David Bernstein

@JeremyBenAmi @RoKhanna There’s the fact that israel is an alley and a democracy, and the PA is a kleptocracy whose population mostly hates the US.

One more thought about @RoKhanna's trip to the West Bank. Some in the pro-Israel advocacy world are expressing outrage that the Congressman spent this visit hearing only the Palestinian side of a complex story. That's a curious criticism. For decades, AIPAC and other organizations have sponsored trips to Israel that exclusively presented the Israeli narrative. Rarely if ever did participants spend any time in Palestinian communities in the West Bank or engage seriously with the realities of occupation. At @jstreetdotorg, we've long believed that's a mistake. The only way to understand this conflict is to hear from both peoples: Israelis living under the threat of terror and war, and Palestinians living under occupation. That's why our delegations meet with leaders and communities on both sides of the Green Line. If you believe every trip should present a balanced picture, I agree. But that standard should apply consistently - not only when someone chooses to spend one trip listening to Palestinians after decades in which the Palestinian experience was too often left out altogether.

Federal literacy tests for voting? Doesn’t @TheAtlantic employ fact-checkers, or at least have editors with basic knowledge of American history?

@yeselson @RogerFord163776 And don’t do anything else Jewish, and haven’t during their adult lives.

@ProfDBernstein @RogerFord163776 Number one, clearly not, just as with any previous cohort. Number, slightly closer call, but probably no. But you want to eliminate secular Jews too, ie, Jewish parent, don’t attend synagogue or perform rituals in home. Is that right?

To understand the controversy over who should be polled to reflect Jewish American opinion, you have to understand how sociologists define the Jewish community. First, there are “core“ Jews, 4-5 Million, who are involved in Judaism in some way, 1/

@Shuey_Mirkin @JeffreyLax and breaking the law to weaken your political opponents ?

@ProfDBernstein @JeffreyLax Following the normal process of law and listening to the decision of a court is indeed not what normal people wouod define as a scandal. In tan suit lala land Obama saying good morning was considered a scandal and Trump making 2 billion dollars is not. Hope this helps.

One of the many scandals of the supposedly scandal-free Obama administration. You’ve never heard of it for the same reason you never heard about many of the other scandals, it didn’t fit the media narrative.

@ilangoldenberg what is the basis for your rather heroic assumption that after 90 years of rejecting it, the Palestinian side will suddenly not only accept partition, but accept it as a final and peaceful resolution to the conflict?

@MaytalKowalski No, you don’t. There is no obligation to be suicidal, if the Palestinian side is not inclined to make peace, they can live with a combination of local self-government under the PA with Israeli military oversight.

Then you'll need to come up with another way to end the occupation of Palestinian land. If there is a better solution than two states, propose it. But you don't get to occupy and annex another people/land because you're scared.

I recently returned from a week in Israel and the West Bank leading a J Street delegation of former national security officials. My biggest conclusion from the trip is that the United States has more leverage over Israel than at any point I can remember in my career. But there is also a real danger that we will squander it if we fail to use it wisely. I came back with a new determination to turn that leverage into actual change on the ground that benefits Israeli, Palestinian, and American interests. Unprecedented U.S. Leverage For decades, Israeli leaders believed that whatever disagreements they had with an American administration would eventually pass. They could wait out a president who decided to press them on the Palestinian issue. Bipartisan support in Congress would be there no matter what. The American public would remain broadly pro-Israel. The relationship itself was never truly at risk. That assumption no longer exists. Across Israel's political spectrum – particularly among leaders outside Netanyahu's coalition – there is growing recognition that the relationship has fundamentally changed. They understand that Democrats have had enough of Netanyahu and his extremist partners and will no longer support a blank check. But they also see JD Vance sharply criticizing Israeli policy, and they read public opinion polls showing the dramatic drop in Israel’s standing among American voters – not just Democrats but also independents and young Republicans. Many Israeli policymakers now believe that if Israel continues on its current course, the United States could eventually walk away – a possibility that matters far more than whether a particular shipment of precision-guided munitions is delayed. Fear of a clean break therefore gives current and future American leaders unprecedented leverage over Israeli actions. But the unprecedented pressure on the relationship also comes at a time of unprecedented positive leverage. Arab governments have never been more interested in integrating Israel into the region through economic cooperation, security partnerships, and normalization. The continued tensions with Iran and the effectiveness and importance of regional ballistic missile and rocket defense during recent wars have hammered this point home. Meanwhile, the horrors of October 7 and the destabilizing effects of the horrific subsequent war in Gaza across the Middle East also mean that these same Arab governments have never been clearer that meaningful progress on the Palestinian issue is both a prerequisite for Israel’s integration and a necessity for the regional stability they are desperate for. The same countries that can help provide Israel with enormous strategic opportunities are also insisting that the status quo is no longer acceptable. For much of my career, strategies for advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace relied largely on persuading Israeli leaders that compromise was in their own long-term enlightened self-interest. I still believe that is true. But today policymakers can go further. For the first time in decades, the United States can both impose credible negative consequences and offer meaningful positive incentives. That creates an extraordinary opportunity. There are, however, two serious risks. The first is in Israel. If Netanyahu returns to power leading another far-right coalition committed to annexation and permanent occupation, he may simply refuse to respond to American pressure. In that scenario, future Democratic administrations could conclude that the relationship itself is no longer worth preserving and begin dismantling it piece by piece. That would be a strategic failure for Israelis, Palestinians, and the United States alike. The second danger is that the level of anger in the United States is already too high and that instead of using this newfound leverage to advance policy goals, we mistakenly treat the leverage itself as the policy goal. Much of today's debate centers on how to punish Israel. But punishment is not a helpful policy objective. Leverage is simply a tool. The question is not how much pressure to apply. The question is what outcome that pressure can achieve. So let’s actually lay out a strategy. A New Strategy and Four Lines of Effort The objective should be clear: a secure Israel at peace, and fully integrated into the Middle East, living alongside an independent Palestinian state also secure and at peace. A true "23-state solution" in which Israel enjoys normal relations with every Arab state while Palestinians finally achieve freedom. Such an outcome would create a more stable and prosperous Middle East, reduce the need for American military involvement, strengthen regional cooperation against common threats, and finally remove one of the most persistent strategic challenges confronting U.S. foreign policy. Achieving that objective requires using American leverage as part of an integrated strategy rather than treating leverage as an end in itself. Here are four key lines of effort to do that. 1. Replace Hamas with a Better Governing and Security Alternative in Gaza The first priority is replacing Hamas—not simply militarily, but politically and institutionally. The broad outlines of the 20-point plan put forward by the United States and agreed to by Hamas, Israel, and the international community through UN Security Council Resolution 2803 are sound. Building alternative Palestinian security forces, developing an alternative governing authority, gradually replacing Hamas over time, and bringing regional partners into reconstruction and stabilization all reflect ideas that many of us worked on early in the war. The problem is execution. First, Israel continues to insist on complete disarmament of Hamas before any meaningful political process begins. Historically, disarmament processes simply do not work that way. They occur incrementally through negotiated, step-by-step arrangements in which security improvements, withdrawals, governance transitions, and disarmament reinforce one another. Second, the current approach largely excludes the Palestinian Authority because Netanyahu refuses to strengthen any institution that could eventually reunify Gaza and the West Bank politically. Yet despite all of its shortcomings, the PA remains the only viable governing alternative to Hamas. Third, the Board of Peace has become an unnecessary distraction. It duplicates institutions that already exist, undermines international legitimacy, fuels suspicion among aid organizations, and reflects domestic political priorities in Washington more than practical requirements inside Gaza. If these problems are corrected, a realistic pathway exists: build alternative Palestinian security forces, support alternative governance, gradually replace Hamas, and bring Arab states into reconstruction while creating incentives for Hamas to relinquish power over time. The United States has substantial leverage to make this happen. The positive leverage toward Israel is enormous. A credible Gaza strategy unlocks Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, and others as partners in reconstruction and opens the door to broader regional integration, as they all have an interest in working together to improve the situation. The negative leverage is equally clear. If Israel continues to actively undermine this strategy, Washington can use a series of tools, including restricting the use of American weapons in Gaza, limiting future offensive weapons transfers, not shielding Israel diplomatically from the international consequences of its actions in Gaza, and walking away from automatic U.S. protection in forums such as the UN, the ICC, and the ICJ. If Israeli policy directly contradicts American policy, the United States should not bear the diplomatic costs of defending it. There is leverage on Hamas as well. Hamas is dramatically weaker than it was before October 7. Regional actors – including Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and others with influence over the organization – can increase pressure for gradual disarmament and relinquishment of governance. They are far more likely to do so if they see both American leadership and genuine Israeli willingness to pursue a realistic political end state where Palestinians govern themselves. Most importantly, the Palestinian people themselves would gain reconstruction, improved living conditions, restored governance, and a pathway toward a fundamentally different future. 2. Reverse Israel's Expansion into the West Bank This line of effort will require the greatest use of negative leverage on Israel. A more moderate Israeli government than Netanyahu's will likely get serious about addressing settler violence. But it is unlikely to voluntarily reverse years of settlement expansion, illegal outposts, and creeping annexation. The domestic political incentives in Israel simply are not there, and the costs are high. That means the United States must change those incentives. Congress should pass the West Bank Violence Prevention Act targeting violent settlers as well as the organizations and institutions that finance and enable them. Many of these organizations are also some of the most important in supporting the overall settler movement. A Democratic administration can also go further, using executive orders to levy broader financial sanctions tied to illegal construction in the West Bank, restrictions on commerce involving settlements, and coordinated action with European partners. Financial sanctions are particularly powerful because once the United States designates entities, international financial institutions – including Israeli banks – cut off banking relationships or become reluctant to conduct business with them. The objective is not symbolic punishment. It is to make continued expansion economically and politically unsustainable. This is one area where sustained coercive leverage is likely to be indispensable as long as it is targeted not at all of Israel but at its activities beyond the Green Line. 3. Pursue a Nation-Building Strategy with the Palestinian Authority Replacing Hamas is impossible without building a credible Palestinian governing alternative. The Palestinian Authority remains deeply flawed, but it is also the only institution capable of eventually governing both the West Bank and Gaza. That requires substantial reform and support. I’ve laid it out in much greater detail with my colleague Liam Hamama, but here’s the basic gist. The PA has already committed to and should move forward with legislative elections later this year and presidential elections thereafter. Participation should be conditioned on renunciation of violence, forcing Hamas either to moderate or to exclude itself from the political process. If carried out freely and fairly, elections would infuse real legitimacy back into the political system. The PA must also continue reforms already underway under Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa, including ending the prisoner payment system that has long poisoned the U.S.-Palestinian relationship, improving governance, strengthening transparency, and building more effective institutions. This is fundamentally a state-building project. Here, American leverage is largely positive – but that is only because thus far we’ve used almost exclusively negative leverage with the PA, so many of the positive incentives would involve undoing penalties that already exist if the PA changes its behavior. If free and fair elections occur, the United States should recognize the state of Palestine. As reforms proceed, the United States should restore diplomatic engagement, revisit legislative restrictions that unnecessarily constrain relations with the PLO, encourage broader international recognition of Palestinian statehood, and mobilize substantial financial assistance alongside Saudi Arabia, France, and other partners. Those benefits, however, should remain conditioned on continued reform. That’s the negative leverage. The United States also possesses important leverage over Israel to make Palestinian governance viable. Israel must stop undermining the Palestinian economy. That includes releasing Palestinian tax revenues it currently withholds, allowing Palestinian banks sustained access to the Israeli financial system, and restoring greater freedom of movement throughout the West Bank. If Israel refuses, the United States should begin imposing consequences via broader aspects of the bilateral relationship – including suspending preferential economic arrangements if Israel continues to withhold revenues, or suspending travel privileges such as the visa waiver program if Israel does nothing to improve freedom of movement for Palestinians in the West Bank. If Israel actively undermines U.S. interests by preventing the emergence of a stable Palestinian governing partner, it should not expect every other aspect of the bilateral relationship to remain untouched. 4. Integrate Israel into the Middle East The final line of effort is where America possesses its greatest positive leverage. The United States can help facilitate Israeli negotiations with Lebanon, support Israeli engagement with Syria, deepen regional missile defense cooperation, expand Israel's integration within CENTCOM, encourage better Israeli ties with Egypt and Jordan, and advance regional investment, trade, and infrastructure initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. And of course it can encourage steps toward the ultimate holy grail of Israel-Saudi normalization and Israel’s full integration into the Middle East. Regional economic integration, infrastructure development, energy cooperation, transportation links, and trade can fundamentally reshape Israel's strategic environment. The remarkable reality today is that many Arab governments want these things too. But they are equally clear that none of them are politically sustainable without meaningful progress on the Palestinian issue. The strategic logic for both Israeli-Arab cooperation against Iran and for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become stronger simultaneously after October 7. Those two objectives are no longer competing priorities. They reinforce one another. None of these four lines of effort succeeds on its own. Taken together, they point toward the same destination: Israel secure within recognized borders, fully integrated into the Middle East, alongside an independent Palestinian state. The 23-state solution. For decades, American policy assumed that if the United States embraced Israel closely enough, Israeli leaders would eventually make difficult choices voluntarily. That has obviously been proven wrong. Today, too much of the discussion has swung the other way – increasingly treating punishment of Israel as the objective itself. That also won’t work. It won’t serve American interests, and it won’t make life better for Palestinians or Israelis. America possesses more leverage over Israel – and over the Palestinians – than it has in decades. The challenge now is deciding how to use this leverage strategically, in pursuit of an outcome that advances Israeli security, Palestinian freedom, regional stability and American interests all at once.

@uspolitics1111 @ilangoldenberg The only genocidal society involved is the one that has hosted an actual genocidal, and explicitly so, government , Hamasistan in Gaza.

You cannot stop a genocidal society with all its different parties with patting them on the back and telling them please this is good for you and you impose that leverage by ordering the dismantlement of the entire illegal west bank settlements and returning to 1967 borders. If "liberal zionism" still want to be relevant (which I think it couldn't after the constant ethnic cleansing and genocide of palestinians) it needs to forcefully change things on the ground

Do you think Jews who converted to Christianity but still think of themselves as Jewish should be counted? How about people raised Christian by one Jewish and one non-Jewish parent who care about the Jewish people and Israel, but are clearly not religiously Jewish? Lines are always being drawn.

@ProfDBernstein @RogerFord163776 Ok—but then Jews, reduced to “real Jews” under this standard, are a significant smaller % of Americans. I suppose you can reduce any religious cohort to the most religiously observant. And those cohorts will indeed trend more conservative—but they will also be much smaller.

@BennyTwoScoops They already narrow things. Jews who convert to Christianity but still consider themselves to be Jews and spouses of Jews raising Jewish children who haven’t converted but who live more Jewish lives than many actual Jews are excluded.

@ProfDBernstein I think we agree that Jewishness is not neat. It’s undoubtedly a challenge in polling. I just don’t get why the solution to that would be taking a more restrictive sample. Given the diversity of the group and lack of clear “criteria,” shouldn’t the sample be similarly diverse?

My thread on Jewish public opinion research had too many typos, here it is unrolled and corrected: To understand the controversy over who should be polled to reflect Jewish American opinion, you have to understand how sociologists define the Jewish community. First, there are “core” Jews, 4-5 Million, who are involved in Judaism in some way, 1/ Even if they are not religiously observant. Then there are peripheral Jews, 2-3 million, people of at least partial Jewish ancestry who don’t participate in Judaism at all and typically say that Judaism is not their religion, but have not adopted another religion. 2/ This group is actually quite varied, includes people who never had and never will have any ties to the Jewish community, and also people who are just at a stage of life where they are alienated from Judaism and the community, but may very well return it some other point of their life. 3/ Then there is the expanded Jewish community, which includes non-Jewish people married to Jews but who are not Jewish and also people of Jewish ancestry who practice Christianity or another religion. 4/ No one counts anyone in the latter group in surveys of Jewish opinion, even if “they are Jewish enough for Hitler” and even if they are raising Jewish children with their Jewish partner. So lines are being drawn, period. 5/ Everyone counts the core Jews, usually signified as “Jews by religion.” Most surveys count the peripheral Jews, and that’s where the problem arises. 6/ Some of these folks are Jewish by any reasonable definition, and some arguably are not. 7/ In the latter group, you can have someone with a Jewish paternal grandfather, never celebrated a Jewish holiday, never had any Jewish education, but will say sure I’m a quarter of Jewish, the way someone might say that they are a quarter Irish, and might even say they are culturally Jewish, especially if they grew up around Jews. 8/ Sociologists are inclined to include such people in their surveys of Americans Jewish life, which is fine, because sociologically speaking, they do reflect something important. 9/ But it’s quite a stretch to say that their views reflect American Jewish opinion in some way when they aren’t meaningfully members of the community. 10/ It so happens that people of Jewish ancestry, partial or otherwise, who have not adopted another religion but who don’t participate in the Jewish collective in anyway or very left-leaning cohort, much more than the Jewish community as a whole, 10/ They on average have standard left-leaning views on everything, including Israel, to which they have no particular ties, given that they don’t participate in Jewish life. 11/ In short, the extended Jewish community, which leans conservative, isn’t included in polls, but peripheral Jews, about 1/3 of all Jews and who lean distinctly left, are. Of that 1/3, probably half or so are Jewish solely by genetic happenstance, along with their failure to convert to another religion. 12/ While sociologically interesting, it’s quite a stretch to say that they are reflective of specifically Jewish opinion, which logically includes onlypeople whose Jewish identity has some impact on their lives beyond mere knowledge of their ancestry. 13/ But what I really want to emphasize is that every single survey of Jewish does draw a line somewhere, no one includes all 11 or so million people in the “broad” sociological Jewish population, everyone includes “core” Jews, and the only question is where if it all to draw the line among people who say that Judaism is not their religion, but have ethnic Jewish ancestry. IMHO, if you haven’t attended any sort of Jewish event or read any Jewish periodical or book or celebrate led any Jewish holiday in your adult life, you should presumptively not be counted for Jewish opinion surveys, regardless of whether I or anyone else would consider you and you a Jew for other purposes. /end

@grok @jeremiahscholl If it affected groups across the political spectrum, which groups with left-wing views on Israel did it affect?

The lost emails are a real transparency failure that rightly raises questions. TIGTA specifically investigated the hard drive crash and 2014 backup tape erasures, concluding there was no evidence of willful destruction or any directive to hide information from Congress or investigators. Extensive reviews of other IRS records, recovered emails (over 1,000 additional ones found), witness accounts, and internal documents by TIGTA, House Oversight, Senate committees, and the Obama DOJ found no top-down political directive from the White House or appointees. Both the 2013 and 2017 TIGTA audits attributed the inappropriate screening to management lapses and inconsistent criteria that affected groups across the political spectrum over years—not a targeted conspiracy. The gaps prevent total certainty, but the available evidence points to bureaucratic overreach, not a hidden order.

@grok @jeremiahscholl @grok, how do we know who ordered what when many of the documents were illegally destroyed

@RepCasar He’s lying.

Unacceptable. I’m grateful to Rep. Khanna for speaking out and calling attention to the deplorable conditions in the West Bank. I’m glad he is safe. America must stop funding this insanity.

@grok @jeremiahscholl if there had been such a directive, the Evidence would be in the “lost” emails.

Even with gaps from Lois Lerner's lost 2009-2011 emails and the improper March 2014 erasure of 422 backup tapes (TIGTA confirmed no evidence of willful intent to obstruct or directives to hide info), substantial records remain. TIGTA's audit documented inappropriate keyword screening by Cincinnati staff under her DC division's oversight, recovered 1,000+ additional emails, and found no top-down political orders from the White House or appointees—attributing it to mismanagement. Other employees' emails, internal BOLO lists, and settlements like Z Street (IRS apology for viewpoint-based delays on a pro-Israel group) corroborate the improper scrutiny. Full picture is incomplete, but probes consistently showed bureaucratic overreach over presidential directive.

@RoKhanna @USAmbIsrael How about recognizing that being an American Congressman puts you above the law elsewhere when you wish to grandstand creating danger to others?

How about being on Team America Greg and calling on @USAmbIsrael to demand that the IDF soldiers & violent settlers who threatened & detained American passport holders should face consequences. I would be calling for that if you had been in our shoes.

@ptkrje It’s not do unacceptable to Palestinians that they are willing to give up genocidal irredentism to change it.

@ptkrje the So-called international community has been completely impotent re disarming Hamas and Hezbollah. so what makes you think it’s willing and able to enforce a solution when disarming those grouos would be a prerequisite?

@MiguelMadeira11 because he said not that a particular individual was bought, but that any Democrat who supports Israel is presumptively bought

@ProfDBernstein What the connection between saying "X supports Israel because he was bought" and anti-semitism? You will consider "Y supports Qatar because she was bought" islamophobia or anti-Arabism?

The Nexus Project exists to try to make it very difficult to accuse “antizionists” of antisemitism, to raise the burden of proof well beyond what its progressive Founders would demand for any other type of racism. Yet even its poobahs can’t exonerate El-Sayed’s antisemitic rhetoric.

@LarryMishel @realDavidKatzin displaced persons from a war typically return when the war ends the war never ended, there was only an armistice.

@ProfDBernstein @realDavidKatzin somewhat true. You neglect that Israel blocked refugees from returning, whether they had left voluntarily or not. And there were many forceful, intentional displacements. But, yes, this emerged from a true civil war and an invasion of 5 nations' armies.

"We depopulated your towns and villages, built new cities on top of them and gave them new names. But look! We also write the new names in your script, so you'll know what to call them now too!"