excess spread 🇺🇸

Seemed like a good idea

@johnarnold who?

Benjamin Graham is turning over in his grave.

@chipperPat Better than US Steel's BHAG - big hairy audicious goal?

Two of my companies stated strategies are based on cringe acronyms; "BIGGER" and now "GROW".... These companies are just begging for activists.

live look at today's post-game

Most media these days (sad!)

@VolMachine Pretty sure he was trolling… getting paid to pick convexity

“His worry is the US government, in a bid to reduce its interest payments during a future recession, might decide to lower the coupons unilaterally on all outstanding debt” If an intern pitched this idea he’d be laughed out. You have to smoke a couple of good bowls for this.

We now have 30+ companies competing in the data centre CPU & TPU markets. All at astronomical multiples & valuations. Barriers to entry seem non-existent. We have a 3-player oligopoly in HBM, with no new entrants even on the horizon. Barriers to entry are astronomical. Hmm…

@yenoms openAI is ded, the Journal told us so this morning (lol)

@MSVCap The bull case is that EAD would eventually be much higher than 10 cents. I assume they have some known workouts.. deals kinda negotiated. And some deals not negotiated yet.. some of the REO & underperforming lab. And the openAI lease is not in the numbers yet.

$KREF price action making more sense.. It was down in the low/mid 5’s on the 60% div cut, a large buy pushed the price above $6. I was surprised to see it rebound given the magnitude of the cut and low enthusiasm on the call. I.e. not full kitchen sink Now it’s fading back down

@mrfriebe not sure on that piece of the "origin story" but calling it a goat rodeo isn't fair to the goats.

@MSVCap Entire careers made (wasted?) pouring over the docs. If memory serves it was a hung bridge from the jump? Total goat rodeo.

$IHRT is an over-levered shitco. Good, so now we have gotten that out of the way. i think the exchange goes through. ~$1.75/share of value to the equity. $2+/- stock before the TSA. Only moved 50 cents, so $2.5 stock with FV of $3.75.

@MSVCap Astounding that this tortured story has persisted for so long.

@yenoms why shouldn't this trade down to 10-12% div yield? seems like REO % of book going up substantially in short term?

I think company will be active with the buyback.. so that may provide a tailwind

What does leadership look like? 👇

@Finsee_main cool, thanks for the response. hope all is well as can be in Sumy.

@MSVCap Gemini 3.1 Pro wrote the article itself, it also used data gathered by 3 Flash, 3.1 Flash Lite, and Chat 5.3.

$SLM Q1 2026 earnings: Massive EPS Beat and Raised Guidance Mask Declining Core Economics Sallie Mae reported a significant Q1 EPS beat ($1.54 vs $1.40 YoY) and raised FY26 EPS guidance from $2.75 to $3.15 at the midpoint. However, the quality of these earnings is poor. Core Net Interest Income was completely flat YoY at $375 million. The earnings growth was entirely engineered through balance sheet mechanics: a massive $3.33 billion loan sale triggered an $11 million CECL provision release (buffer reversal) and funded an aggressive $259 million share buyback that retired 12 million shares. Most concerning is the collapsing economics of their loan sales—despite selling 66% more loan volume than last year, the actual gain on sale dollars dropped by 22%. The raised guidance reflects front-loaded buybacks and accounting releases, not organic core profitability. Full article with charts - link in bio 🐂 𝗕𝘂𝗹𝗹 𝗖𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗔𝗴𝗴𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗖𝗮𝗽𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗹 𝗥𝗲𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗻𝘀 𝗘𝗻𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗦𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗲𝗵𝗼𝗹𝗱𝗲𝗿 𝗩𝗮𝗹𝘂𝗲: Management executed a massive $259 million share repurchase in a single quarter, including a $200 million Accelerated Share Repurchase. By heavily reducing the share count (down to 198 million), EPS will remain structurally elevated even if net income stagnates. 𝗣𝗟𝗨𝗦 𝗥𝗲𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺 𝗢𝗽𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝘂𝗻𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘆 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗮𝗰𝘁: Private Education Loan originations grew a stable 5% YoY, and management maintained their 12%-14% full-year growth guidance, signaling confidence in capturing the massive new addressable market created by federal Grad PLUS loan eliminations. 🐻 𝗕𝗲𝗮𝗿 𝗖𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗚𝗮𝗶𝗻 𝗼𝗻 𝗦𝗮𝗹𝗲 𝗘𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗼𝗺𝗶𝗰𝘀 𝗖𝗼𝗹𝗹𝗮𝗽𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴: While management highlighted loan sales as 'supporting earnings', the margins are reversing violently. They sold $3.33B in loans for a $146M gain (4.4% margin), compared to $2.0B sold for a $188M gain (9.4% margin) a year ago. 𝗖𝗿𝗲𝗱𝗶𝘁 𝗤𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗗𝗲𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴: Delinquencies as a percentage of loans in repayment are decelerating, climbing to 3.98% from 3.58% a year ago, pointing to a tougher macroeconomic reality for recent graduates entering the workforce. ⚖️ 𝗩𝗲𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗰𝘁 🔴 Bearish. The raised guidance and headline EPS beat look spectacular until you realize they are driven entirely by selling assets at lower margins to release accounting reserves and buy back stock. Flat Net Interest Income and rising delinquencies show the core engine is stalling. — • — • — 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝗺𝗲𝘀 New: 🔴🔴 𝗟𝗼𝗮𝗻 𝗦𝗮𝗹𝗲 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗶𝗻𝘀 𝗖𝗼𝗹𝗹𝗮𝗽𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 Reversing. A direct contradiction to management's positive narrative about strategic balance sheet actions. While volume surged, profitability tanked. The company sold $3.33 billion in loans in Q1 2026, generating a $146 million gain. This implies a 4.4% margin. In Q1 2025, they sold $2.0 billion and generated a $188 million gain (9.4% margin). This indicates that the new private credit partnerships are demanding much steeper discounts, structurally lowering the ceiling on non-interest income. 🟢 𝗛𝘆𝗽𝗲𝗿-𝗔𝗴𝗴𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗖𝗮𝗽𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗹 𝗥𝗲𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗻𝘀 Accelerating. SLM repurchased an astounding 12.0 million shares for $259 million in Q1 alone, utilizing more than half of the $500 million authorization announced just last quarter. This included entering a new $200 million Accelerated Share Repurchase (ASR) program in March. This financial engineering is the primary driver of the massive EPS beat and guidance hike, successfully bridging the gap while core net interest income remains flat. 🔴 𝗖𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗗𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗾𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝗥𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 Decelerating. Asset quality metrics are slowly bleeding. Delinquencies as a percentage of loans in repayment ticked up to 3.98%, compared to 3.58% in Q1 2025. Similarly, loans in hardship forbearance increased from 0.92% to 0.99% YoY. While net charge-offs remained within expectations at $89 million, the rising early-stage delinquency pipeline suggests the 'ambiguous economic environment' for new grads is starting to materialize in the data. ⚪ 𝗔𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗕𝗲𝗻𝗲𝗳𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗕𝘂𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿 𝗘𝗮𝗿𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴𝘀 Stable. The provision for credit losses flipped to an $11 million benefit (gain) this quarter, compared to a $23 million expense a year ago. This was largely a mechanical CECL reserve release triggered by moving $3.33 billion in loans off the balance sheet. While not organic operating profit, this accounting lever is a powerful driver of reported net income that SLM can pull whenever they execute large portfolio sales. 🟢 𝗚𝗿𝗮𝗱 𝗣𝗟𝗨𝗦 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗸𝗲𝘁 𝗖𝗮𝗽𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗴𝘆 Stable. Q1 Private Education Loan originations grew 5% YoY. While seemingly light compared to the maintained 12-14% full-year guidance, Q1 is not the peak origination season. Management remains steadfast that 2026 is the critical investment year to capture the estimated $4.5B-$5B TAM expansion resulting from federal Grad PLUS loan eliminations, driving the intentional 10% YoY spike in operating expenses. ⚪ 𝗖𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝗙𝘂𝗻𝗱𝘀 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘇𝗶𝗻𝗴 (𝗠𝗮𝗰𝗿𝗼) Stable. In a higher-for-longer rate environment, Sallie Mae managed to slightly reduce its cost of funds to 4.13% (vs 4.23% a year ago). This disciplined liability management helped preserve a Net Interest Margin of 5.29%, preventing the margin compression seen across many regional lending peers. 🟢 𝗞𝗞𝗥 𝗣𝗿𝗶𝘃𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗖𝗿𝗲𝗱𝗶𝘁 𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁𝗻𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗽 𝗘𝘅𝗲𝗰𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 Accelerating. The massive $3.33 billion loan sale is the first major proof point of the strategic shift announced in late 2025 to utilize private credit partnerships (specifically KKR) for forward-flow funding. This structural innovation allows SLM to originate loans without trapping regulatory capital, effectively shifting them from a traditional 'hold' model to an 'originate-and-sell' hybrid. — • — • — 𝗢𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿 𝗞𝗣𝗜𝘀 𝗡𝗲𝘁 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗜𝗻𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲 (𝟮𝟲𝗤𝟭): $𝟯𝟳𝟱 𝗺𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗼𝗻 Stable YoY (was exactly $375 million in Q1 2025). Despite a 5% increase in originations, total interest income was essentially flat and offset by flat interest expenses. This lack of core balance sheet revenue growth forces the company to rely on loan sales and buybacks for EPS expansion. 𝗡𝗼𝗻-𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗘𝘅𝗽𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗲𝘀 (𝟮𝟲𝗤𝟭): $𝟭𝟳𝟭 𝗺𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗼𝗻 Accelerating. Up 10% from $155 million a year ago. This aligns with the company's narrative that 2026 is an 'investment year', requiring heavy upfront marketing and product spend to capture the new customer cohorts created by the upcoming federal PLUS reform. 𝗡𝗲𝘁 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗶𝗻 (𝟮𝟲𝗤𝟭): 𝟱.𝟮𝟵% Stable. Slightly improved from 5.27% in Q1 2025 and 5.21% in Q4 2025. Effective balance sheet management and a lower cost of funds successfully defended the core yield, showcasing operational discipline in pricing. — • — • — 𝗚𝘂𝗶𝗱𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗙𝗬𝟮𝟲 𝗗𝗶𝗹𝘂𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗘𝗣𝗦: $𝟯.𝟭𝟬 - $𝟯.𝟮𝟬 Accelerating. This is a massive upward revision from the $2.70 - $2.80 initial guidance provided just last quarter. However, it still represents a deceleration from the $3.46 achieved in FY25. The hike is entirely driven by the front-loaded $200M ASR buyback and the mechanical provision release from the Q1 loan sale. 𝗙𝗬𝟮𝟲 𝗣𝗿𝗶𝘃𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗘𝗱𝘂𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗟𝗼𝗮𝗻 𝗢𝗿𝗶𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗚𝗿𝗼𝘄𝘁𝗵: 𝟭𝟮% - 𝟭𝟰% Stable. Maintained from prior guidance. Since Q1 delivered only 5% growth, achieving this target requires significant acceleration in the second half of the year, placing heavy execution risk on the upcoming fall enrollment season. 𝗙𝗬𝟮𝟲 𝗡𝗲𝘁 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗲-𝗢𝗳𝗳𝘀: $𝟯𝟰𝟱 - $𝟯𝟴𝟱 𝗺𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗼𝗻 Stable. Maintained from prior guidance. Q1 printed at $89 million, pacing cleanly toward the midpoint. Management maintains that rising early-stage delinquencies have not yet translated into higher terminal loss rates. 𝗙𝗬𝟮𝟲 𝗡𝗼𝗻-𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗘𝘅𝗽𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗲𝘀: $𝟳𝟱𝟬 - $𝟳𝟴𝟬 𝗺𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗼𝗻 Stable. Maintained from prior guidance. The Q1 print of $171M paces perfectly to the low end of this range, confirming the strategic commitment to increased marketing spend for PLUS reform capture. — • — • — 𝗞𝗲𝘆 𝗤𝘂𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗖𝗼𝗹𝗹𝗮𝗽𝘀𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗚𝗮𝗶𝗻 𝗼𝗻 𝗦𝗮𝗹𝗲 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗶𝗻 The gain on sale margin dropped from 9.4% to 4.4% year-over-year. Is this severe compression the permanent new normal under the KKR private credit partnership, or an artifact of the specific mix of seasoned vs. new loans sold this quarter? 𝗕𝘂𝘆𝗯𝗮𝗰𝗸 𝗣𝗮𝗰𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗘𝘅𝗵𝗮𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 You consumed $259 million in buybacks in Q1 alone, utilizing more than half of the $500 million authorization for 2026. Without this massive tailwind in the back half of the year, how will you sustain EPS growth? 𝗖𝗼𝗿𝗲 𝗡𝗲𝘁 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗜𝗻𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝗴𝗻𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 Despite a 5% increase in originations and stable Net Interest Margins, core Net Interest Income was perfectly flat YoY. At what point does the new origination volume outpace the runoff and loan sales to actually expand the balance sheet's earning power? 𝗗𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗾𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 Delinquencies have crept up nearly 40 basis points year-over-year to 3.98%. Given the macroeconomic ambiguity you frequently cite, what is preventing these early-stage delinquencies from rolling into your net charge-offs later this year?

@compound248 omnibus hearing tomorrow. tick tock

Spirit Airlines (fka $SAVE) sits on the edge of what is effectively a third bankruptcy in two years. If only there had been a private market solution to this problem...

CFOs realizing that their AI token budget is going to be higher than the salaries of the people they laid off