable center of the Western order. American influence is not disappearing. But it is becoming less predictable and more costly for allies. And when allies begin to factor in risks not only from U.S. adversaries but also from Washington’s own actions, the international system enters a new phase. This new phase means more balancing, more hedging against risks, more regional maneuvering, and a greater role for energy, maritime security, logistics, political resilience, and autonomous security decisions. This is what the key systemic consequences of this war look like as of now.